Post by mdenney on Mar 4, 2007 14:19:11 GMT -5
[FN344]. Id. at 300, 310. The Attorney General responded to Reverdy Johnson's arguments that the fifth and sixth
amendments required that the defendants be indicted by grand jury and tried by petit jury by distinguishing between "crimes,"
which fell under the protection of those amendments, and "offences," which did not. Id. at 312-13.
[FN345]. Trial of Henry Wirz, reprinted in H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 23, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1868).
[FN346]. Id. at 10.
[FN347]. Id. at 726-28.
[FN348]. Id. at 805, 809.
[FN349]. See Proclamation by the President, supra note 340. At least one state court had previously addressed questions
43 STNLR 13 FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY Page 58
43 Stan. L. Rev. 13
(Cite as: 43 Stan. L. Rev. 13)
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
about the validity of military trials of civilians in time of war. Smith v. Shaw, 12 Johns. 257 (N.Y. 1815). Shaw brought an
action for assault and battery and false imprisonment based on his arrest and detention by the military. Shaw had been
charged with, among other things, exciting insurrection and being a spy. Chief Judge Thompson, speaking for the New York
Supreme Court, readily found that, because he was an American citizen, Shaw could not be charged as a spy. Therefore, he
could not be brought before a court-martial for trial. Id. at 265.
[FN350]. See Proclamation by the President, supra note 340. Despite the suspension of the writ, many federal district courts
entertained petitions for writs of habeas corpus and demanded responses from the military. If they responded at all, the
military commanders simply relied upon the President's suspension of the privilege. See J. RANDALL, supra note 296, at
157-63. A few courts upheld the authority of the military to make the arrests. See, e.g., Ex parte Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas.
874, 924 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1863) (No. 16,816), cert. denied, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863); Ex parte Field, 9 F. Cas. 1, 8
(C.C.D. Vt. 1862) (No. 4761). Other courts determined the arrests to be unlawful and issued writs of habeas corpus, but the
commanders were under orders not to obey the writs and the courts had no ability to enforce their judgments. See J.
RANDALL, supra note 296, at 157-63. Some judges issued opinions denouncing the failure to obey the court. See, e.g., Ex
parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). At least one judge simply acknowledged the difficult
position of the marshal who held the prisoner, caught between two masters, and declined to hold him in contempt. Ex parte
Benedict, 3 F. Cas. 159, 173-74 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 1292).
[FN351]. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). The Court was earlier presented with the opportunity to rule on the
validity of military commission trials of citizens of the Union in Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863).
Perhaps uncomfortable with the possibility of undermining the President's war effort, the Court declined to decide the
question whether the military commission had jurisdiction over Vallandigham. The Court ruled instead that neither the
United States Constitution nor federal statutes granted the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction to review military trials by
writ of certiorari. Id. at 251-52. Although Vallandigham had sought a writ of habeas corpus from the United States Circuit
Court, which was denied, he apparently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the military
proceedings rather than to review the denial of habeas corpus relief. See J. RANDALL, supra note 296, at 178-79. In Ex parte
Milligan, the defendant instead sought review of the denial of the writ of habeas corpus, and the Court agreed that there was
jurisdiction to hear the claim. See text accompanying notes 352-356 infra.
[FN352]. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
[FN353]. Id. at 121, 130.
[FN354]. Id. at 121-27.
[FN355]. Id. at 126.
[FN356]. Id. at 131.
[FN357]. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
[FN358]. Id. at 28-29. The primary statutory authorization was contained in the 1920 revision of the Articles of War. Act of
June 4, 1920, ch. 227, 41 Stat. 759. Article 12 specified that general courts-martial would have the power to try "any other
person [not subject to the Articles of War] who by the law of war is subject to trial by military tribunals." Id. at 789. Article
15 specified that the Articles of War "shall not be construed as depriving military commissions . . . of concurrent jurisdiction
in respect of offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be triable by such military commissions." Id. at
790. Congress thus did not expressly define the jurisdiction of military commissions but instead recognized the law of war as
providing a separate source of authority for military tribunals.
[FN359]. 317 U.S. at 29.
[FN360]. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
[FN361]. 317 U.S. at 29-30. The Quirin Court relied upon earlier decisions that had established the flexibility accorded
Congress in defining offenses against the law of nations. See Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232 (1844);
43 STNLR 13 FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY Page 59
43 Stan. L. Rev. 13
(Cite as: 43 Stan. L. Rev. 13)
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 40-41 (1826); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 158-62 (1820). In
1867, perhaps in response to protests about the military arrests and trials during the Civil War or to civil suits against the
officers who had made those arrests, Congress attempted to validate the actions of the military after the fact:
ll acts, proclamations, and orders of the President [from March 4, 1861 to July 1, 1866] . . . respecting martial law,
military trials by courts-martial or military commissions, or the arrest, imprisonment and trial of persons charged with
participation in the late rebellion against the United States . . . and all proceedings and acts done or had by courts-martial or
military commissions . . . are hereby approved in all respects, legalized and made valid . . . .
Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 155, 14 Stat. 432. To the extent that this Act attempted to make punishable acts that were not
otherwise unlawful at the time, it was condemned as an ex post facto law. See In re Murphy, 17 F. Cas. 1030, 1032 (C.C.D.
Mo. 1867) (No. 9947). Under the ruling in Murphy, if the military commission trying the Dakota went beyond its authority,
the Act of Mar. 2, 1867, could not legitimize those trials.
[FN362]. Jecker v. Montgomery, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 110, 112 (1855). See also cases cited in note 321 supra.
[FN363]. Jecker, 59 U.S. at 112.
[FN364]. See generally Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819, 825-
26 (1989).
[FN365]. Id. at 825-26.
[FN366]. 11 U.S. 31, 7 Cranch 32 (1812).
[FN367]. Id. at 34.
amendments required that the defendants be indicted by grand jury and tried by petit jury by distinguishing between "crimes,"
which fell under the protection of those amendments, and "offences," which did not. Id. at 312-13.
[FN345]. Trial of Henry Wirz, reprinted in H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 23, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1868).
[FN346]. Id. at 10.
[FN347]. Id. at 726-28.
[FN348]. Id. at 805, 809.
[FN349]. See Proclamation by the President, supra note 340. At least one state court had previously addressed questions
43 STNLR 13 FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY Page 58
43 Stan. L. Rev. 13
(Cite as: 43 Stan. L. Rev. 13)
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
about the validity of military trials of civilians in time of war. Smith v. Shaw, 12 Johns. 257 (N.Y. 1815). Shaw brought an
action for assault and battery and false imprisonment based on his arrest and detention by the military. Shaw had been
charged with, among other things, exciting insurrection and being a spy. Chief Judge Thompson, speaking for the New York
Supreme Court, readily found that, because he was an American citizen, Shaw could not be charged as a spy. Therefore, he
could not be brought before a court-martial for trial. Id. at 265.
[FN350]. See Proclamation by the President, supra note 340. Despite the suspension of the writ, many federal district courts
entertained petitions for writs of habeas corpus and demanded responses from the military. If they responded at all, the
military commanders simply relied upon the President's suspension of the privilege. See J. RANDALL, supra note 296, at
157-63. A few courts upheld the authority of the military to make the arrests. See, e.g., Ex parte Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas.
874, 924 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1863) (No. 16,816), cert. denied, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863); Ex parte Field, 9 F. Cas. 1, 8
(C.C.D. Vt. 1862) (No. 4761). Other courts determined the arrests to be unlawful and issued writs of habeas corpus, but the
commanders were under orders not to obey the writs and the courts had no ability to enforce their judgments. See J.
RANDALL, supra note 296, at 157-63. Some judges issued opinions denouncing the failure to obey the court. See, e.g., Ex
parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). At least one judge simply acknowledged the difficult
position of the marshal who held the prisoner, caught between two masters, and declined to hold him in contempt. Ex parte
Benedict, 3 F. Cas. 159, 173-74 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 1292).
[FN351]. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). The Court was earlier presented with the opportunity to rule on the
validity of military commission trials of citizens of the Union in Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863).
Perhaps uncomfortable with the possibility of undermining the President's war effort, the Court declined to decide the
question whether the military commission had jurisdiction over Vallandigham. The Court ruled instead that neither the
United States Constitution nor federal statutes granted the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction to review military trials by
writ of certiorari. Id. at 251-52. Although Vallandigham had sought a writ of habeas corpus from the United States Circuit
Court, which was denied, he apparently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the military
proceedings rather than to review the denial of habeas corpus relief. See J. RANDALL, supra note 296, at 178-79. In Ex parte
Milligan, the defendant instead sought review of the denial of the writ of habeas corpus, and the Court agreed that there was
jurisdiction to hear the claim. See text accompanying notes 352-356 infra.
[FN352]. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
[FN353]. Id. at 121, 130.
[FN354]. Id. at 121-27.
[FN355]. Id. at 126.
[FN356]. Id. at 131.
[FN357]. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
[FN358]. Id. at 28-29. The primary statutory authorization was contained in the 1920 revision of the Articles of War. Act of
June 4, 1920, ch. 227, 41 Stat. 759. Article 12 specified that general courts-martial would have the power to try "any other
person [not subject to the Articles of War] who by the law of war is subject to trial by military tribunals." Id. at 789. Article
15 specified that the Articles of War "shall not be construed as depriving military commissions . . . of concurrent jurisdiction
in respect of offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be triable by such military commissions." Id. at
790. Congress thus did not expressly define the jurisdiction of military commissions but instead recognized the law of war as
providing a separate source of authority for military tribunals.
[FN359]. 317 U.S. at 29.
[FN360]. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
[FN361]. 317 U.S. at 29-30. The Quirin Court relied upon earlier decisions that had established the flexibility accorded
Congress in defining offenses against the law of nations. See Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232 (1844);
43 STNLR 13 FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY Page 59
43 Stan. L. Rev. 13
(Cite as: 43 Stan. L. Rev. 13)
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 40-41 (1826); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 158-62 (1820). In
1867, perhaps in response to protests about the military arrests and trials during the Civil War or to civil suits against the
officers who had made those arrests, Congress attempted to validate the actions of the military after the fact:
ll acts, proclamations, and orders of the President [from March 4, 1861 to July 1, 1866] . . . respecting martial law,
military trials by courts-martial or military commissions, or the arrest, imprisonment and trial of persons charged with
participation in the late rebellion against the United States . . . and all proceedings and acts done or had by courts-martial or
military commissions . . . are hereby approved in all respects, legalized and made valid . . . .
Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 155, 14 Stat. 432. To the extent that this Act attempted to make punishable acts that were not
otherwise unlawful at the time, it was condemned as an ex post facto law. See In re Murphy, 17 F. Cas. 1030, 1032 (C.C.D.
Mo. 1867) (No. 9947). Under the ruling in Murphy, if the military commission trying the Dakota went beyond its authority,
the Act of Mar. 2, 1867, could not legitimize those trials.
[FN362]. Jecker v. Montgomery, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 110, 112 (1855). See also cases cited in note 321 supra.
[FN363]. Jecker, 59 U.S. at 112.
[FN364]. See generally Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819, 825-
26 (1989).
[FN365]. Id. at 825-26.
[FN366]. 11 U.S. 31, 7 Cranch 32 (1812).
[FN367]. Id. at 34.