|
Post by mdenney on Sept 2, 2007 13:32:20 GMT -5
154 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE, OR CHAPLIN HILLS, KY. Oct. 8, 1862.
Eeport of Brig. Gen. James B. Steedman, Commanding Third Brigade.
HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION, ARMY or THE OHIO,
CAMP, NEAR CRAB ORCHARD, KY., Oct. 19, 1862.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report, pursuant to Special Orders, Ko. 14, from corps headquarters, that late in the afternoon of the 8th instant, having been ordered with my brigade to support Major General McCook, my command, in obedience to the orders of that officer, took position on the right of the di vision commanded by Brigadier General Eousseau, where it was exposed to a quite severe fire of shot and shell and some musketry without being able to reply, except with the artillery attached (Company I, Fourth IT. S. Artillery, com manded by Lieut. Frank G. Smith), which opened and fired with eifect for about forty-five minutes, dismounting two guns, exploding one caisson, and effectually silencing the battery against which its fire was directed.
The casualties of this command were: Thirty-fifth Ohio Volunteers, Col. F. VanDerveer commanding Lieut. Joseph S. Claypoole and 3 men taken prisoners (since paroled for exchange) ; Ninth Ohio Volunteers, Lieut. Col. Charles Joseph commanding 1 man severely wounded and 2 men taken prisoners (since paroled); Eighty-seventh Indiana Volunteers, Col. K. G. Shryock commanding 2 men wounded, 1 severely; Eighteenth IT. S. Infantry, Maj. F. Townsend commanding 3 men wounded, 1 severely; Second Minnesota Volunteers, Col. James George commanding 1 man taken prisoner; Company I, Fourth IT. S. Artillery, Lieut. F. G. Smith commanding 1 man severely wounded and 1 man taken prisoner (since paroled); Lieut. Eichard Schneider, serving on my staff, captured while conveying orders on the field (since paroled for exchange).
I avail myself of this opportunity to reassure you of my entire confidence in the officers and men of my command.
With esteem, respectfully yours,
JAMES B. STEEDMAN,
Brigadier General, Commanding Third Brigade. Capt. J. EDWARD STACY,
A. A. A. G., Third Corps, Army of the Ohio.
EXTRACT FROM EEPORT OF CAPT. EBENEZER GAY, SIXTEENTH UNITED STATES INFANTRY, INSPECTOR AND CHIEF OF CAVALRY, INCLUDING OPERATIONS OCTOBER 7.
LEBANON, KY., Oct. 21, 1862.
The Ninth Pennsylvania was now ordered to take position to the left and front, in open ground, in order to ascertain the situation of the enemy s
BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE. 155
batteries. They had proceeded about a quarter of a mile when the enemy opened upon them from two batteries and his position became known. I placed two pieces of artillery, under Captain Hotchkiss, in position opposite these batteries, and opened fire upon them. In twenty minutes they were silenced and the enemy was driven from the wooded hill. Observing that the enemy were showing them selves farther to my left and front, I moved forward to a more advanced position, near a fork of Chaplin creek, placing my battery in position on a knoll near it, and throwing out portions of the Ninth Pennsylvania and Second Michigan as skirmishers in advance. The enemy s batteries were again silenced here, and his cavalry, broken and disordered, were driven toward Harrodsburg. * * *
Too much praise cannot be awarded Captain Hotchkiss [Second Minnesota Battery] and his men for their brave and effective services.
EXTRACT FROM REPORT OF BRIG. GEN. LOVELL, II. EOUSSEAU, COMMANDIN&
THIRD DIVISION.
HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, ARMY OF THE OHIO,
IN THE FIELD, Oct. 17, 1862.
* * * On the morning of the 8th, on the march, General McCook showed me an order of General Buell, in which it was said he should move cautiously on approaching Perry ville, as the enemy would probably make resistance in that vicinity.
When near Chaplin Hills battle ground, and perhaps 3 miles from Perryville, the report of artillery to our right and front was heard, and General McCook ordered me to advance my cavalry and infantry in reconnaissance, leaving the artillery on an eminence in the road. I moved on with the infantry, preceded by six companies of the Second Kentucky Cavalry (Col. Buckner Board), and when near the field of battle Colonel Board reported the enemy in sight. I halted the column and sent back for General McCook, and he and I rode forward to the front, examined the ground, and chose a line of battle, to be adopted if the enemy advanced upon us, and soon after moved up to Bussell s house, on the hill over looking the field, and there halted the head of the column. While there the artillery (two pieces) of Captain Hotchkiss battery, with Gay s cavalry, con tinued to fire, and small-arms were also heard.
Gay addressed a note to me, saying he had been pursuing the enemy all the morning, was pressing him then, and much needed a regiment of infantry to sup port his pieces. I ordered the Forty-second Indiana Eegiment to do so, and rode forward to his pieces and found him and Captain Hotchkiss there. The enemy was just disappearing in the woods far to the front, and out of the range of Hotchkiss ordinary brass pieces. I then ordered up Loonds, with two of his Parrott guns, and he shelled the woods, the enemy now and then appearing, until finally he was no longer to be seen, and the firing was ordered to be stopped. Everything indicated that the enemy had retired and it was so believed. General McCook rode off to see General Buell, understood to be 2 or 3 miles to our right.
156 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
EXTRACTS FROM REPORT OF BRIG. GEN. EGBERT B. MITCHELL, COMMANDING NINTH DIVISION, INCLUDING SKIRMISH OCTOBER 7.
HEADQUARTERS NINTH DIVISION, ARMY OF THE OHIO, GOODNIGHT SPRING, 2 MILES FROM PERRYVILLE, KY., Oct. 9, 1862.
At daylight on the morning of the 8th I sent forward a section of Captain Hotchkiss Second Minnesota Battery to relieve the section of Captain Pinney s battery, which, under Lieutenant Hill, did such brilliant work the day before.
At 2 p. M. of the 8th, in obedience to orders received from Major General Gilbert, commanding corps, I advanced my division on the road to a point desig nated by General Gilbert, where I formed my brigades as follows:
The Thirtieth Brigade, Colonel Gooding, Twenty-second Indiana Volunteers, commanding, composed of the Twenty-second Indiana Volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel Keith; Fifty-ninth Illinois Volunteers, Maj. J. C. Winters; Seventy -fourth and Seventy-fifth Illinois Volunteers, commanded respectively by Lieutenant Colonel Kerr and Lieutenant Colonel Bennett, and the Fifth Wisconsin Battery, Capt. O. F. Pinney, on the left of the road.
The Thirty-first Brigade, Colonel Carlin, Thirty-eighth Illinois Volunteers, commanding, composed of the Twenty-first and Thirty-eighth Illinois Volunteers, commanded respectively by Colonel Alexander and Major Gilmer; the Fifteenth Wisconsin Volunteers, Colonel Heg; the One Hundred and First Ohio Volunteers, Colonel Stem, and two sections of Captain Hotchkiss Second Minnesota Battery, commanded by Lieutenant Dawley (Captain Hotchkiss, with one section, being engaged with General McCook on the left), I formed on the right of the road, on a wooded eminence, the men under cover, this brigade being in rear and within supporting distance of General Sheridan s division, which was then engaging the enemy in front.
The Thirty-second Brigade, Colonel Caldwell, Eighty-first Indiana Volunteers, commanding, was formed in rear of the Thirty-first Brigade, Colonel Caldwell s brigade comprising the following regiments and battery: Twenty-fifth and Thir ty-fifth Illinois Volunteers, commanded by Lieutenant Colonels McClelland and Chandler; the Eighth Kansas, Lieutenant Colonel Martin; the Eighty-first Indiana Volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel Timberlake, and the Eighth Wisconsin Battery, Captain Carpenter. * * *
On the morning of the 9th a force of rebel cavalry was seen winding from the enemy s left and evidently proceeding toward the Harrodsburg turnpike. I di rected Hotchkiss battery to fire upon them, which was done with good effect, the enemy rapidly retreating. I then advanced with my division to this point, seeing on every side indications of the enemy s precipitate retreat.
TUSCUMBIA, ALA., -July 15, 1862. Hon. I. DONNELLY,
Lieutenant Governor,
DEAR SIR: In company with Captain West, of our cavalry, who, at the in stance of Major Brackett, has accompanied me ever since I passed by the camp
EECONNAISSANCE TO CHARLESTOWN. 157
at Humboldt, I reached this place night before last, by railroad from Corinth, distance about sixty miles east. Before breakfast (that is the time to do your work here), we walked to the camp of our Second Begiment, about a mile from town, on a salubrious and picturesque elevation and adjoining the camp of Col. (now General) Eobert McCook s Ohio regiment.
I was surprised to find the men and the officers of the regiment so well. There are from 570 to 600 effective men on the rolls more than the average strength of regiments so long in service. The colonel, lieutenant colonel, and major are with the regiment, well and in fine spirits, and the same can also be said of the company officers.
Doctors Tollman and Wharton are giving all attention to the few sick with them. There are but ten in the regimental hospital. Eighty-eight are in other hospitals.
We spent the day very pleasantly there. This morning we returned to town, and by the train from Decatur had the first information of the unfortunate affair at Murfreesborough, and further that the bridges on the road beyond Decatur were destroyed. So I am compelled to abandon my trip eastward by Murfrees borough and Nashville, and at once turn towards Washington. If time allows I hope to see our brave and unfortunate men of the Third, after the transaction of necessary business at the capital.
CORINTH, July 15.
Since my return to Corinth, General Halleck informs me that the division of General Thomas, including our Second Eegiment, is ordered on to the country between this and Murfreesborough.
I leave to-night for Columbus and the East.
Very truly yours,
ALEX. EAMSEY.
RECONNAISSANCE TO CHARLESTOWN, W. VA Oct. 16-17, 1862.
Report of Col. William E. Lee, Twentieth Massachusetts Infantry, Commanding Pro visional Brigade.
HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, SECOND CORPS,
BOLIVAR, VA., Oct. 23, 1862.
CAPTAIN: In compliance with the direction of General Hanthingy, I have the honor to report the following as the operations of the troops under my command in the late reconnaissance to Charlestown, Ya. :
To the Twentieth Massachusetts, Seventh Michigan, Forty-second New York, and Fifty-ninth New York, of the brigade under my command, were added the First Minnesota and Seventy-first and Seventy -second Pennsylvania regiments. The First Minnesota, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Morgan, was de tached for skirmishers, under command of Colonel Brooke, and remained so
158 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
detached during the reconnaissance. The Twentieth Massachusetts was directed to act with Colonel Zook s brigade at the commencement of the firing, in advance, and was absent from the brigade until the return to canrp.
When advanced about one mile beyond Halltown, I received orders to move forward on the left of the road, in line of battle, and to support batteries then engaged. The Forty-second New York, the Seventh Michigan, and Seventy-first Pennsylvania were formed in line of battle, and placed under the immediate command of Col. N. J. Hall, Seventh Michigan Volunteers. The Fifty-ninth New York and Seventy-second Pennsylvania were ployed in column, in rear of the right and left flanks of the line, respectively. After some time, my command was moved, by the flank, upon the road to the suburbs of Charlestown, where the Seventh Michigan and Twenty-first Pennsylvania were left, under Colonel Hall, to support Tompkins battery on the right, and these two regiments, with the Forty-second New York, furnished pickets for the right flank of the town till withdrawn on the next day. The other three regiments were in reserve, near the road.
Upon falling back toward camp, niy command was the advance guard. The Seventh Michigan and Seventy-first Pennsylvania were deployed as skirmishers for 1, 000 yards on each side of the road, until the head of the column arrived before Halltown, when the former was relieved, and joined the brigade, which was in line of battle on the right of the road. The Seventy-first Pennsylvania remained as pickets during the night, and returned with the brigade to this place in the morning.
The troops under my command were not engaged with the enemy, but their behavior was in every respect perfectly satisfactory.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WM. R. LEE,
Colonel, Commanding Third Brigade, Second Division. Capt. WILLIAM G. MITCHELL,
Acting Assistant Adjutant General, Hanthingys Division.
BATTLE OF FREDEBICKSBURG, VA- Dec. 11 - 15, 1862.
Report of Col. George N. Morgan, First Minnesota Infantry.
CAMP, NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., Dec. 16, 1862.
In accordance with paragraph 742 of the Army Eegulations, I have the honor of submitting a report of the part taken by my regiment in the occupation of the city of Fredericksburg and the actions following thereupon.
At 2 o clock on the morning of Thursday, the llth instant, I received orders from the general commanding brigade to have my command in readiness to march at 6:30 A. M., at which time the regiment marched from this camp and formed upon the left of the brigade, and, after a march of about 2} miles, reached a
BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. 159
covered position near the point intended for crossing the Eappahannock river, and there halted until 5 p. M., awaiting the completion of the pontoon bridge. The regiment then crossed upon the bridge into the city of Fredericksburg under a heavy fire from the enemy s artillery and a dropping fire from his sharpshooters, stationed in buildings in the city. Darkness coming on, the men bivouacked in the first street from the river, the enemy during the most of the night keeping up a scattering fire from, adjacent buildings.
At daybreak on the morning of the 12th, we resumed the advance into the city and occupied it without further opposition, the enemy having retired to his works upon the eminence to the rear of the town. During this day and the night following, this regiment performed picket duty, being a portion of the time under a heavy artillery fire, in which 2 men were wounded.
On the morning of the 13th instant, they were relieved from picket, and were shortly afterward ordered to the front to take part in the action then progressing. Placed upon the right of the brigade, and marching by the right flank, the regi ment took position in front and in support of Kirby s battery, upon an elevated ridge at the right of our line of battle. In this position the regiment was, for several hours, exposed to a tremendous cannonade of the enemy, who apparently concentrated their fire upon Kirby s guns and this regiment. Fortunately we escaped serious loss, the only casualties being 1 officer and 6 enlisted men wounded. Night coming on, we were ordered to a position in the rear of and in support of the picket lines, and continued to act as such support until the evening of the 14th instant, when we were again put on picket duty on a very exposed part of the battle-field near the advanced works of the enemy. Owing to the darkness and want of acquaintance with the ground, the task of establishing the line of pickets was a difficult and delicate one. In this duty, as on all occasions, I was much indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Colvill and Major Adams for their aid rendered in a careful reconnaissance of the enemy s line of pickets in front.
I regret here also to mention the loss of a brave and intelligent soldier Cor poral Irvine, of Company D. He was sent by my order, to examine a point where the sound of intrenching tools could be heard, and which we afterwards ascertained to be within the rebel lines. As he did not return, it is presumed he was captured by the enemy.
On account of the exposed condition of our lines, the precaution was taken during the night to dig slight trenches to protect the men from the artillery fire, and also that of the enemy s sharpshooters, stationed in rifle-pits and build ings which overlooked our position. This precaution, doubtless, saved many men on the day following, when the enemy poured upon them a terrible fire, both from the front and enfilading from our right flank. This fire at one time came with such vigor and severity that three regiments upon our right fled from their position, leaving the right flank of my command completely exposed.
The conduct of my command at this trying moment is a matter of pride to me. The line officers behaved admirably, setting an example of coolness and courage which was scarcely needed by the men. Not a man showed any incli nation to follow the example of those who fled.
About 9 P. M. of the 15th instant, w r e were relieved from picket, and, after a rest of about one hour, marched across the river again, reaching this camp about midnight.
160 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
The casualties sustained by my command during the above detailed operations were: Wounded, 2 commissioned officers and 10 enlisted men; missing, 2 enlisted men. Several others received slight wounds, but not such as to disable them for duty. The conduct of both officers and men upon all occasions was emi nently praiseworthy.
I omitted to state that on the 13th, while the regiment was supporting Kirby s battery, one company (F) was detached from it, being on outpost duty still far ther to the right.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. N. MORGAN,
Colonel, First Minnesota Volunteers. Capt. JOHN J. MCCALLUM,
Acting Assistant Adjutant General.
Report of Brig. Gen. Alfred Sully, Commanding First Brigade.
HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, CAMP, NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., Dec. 18, 1862.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my brigade in the recent action at Fredericksburg:
Agreeably to orders from the division headquarters, I moved my brigade from camp, at about 6:30 A. M. on December 11, toward Fredericksburg, in the follow ing order: Thirty-fourth and Eighty-second New York Volunteers, Fifteenth Massachusetts Volunteers, Nineteenth Maine Volunteers, and First Minnesota Volunteers; in all, including officers, 2,211 strong.
After marching about 2 miles, we were halted, by orders, under a hill in front of Fredericksburg. Two companies of the Nineteenth Maine were detached, under Major Cunningham, to support a battery on this side of the river. We remained in our position until near sunset, waiting the placing of a pontoon bridge. Subsequently we crossed, under a fire of the enemy, and occupied the city.
The next morning early we moved to the outskirts of the city, on the right, beyond the position occupied by Colonel Hall s brigade, which was in advance in capturing the city, and I advanced companies of different regiments as skir mishers (the enemy s pickets retiring), and took possession of the heights near the city. The enemy disputed our movement by artillery fire, but with no serious loss on our part.
Afterward it was necessary to send forward the Eighty-second to strengthen a crest we occupied. A detachment from this regiment, under Captain Cuni- mings, was sent to a paper mill to draw off the water from a canal supplying the mill. This was executed under fire. This difficult position my brigade held until the morning of the 13th, when the attack against the enemy s works com menced. My brigade was ordered out to the support. We moved out of the city under fire, and took a position on the right of our line of battle.
BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. 161
Here the Fifteenth Massachusetts was ordered to the left, to join Colonel Owen s brigade. Major Philbrick, commanding, being wounded, the command fell upon Captain Murkland, senior officer present, Captain Watson having been taken sick; and here, also, Dr. Haven, their surgeon, in his anxiety to be near his regiment, exposed himself unnecessarily and was killed.
I was stationed on the plank road, exposed to the enemy s batteries, but I managed to find good shelter for my brigade. A battery was stationed on the right of me, supported by part of my command. By order, I soon after deployed to the right, in order to charge; but, after having taken position, this order was countermanded, and I moved to the brigade engaged on my left. I here placed my men, with orders to lie down.
I had detached the First Minnesota to support the battery on my right, as I found the enemy s infantry was threatening it. The rest of the brigade I placed in as good a position as possible to be of service, and protected at the same time from a murderous fire; but a brigade of another division was placed, closed en masse, in my rear, which drew a heavy fire of artillery, causing them to fall back and a heavy loss to my brigade. We held the position, no man falling back, till 12 o clock that night, when we were relieved by other troops.
Here I should state that the Thirty-fourth New York Volunteers found a color belonging to none of my regiments, thrown away in a most cowardly man ner by some regiment unknown. I would recommend that the Thirty -fourth be allowed to keep this color.
On the night of the 14th, the First Minnesota and Fifteenth Massachusetts were ordered on picket in a dangerous position, which they held till relieved next night; though during the day of the 15th the enemy s fire caused other regiments, on their right, not belonging to my brigade, to fall back. I was ordered, with the rest of the brigade, to the support. I placed the Nineteenth Maine on the right, under cover of houses; the Eighty-second in houses in front. Lieutenant Murphy, in command of two companies of this regiment, I sent down the road to occupy a house on the right of the First Minnesota; this they did in gallant style, under a galling fire of the enemy s sharpshooters.
I am happy to state my loss is not so severe as in many other brigades. It is as follows: Killed officers, 1; enlisted men, 14; wounded officers, 5; enlisted men, 70; missing, enlisted men, 14. Total, 104.
It would be impossible for me to make any distinction in the conduct of the regiments of the brigade; but it may, however, be my duty to especially notice the Nineteenth Eegiment Maine Volunteers, who for the first time smelt gun powder, and apparently did not dislike the smell of it.
My thanks are due to Captain McCallum, my acting assistant adjutant general, and my aide, Lieutenant King. The first was severely wounded in the action of the 12th.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
ALF. SULLY, Brigadier General. Capt. E. WHITTLESEY,
Assistant Adjutant General.
|
|
|
Post by mdenney on Sept 2, 2007 13:33:24 GMT -5
162 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
EXTRACT FROM REPORT OF BRIG. GEN. OLIVER O. HOWARD, COMMANDING- SECOND DIVISION.
HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, SECOND ARMY CORPS, CAMP, NEAR FALMOUTH, YA., Dec. 19, 1862.
# * # Again on the following night I was ordered to relieve General Sykes. I chose five regiments, and put them under command of Colonel Morgan, First Minnesota. In the night two companies of the Nineteenth Maine worked vigorously, and covered the regiments to the left of the road with rifle-pits for their skirmishers. * * *
It is unnecessary to call attention to General Sully, always cool, and especially so at the late battle, where he received a slight wound. * * *
THE SIOUX INDIAN WAR.
PAJUTAZEE, MINN., June 2, 1862.
Hon. T. J. GALBRAITH,
U. S. Agent for the Sioux Indians,
DEAR SIR: I am requested by your Dakota children to write to you. * * * Marpiya Wicasta (Cloud Man) requests me to say to you that through Wam- midupiduta (Scarlet Feather) (who returned from the buffalo region in the north west last Friday), and also in other ways, he is informed that five parties of Ehanktowan, one of them headed by a son of Inkpaduta (Scarlet Point), have started to steal horses. Some of these parties, he thinks, will come to this neigh borhood, some to the Medawakantan and some to the white settlements. He says further, that the Ehanktowan, to the number of 300 or 400 tents, are killing buf falo on the Peh (or Elm) river, a branch of James river, about due west from Lac Travers and the head of the Coteau of the Prairie, and are expecting large accessions to their numbers from the Sioux beyond the Missouri, and talk of coming here to demand of the Wahpehtonwan and Sissetonwan, pay for their lands, sold at the treaty in 1851, and say if they do not get it they will kill the Indians who dress like white people, and the white people, and burn the houses, and on this account he wishes you to have a large number of soldiers here. This is the report as told me by the Cloud Man. It is a new edition of the tale which we have had every year, except one, since 1857. But for the fact that many men from Minnesota have gone to the war, and these distant Indians hear very exagge* ated reports of this, which may lead them to think the frontiers wholly unpro tected, these reports might merit very little attention. As circumstances are, ! think they should not be wholly neglected. I think it probable from 50 to 100 Ehanktowan warriors, and possibly two or three times that number, may con*.
OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE. 163
here in two or three weeks. They will not probably come intending to fight, but prepared to do so, and as their presence is likely to cause alarm, when they see the people here are afraid of them, this may encourage them to do mischief, es pecially if they think they can do so with impunity. As it seems very desirable you should be here when the Ehanktowans arrive, I would suggest that you return as soon as you dispose of your business in St. Paul.
The Indians here say they are willing to arm and defend themselves, but that many of them are destitute of guns and ammunition. They say also that the Mdewakantowan are willing to come to their assistance, which is no doubt true in regard to many. I do not think it would be proper to ask Indians to go away from their country to fight white men, but under present circumstances I think it would be right and proper to require those who are receiving so much aid from our government, to arm and organize themselves as home guards for the defense of their own homes against other Indians. If properly armed and organized I have no doubt they are able to defend the reservation against all other Indians who can come to it. You can do more toward arming and organizing them than anyone else. Some of the civilized Indians may need to be furnished with guns, which probably can be obtained of the traders. That the Ehanktowan may know that the reports which they have heard, that all the white men and soldiers from Minnesota have gone to the war, I think it desirable when they come here they should see as many soldiers here as they have seen in past years in time of payment. Perhaps by seeing Governor Eamsey you can make some arrangement to send other soldiers to Fort Eidgley, so that the entire company which is there may come up here and remain while the Ehanktowan may be here.
I hope you will not suffer anything which I have written in this letter to be divulged in such a way as to cause a panic or alarm in the white settlements. We are not alarmed here, and I think there is no occasion for anything of the kind, and I write this that there may be none in future.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
THOS. S. WILLIAMSON.
Sioux AGENCY, June 14, 1862. CLARK W. THOMPSON, ESQ.,
Superintendent Indian Affairs, St. Paul, Minn.,
SIB: Authentic information has been furnished me that the Yanktonais Indians intend, in large numbers, to visit Yellow Medicine prior to, and to re main during the annuity payment for the year 1862. As nearly as I can ascer tain, their intention is to make demand of what they claim to be their share of the annuity money, and also of certain goods which the government bought for them heretofore, and which they refused to take or failed to get.
They make threats which I deem wise to provide against and hence I request that you furnish forthwith at Yellow Medicine, at least 150 soldiers to preserve order, protect life and property, and prevent the usual panic incident to the payments at that place.
I annex copy of a letter received from Rev. l3r. Williamson, a most estima ble and devoted missionary, who has spent most of his life among ;the Dakotas,
164 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
and upon whose word and judgment I have the most confident reliance. I have many other letters of the same purport, from other reliable sources, which I omit. My own information from Indians and others, is substantially of the same kind. Troops ordered should have tents, transportation and rations, for at least fifteen days, and should report to me at Yellow Medicine on or before June 25th 7 1862. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
THOMAS J. GALBRAITH,
Sioux Agent.
OFFICE SUPERINTENDENT INDIAN AFFAIRS, ST. PAUL, MINN., June 14, 1862.
His Excellency, ALEX. EAMSEY,
Governor of Minnesota, etc.,
SIR: I have to request that you order 150 troops, or as near that number as is practicable, to report themselves to Agent Galbraith, at Yellow Medicine, by the 25th of this month, or as soon thereafter as possible, for the purpose of pre serving order and protecting United States property during the time of payment to the Upper and Lower Sioux. The troops should be provided with transpor tation, and at least fifteen days rations.
I inclose copy of letter and accompanying documents received at this office upon this subject, from Agent Galbraith.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CLARK W. THOMPSON, Supt. Indian Affairs.
UPPER Sioux AGENCY, July 27, 1862.
SIR: I have to request that you detail a small detachment of your command, and with it proceed forthwith in the direction of Yellow Medicine river, in search of Inkpaduta and his followers, who are said to be camped somewhere in the region, having in their possession stolen horses, etc. You will take said Inkpaduta and all Indian soldiers with him, prisoners, alive if possible, and deliver them to me at the agency. If they resist, I advise that they be shot. Take all horses found in their possession and deliver them to me. A party of reliable citizens will accompany you; they will report to you and be subject to your orders. Ten or twelve men will in my opinion be sufficient. They should by all means be mounted on horses or mules. You should take at least nine days rations, and should start a sufficient time before daylight to get away without the knowl edge of the Indians. While I recommend prompt and vigorous action to bring these murderers, thieves and villains to justice, dead or alive, yet I advise pru dence and extreme caution.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
THOMAS J. GALBRAITH,
Lieut. T. J. SHEEHAN, Sioux Agent.
Commanding Camp at Sioux Agency.
OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE. 165
EXECUTIVE OFFICE, ST. PAUL, Aug. 19, 1862.
OSCAR MALMROS,
Adjutant General,
SIR: Information just received by express from Thomas J. Galbraith, agent for the Sioux, and from Lieutenants Gere and Cullen at Fort Eidgley leaves no doubt that the Sioux Indians, in considerable numbers, in the vicinity of the Bed- wood Agency, have taken the lives and property of our citizens, and that as a consequence the people on the frontier are alarmed and excited. You will there fore immediately organize an expedition composed of four companies of the in fantry now at Fort Snelling, and place them in charge of ex-Governor Sibley, to move to the scene of difficulties with the utmost promptitude.
Eespectfully yours,
ALEX. EAMSEY.
HEADQUARTERS INDIAN EXPEDITION, Aug. 20, 1862.
His Excellency, ALEX. EAMSEY,
St. Paul, Minn.,
SIR: Since I wrote this morning I have conversed with Mr. Blum, just ar rived from St. Peter. From his full and circumstantial account of matters above, it is placed beyond question that the whole Indian force is in arms, and that they are waging a war of extermination. Missionaries, half-breeds and whites have been alike pitilessly massacred.
To punish this awful succession of outrages will require a far larger force than I have, and it would be as well for you to send up, without delay, at least 500 men, with arms and equipments. I shall take position to protect the settlements until re-enforced.
The arm, called the Austrian musket, furnished us, is a very poor affair. Many of them will not burst a cap, and the men feel them to be but a poor re source in a desperate fight. Several thousand of the cartridges sent are utterly unfitted for the guns, and I send them back by the boat. They are entirely too large for any bore we have. We shall need more guns, more ammunition and more provisions. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. H. SIBLEY, Colonel, Commanding.
ULM, Aug. 20, 1862. Governor ALEX. EAMSEY,
St. Paul, Minn.,
DEAR SIR: The reports that you have probably heard about Indian troubles on the frontier are a sad reality.
We immediately on hearing of it raised 90 men and started for this point, where we arrived last night, between 9 and 10 o clock. As we approached the town we found the upper part of it in flames, and the citizens, together with an advance guard of horsemen, sent out by us, engaged in a brisk battle with the
166 OFFICIAL EEPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
Indians, which lasted about two hours and resulted in the repulse of the Indians. They killed several of our people in the engagement, and destroyed many valu able buildings in the town.
Our timely arrival saved the town and inhabitants from a night attack which might have proved fatal. This morning our scouts brought in 9 bodies of white men killed within a mile of the town, evidently endeavoring to get into town. The bodies were horribly mutilated.
To-day about 70 men arrived from South Bend, and we look for a detachment from Mankato hourly. We feel now confident of our ability to hold the town against any force they can bring to bear upon us. Yet our men, having left their business pursuits and their towns entirely void of men, since the depletion by volunteering, are impatient to get home, and cannot be kept here longer than a few days.
The only reliable information we have of matters above us is at the town of Leavenworth, on the Cottonwood river, where 60 dead bodies are lying. We feel secure enough now to go out to that point and bury them to-morrow. We know nothing of the occurrences at the fort or the agencies, save from rumor, which depicts a horrible state of things. I have sent an express to the fort to day, and expect an answer hourly. If it does not arrive shortly, I will detail twenty men to go, who are desirous of doing so.
I can tell you no more concerning these troubles, having no further reliable data. I write principally to urge upon you the absolute necessity of sending at least a regiment of the troops at the fort, part to this point and part to Eidgley, if you desire to prevent the utter abandonment and destruction of this flourish ing settlement, and the whole region beyond, as the people here declare, and very wisely, that unless a competent force is placed in the country they will remove permanently, and abandon their homes and farms.
I hope no hesitation will be felt by your Excellency in complying with this, request. It is the unanimous decision of the first men in the Minnesota Valley, most of whom are present,
With much respect, I am, your obedient servant,
CHARLES E. FLAXDRAU, Commanding at New Vim.
BATTLE OF RED WOOD. -Aug. 18, 1862.
Report of First Lieut. John F. "Bishop, Fifth Minnesota Infantry.
One of the first and most disastrous episodes of the Indian War of 1862 was the ambuscade at the agency ferry, August 18th, of Captain Marsh s company (B) of the Fifth Regiment Minnesota Volunteers, and the slaughter on the spot of more than two-thirds of the command. No official report of this affair was ever made or called for, so far as I know. I was at the time a boy of nineteen the fifth sergeant of the company, and was the senior survivor of the fight. I had been but a few months in the military service, and no one suggested at the time that I should make anything more than a verbal statement of what happened. I
BATTLE OF REDWOOD. 167
now submit the following account of the facts as I remember them, that they may be used, so far as required, in making up the history of those memorable days.
The first indication of an Indian outbreak we saw at Fort Ridgley was a team from Lower Sioux Agency, bringing in a citizen badly wounded and pleading for help. This was about 8:30 A. M., August 18, 1862. Captain Marsh at once or dered the long roll sounded, and the whole company fell in, about 85 men strong. He selected 54 men with 40 rounds of ammunition and one day s rations, leaving the balance of the company, under command of Lieut. T. P. Gere, to guard the post.
We left the fort about 9 o clock A. M., taking a six-mule team along with ex tra ammunition, rations, blankets, etc. Citizens had already commenced arriving and lined the road, mostly panic-stricken women and children. We marched about six miles toward the agency and came to a small log house on fire. Dr. Humphrey, the agency physician, lay dead on the doorstep, tomahawked. Mrs. Humphrey lay in the centre of the room on the floor, dead, tomahawked, and an infant two days old lay on her breast alive, but too far gone to be helped. We passed on half a mile further, and found another citizen tomahawked and nearly dead; we laid him out on one side of the road, and Captain Marsh requested some citizen to help him to the fort. Between the top of a hill (we used to call it Fari bault hill, on account of a log house at the bottom, owned by a half-breed named Faribault) and the bottom we found 4 citizens, dead; at the .bottom, in a small creek, we found 4 men; out of Faribault s house came about 25 women and children and they filed toward the fort as we passed by. Faribault s house was about nine miles from the fort on the road to the agency. Between the creek and ferry we found 2 more citizens dead in the road one was the ferry man. These citizens all appeared to have been overtaken and murdered within a few minutes before our arrival. The ferry at that time was located about one mile down the river fiom Lower Sioux Agency, and I think about eleven miles above Fort Eidgley. The Minnesota river at this point keeps close to the bluffs on the southwest side. These bluffs at that time were covered with a thick growth of hazel-brush and small trees, while on the east side was a wide bottom, covered with heavy, high grass.
We arrived at the ferry on the east side about 12 o clock noon, and found the ferry-boat on the east side, apparently ready to take us over, but Captain Marsh said probably the ferryman, whom we had j ust passed, was the last man over and had left it on this side. One lone Indian, " White Dog," chief, I believe of a small band of an Upper Sioux tribe, stood on the opposite side of the river. Captain Marsh commenced talking to him through Interpreter Quinn. In a few minutes Quinn said, "I don t know this Indian, he don t belong here." I told Captain Marsh I had seen this same Indian among the Upper Sioux at Yellow Medicine, under Chief Standing Buffalo. Captain Marsh then asked him what he was at Little Crow Agency for. He said "Only on a visit for a few days." He, the chief, urged Captain Marsh to cross over and go up to the agency and hold a council. He said the Indians were all up there waiting for us, and all would be right. He said they had had some trouble with the traders, but the captain could fix it up with the Indians, and all would be right. In the meantime I had stepped down to the edge of the river to dip up a cup of water to drink; I found the water rily and twigs and leaves floating down. I think the captain was about
168 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
to order his men onto the boat, when I said to him, " Captain Marsh, I believe we are being surrounded by Indians crossing the river above us," and gave him my reasons. I then ran up on a pile of sand caused by grading the approach to the ferry, and looked over the river; in a small ravine between the ferry and the agency on the west side of the river I saw a lot of ponies switching their tails in the bush, and at once reported this to Captain Marsh. He then ordered Quinn to ask White Dog what the ponies were there, just above him, for, if the Indians were all up at the agency. The Indian, who had been talking to us, then raised his gun. Quinn exclaimed, "Look out!" the Indian fired, and in an instant after ward a volley of shot came from the brush on the opposite side of the river; about one-half of our men dropped dead where they had been standing, Quinn with about ten or twelve balls through him. A fearful yell, right behind us, followed the volley from the opposite side of the river. I heard Captain Marsh call out, " Steady, men!" I was standing on the sand pile at this time, about twenty-five feet to the right of the company, who were facing the river. Indians rushed in upon us from behind, firing mostly double-barrel shotguns, when Cap tain Marsh and his surviving comrades turned about, advanced to the top of the river bank and fired a volley at them. Then a hand-to-hand encounter took place, every man fighting the best he knew how to cut his way out of the terrible looking mob around us. They were all painted and naked, except breech-clouts. Sergeant Trescott of Chatfield, two others and myself, tried to cut our way through, in order to get into the ferryman s log house or barn, which stood on opposite sides of the road leading to the ferry on our side of the river. Trescott fell about two hundred feet from the house; the others fell before they reached it, shot by Indians inside the house or barn. Both were full of Indians. I could not stop to argue right of passage, but darted through between the buildings; I don t think they were over one hundred feet apart. The charge on Hood at Kashville, Dec. 16, 1864, was a quiet promenade for me in comparison to this dash; a large sized ball shivered the stock of my musket and cut a flesh wound in the thigh, but not a very serious one. A little beyond the ferry-house I met an Indian with a double shotgun; he gave me the contents of both barrels, which struck the sand in the road at my feet; he was excited, I suppose, as well as my self. We both commenced loading; he had both barrels loaded as I rammed my cartridge home. A gun barrel then came up under my left arm. Supposing it to be an Indian in my rear about to use his hatchet, I did not turn to see how it was to be done; the gun went off and the Indian fell and the road was clear once more. Young James Dunn of Chatfield, afterward killed at Nashville, spoke up and said, "Is your gun loaded 1 ?" "Yes, as soon as I can cap it." He said, "You lead, my gun is empty." We went about three hundred feet farther, and 5 Indians jumped into the road from the grass. We then turned off to the south, in hopes to find an opening, but they bore down on us, and others joined them, and we were pressed or crowded to the south and west in a kind of circle, until we reached the thicket just below the ferry. This thicket, at that time, varied from one rod to ten in width, and ran along the edge of the river about one mile to nearly opposite the Faribault house, where it ended in an open bottom beyond. When we entered it we found Captain Marsh and 11 men had reached it before us. After the Indians closed in on us it became utterly impossible for a soldier to rejoin his command if he had become in any way separated from it.
|
|
|
Post by mdenney on Sept 2, 2007 13:34:25 GMT -5
BATTLE OF REDWOOD. 169
The Indians seemed determined to cut our men off from the command one or two at a time, as in that manner they were more easily disposed of. Most of our loss after the first volley occurred by the men being thus crowded out of their ranks by the Indians.
The Indians surrounded this thicket, yelling, and shooting shot and ball in thick and fast, and here we commenced to use our ammunition carefully under cover of brush and grass, to stand the devils oif. This was kept up until about 4 o clock p. M., when, our ammunition being reduced to not more than four rounds to a man, Captain Marsh ordered his men to swim the river and try and work our way down on the west side. He entered the river first, and swam to about the centre, and there went down with a cramp. I ordered two of the best swimmers to try and help him; one reached him. when he came to the surface a second time, only to be drawn under. I will never forget the look that brave officer gave us just before he sank for the last time will never forget how dark the next hour seemed to us, as we crouched underneath the bank of the Minnesota river, and talked over and decided what next best to do. While we were holding this council all had become quiet outside the thicket, and upon further examination we found the Indians had all left us, crossed the river at a ford near, and were lying in ambush, they having supposed we were crossing when they saw Captain Marsh and his helpers floundering in the water. "We then worked our way to ward the fort. Our progress was slow on account of 2 wounded, including my self, the other having to be carried for ten miles. After dark, when about five miles out, I dispatched 2 of our best men to warn the post commander of what liad happened, that he might prepare for what was likely to follow. In an instant after his arrival a man was mounted upon the swiftest horse to be found and started for St. Paul with dispatches to the Governor for help, and to warn St. Peter, Henderson, Le Sueur and Shakopee, and all settlers. We reached the fort about 10 o clock p. M. Some things we saw that day are too revolting to relate; it chills my blood now to think of them.
Just after dark, when five or six miles from the fort, we discerned something moving in the grass near the road. I thought we had run upon our enemy again, but demanded who was there, when a lone woman arose, and approaching us, exclaimed, "Have I found help at last? Am I saved?" She then asked us to help her sister, lying in the grass near by, with a new-born child not an hour old. We helped them in with our wounded, which made our progress very slow.
Captain Marsh was the only commissioned officer present on this expe dition. There were 3 sergeants and I think 4 corporals. Two sergeants were killed, Findley and Trescott of Chatfield. I was fifth sergeant at this time, and after Captain Marsh was drowned took command and brought the men in. Of course the other men that escaped into the thicket had as hard a time getting there as myself, and some of them more so. Tom Parsley of Chatfield, and four others, were cut off in another thicket by themselves; 3 were killed before dark, and after dark he crawled out and came into the fort alone. William Sutherland and Blodgett of Chatfield were both shot through the body, and remained where they fell until in the night, when they revived and I believe they found an old canoe and with it floated down the river and arrived at the fort the next day. E. Rose of Chatfield, shot through the arm, cut his way through alone and started for the fort in the night, got lost, and was picked up on the prairie
170 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
between Fort Eidgley and Henderson, nearly dead from loss of blood. Corp. W. B. Hutchinson and Private M. H. Wilson were survivors in the party with me and are still living; others names have passed from my memory, would give them if I had my diary, bnt it was lost on one of our marches in the South.
A young Indian whom I had often befriended and who was captured by Gen eral Sibley, told me one night while in camp near Henderson while en route to Fort Snelling under charge of General Marshall, that he was in the fight at the ferry, and that Little Crow had about 325 or 350 armed warriors, about 50 war riors from the upper band and about 20 or 25 Winnebagoes, besides some boys with bows and arrows, whom they did not consider fighters. He said their trick was to entice us on to the ferry-boat, then cut the rope and let us drift down the stream and shoot us at their leisure. After we were all disposed of, they were to cross their ponies and ride to the fort and capture that, then take their squaws and children along in the rear and attack Mankato, St. Peter and other towns, as far as possible. I do not now remember how many were killed, but think about 25 men, and about 10 wounded. Their names are doubtless reported on rolls at the office of the adjutant general.
I think the great mistake of Captain Marsh was in not deploying two or three men each side of the road, and in advance of his command, after we had com menced finding the dead. In that case the skirmishers might have discovered some of the Indians in the grass as we approached the ferry, and they might not. The agency buildings were on fire at the time we arrived at the ferry.
Many have censured Captain Marsh because he did not turn back when he commenced finding the dead lying in the road about four miles from the ferry. I will say in explanation for him, that no brave officer could have turned back and left those defenseless women and children between that band of Indians and our selves. They were continually swarming by us in groups of a dozen, more or less, at a time; not less than 200 to 300 of them passed us between Fort Eidgley and the ferry where we found the Indians in ambush. An officer who would or der his men back in the face of these facts would deserve to be shot without a trial, and dishonor would certainly have followed him and there would have re sulted the murder of many women and children who escaped while we were pressing forward. Moreover, if we had returned to the fort at once, the baud of Indians would certainly have followed us in hot pursuit, -and would undoubtedly have captured the fort that night, and there would then have been nothing to stop them until they reached Fort Snelling.
JOHN F. BISHOP, Late First Lieutenant Co. B, Fifth Regiment Minn. Infantry Vols*
Sheldon, Iowa, Sept. 5, 1887.
List of Killed and Wounded of the Fifth Minnesota Infantry in the Battle of Redwood,
as Compiled from the Roster.
COMPANY B Killed: Capt. John S. Marsh (drowned), First Sergt. Russell H. Findley, Sergt. Solon A. Trescott, Corp. Joseph S. Besse, Privates Charles R. Bell, Edwin F. Cole, Charles E. French, John Gardner, Jacob Gehring, John Holmes, Christian Joerger, Duras Kanzig, James
BATTLE OF FORT RIDGLEY. 171
H. Kerr, Wenzel Kusda, Henry McAllister, Wenzel Norton, John Parsley, Moses P. Parks, John W. Parks, Harrison A. Philips, Nathaniel Pitcher, Henry A. Shepard, Charles W. Smith, Nathan. Stewart.
Wounded: Sergt. John F. Bishop, Privates Wm. H. Blodget, Ezekiel Rose, Ole Svendson,. Wm. A. Sutherland.
BATTLE OF FORT RIDGLEY. -Aug. 20-22, 1862.
Report of Lieut. Timothy J. Sheehan, Fifth Minnesota Infantry.
HEADQUARTERS, FORT EIDGLEY, MINN., Aug. 26, 1862.
GENERAL: I have the honor to report that this post was assaulted by a large force of Sioux Indians on the 20th instant. The small remnant of Company B, Fifth Eegiment Minnesota Volunteers, together with a detachment of Company 0, Fifth Eegiment Minnesota Volunteers, and the Eenville Eangers, a company just organized for one of the regiments of this state, were the only troops I had under my command for its defense, and nobly did they do their duty. The en gagement lasted until dusk, when the Indians, finding that they could not effect a lodgment, which was prevented in a great measure by the superior fire of the artillery, under the immediate charge of Ordnance Sergt. J. Jones, IT. S. Army, which compelled them to evacuate the ravines by which this post is surrounded, withdrew their forces, and the gallant little garrison rested on their arms, ready for any attack.
During the night several people, remnants of once thriving families, arrived at the post in a most miserable condition, some wounded severely burned having made their escape from their dwellings, which were fired by the Indians. The people in the immediate vicinity fled to the post for protection, and were organized and armed, as far as practicable, to aid in the defense.
On the 22d they returned with a much larger force and attacked us on all sides, but the most determined was on the east and west corners of the fort, which are in the immediate vicinity of ravines. The west corner was also covered by sta bles and log buildings, which afforded the Indians great protection, and, in order to protect the garrison, I ordered them to be destroyed. Some were fired by the artillery, and the balance by the Eenville Eangers, under the command of First Lieut. J. Gorman, to whom, and the men under his command, great credit is due for their gallant conduct. The balls fell thick all over and through the wooden building erected for officers quarters. Still the men maintained their ground. The Indians prepared to storm, but the gallant conduct of the men at the gun& paralyzed them, and compelled them to withdraw, after one of the most deter mined attacks ever made by Indians on a military post.
The men of Companies B and C, Fifth Eegiment Minnesota Volunteers, aided by citizens, did good execution, and deserve the highest praise for their heroic conduct.
I beg leave also to bring to your notice Dr. Muller, the acting assistant sur geon of this post, who, assisted by his excellent lady, attended the wounded
172 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
promptly 5 and I am happy to say that, under his careful treatment, most all of them are prospering favorably. Mr. Wykoff and party, of the Indian Depart ment, with many other citizens, rendered efficient service.
Our small-arms ammunition nearly failing, on consultation with Ordnance Sergt. J. Jones, I ordered the balls to be removed from some of the spherical- case shot, which, with the balls fired by the Indians (many of which were collected and recast), was made into ammunition by a party of men and ladies organized for the purpose, who worked night and day until a good supply was obtained.
The buildings composing the garrison proper are still up, but they are very much wrecked. All of the out-buildings, except the guard-house and magazines, are entirely destroyed. Most of the mules and oxen belonging to the quarter master s department were taken by the Indians, and we are left with a scanty supply of transportation.
I adopted every possible means in my power for the defense, by erecting bar ricades, covering the storehouses with earth (to guard against fire arrows, several of which were thrown), determined to sacrifice all but the men s quarters and storehouse, which are stone buildings.
I also herewith inclose a list of the killed and wounded. 1
Yery respectfully, your obedient servant,
T. J. SHEEHAN, First Lieutenant Co. C., Fifth Regt. Minn. Vols., Comdg. Post.
lAst of Killed and Wounded of the Fifth Minnesota Infantry in the Battle of Fort Ridgley, Aug. 20, 1862, as Compiled from the Roster.
COMPANY B Wounded: Corporals William Good, James M. Munday, Privates John L. Magill, Andrew Rufredge, Robert J. Sporintz.
COMPANY C Killed : Private Mark M. Greer. Wounded : Private Frank A. Blackmer.
Report of Ordnance Sergt. John Jones, TJ. S. Army.
FORT KIDGLEY, MINN., Aug. 26, 1862.
SIR: In compliance with your orders I have the honor ^most respectfully to submit the following report of the artillery under my command during the attack by the Sioux Indians at this post on the 20th and 22d of August, 1862:
The alarm was given about 2 p. M. on the 20th; the gun detachments were promptly at their post, and gave much satisfaction, I am sure, to all who wit nessed the action. Aided by the small-arms parties, this attack was repelled,
1 The return, without names, as printed in VoL 13, page 249, Rebellion Record, shows that the casualties in the Fifth Minnesota Infantry were 1 enlisted man killed and 9 enlisted men -wounded; in the Renville (Minnesota) Rangers, 2 enlisted men killed and 4 enlisted men wounded.
BATTLE OF FORT RIDGLEY. 173
and the guns, under their respective chiefs, drove the Indians from the ravines by well-timed shells and spherical-case shot.
On the 22d of August, 1862, a still more determined attack was made about 2:30 P. M. by a very large force of Indians. The balls fell as thick as hail, and they seemed determined to drive the men from the guns, but they failed in so doing, and I think I may safely state, without flattery, that the safety of the garrison was solely dependent upon the superior courage of the non-commissioned officers, privates, and citizens, who so nobly stood to their posts; and, in order that their merit may be duly appreciated, I beg leave herewith to append their names. The number of shots fired by each gun it is not at present possible to state until an opportunity offers of counting the ammunition stored in the several buildings. The small-arms ammunition on hand was all expended, but by your energies in organizing a party to cast balls and make cartridges we have still a moderate supply. The ammunition for the field guns is in good order and in quantities sufficient for the emergency.
I cannot close this report without bringing to your notice the brave conduct of the Eenville Eangers, under the command of First Lieut. J. Gorman, who stood up to their work like veterans. Their services were under my immediate notice. The other portions of the garrison acted nobly.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. JOKES,
Ordnance Sergeant IT. S. Army, in Charge of Artillery. First Lieutenant SHEEHAN,
Fifth Regiment Minnesota Vols., Comdg. Post.
EXTRACT FROM THE NARRATIVE OF THE FIFTH REGIMENT,
BY GEN. L. F. HUBBARD. 1
Before the regiment was fairly organized, Companies B, C and D were de tached and ordered to the Minnesota frontier, where they served as garrisons for Forts Eidgley, Eipley and Abercrombie during the spring and summer of 1862, or until the occurrence of the Sioux Indian outbreak, that desolated the western border of the state, in August of that year. The bloody events of that period of horrors are yet fresh in the minds of the early settlers of Minnesota, but probably have little lodgment in the memories of much the larger portion of the present population of our state. To many of our then frontier settlers and to those members of the Fifth Regiment who participated in the events here narrated, the horrors thereof leave a more lasting impression upon mind and
1 Those portions of this narrative that relate to the Indian War of 1862 have been prepared by members of the regiment who were present at the frontier posts and participated in the events of which they write. The events that preceded the Sioux outbreak and those connected with the fight at the ferry, or Redwood, and the defense of Fort Ridgley, are related by Lieut. T. P. Gere of Company B. Those that transpired at Fort Abercrombie are related by Capt. John Vander Horck of Company D, and those at Fort Ripley by Lieut. F. B. Fobes of Company C. [L. F. H.
174 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
heart than the mightiest events of the War of the Eebellion. A recital of the horrible atrocities committed by those Indian devils, and the brutalities and terrible deaths suffered by many of the defenseless pioneers upon our then western border, is sufficient to curdle the blood and chill the heart of the hearer. That those horrors were not multiplied tenfold and additional thousands num bered among their victims, is due in great measure to the service rendered bj Companies B, C and D of the Fifth Minnesota.
At the outbreak of the great Eebellion the Indian tribes of Minnesota were, by virtue of treaties with the United States, occupants of the northern and west ern portions of the state; the Chippewas to the eastward, mostly in the timbered regions drained by the upper Mississippi, the Sioux to the westward, on the headwaters of the Minnesota and the Eed Eiver of the North. As outposts for the frontier on these three rivers, respectively, had been established Forts Eipley, Eidgley and Abercrombie, garrisoned previous to war-time by troops of the regular army; these commands, when ordered to the South, being relieved by companies from Minnesota s volunteer regiments. Thus, upon the organization of the Fifth Eegiment, three of its companies were assigned to this garrison duty as follows: To Fort Abercrombie, Company D captain, John Yander Horck; first lieutenant, F. A. Cariveau; second lieutenant, John Groetch. To Fort Eip ley, Company C captain, Francis Hall; first lieutenant, Timothy J. Sheehan; second lieutenant, Frank B. Fobes. To Fort Eidgley, Company B. Captain John S. Marsh of this company had not yet joined. Second Lieut. "N. K. Culver, having been designated to relieve the post quartermaster at Eidgley, preceded his command, and the company, commanded by First Sergeant Thomas P. Gere, left the rendezvous at Fort Snelling at noon on March 22d, moving up the Minne sota Yalley. It was still winter, deep snow covering the ground. The command occupied the Scott county court-house at Shakopee on the night of the 22d, and on the following day passed through Belle Plaine and Le Sueur, and crossing the Minnesota river on the ice at Traverse de Sioux after dark, reached St. Peter, where the Ni collet county court-house afforded shelter for the night. On the 24th the company moved to La Fayette, a settlement eighteen miles southeast of Fort Eidgley, arriving at that post at noon on March 25th. Captain Marsh joined his company April 16th, assuming command of the post. Second Lieu tenant Culver had been appointed first lieutenant, and was post quartermaster and commissary. First Sergeant Gere had been promoted to be second lieuten ant, and was detailed as post adjutant. At all these posts during the spring and early summer months, very little occurring to interrupt the usual routine of garrison duty, these companies were actively exercised in daily drill and in structed in everything that could increase their military efficiency, their daily hope being for an order that should relieve them from mere garrison service and direct them to join their regiment in active duty in the South.
At Fort Eidgley, in addition to Company B, there were in the United States service Post Surgeon Alfred Muller, Sutler B. H. Randall, Indian Interpreter Peter Quinn and Ordnance Sergt. John Jones, the latter in charge of the six pieces of artillery which had been left there. Company B, having rapidly reached a high efficiency in the manual of arms and infantry evolutions, especially in skirmish drill, was now daily and vigorously exercised in the artillery drill, under the able instruction of Ordnance Sergeant Jones, and by midsummer had several
|
|
|
Post by mdenney on Sept 2, 2007 13:35:29 GMT -5
BATTLE OF FORT RIDGLEY. 175
trained squads well qualified in all the details necessary to use the guns. While this work was undertaken more to promote the general efficiency of the company than in anticipation of its necessity or actual use at the fort, subsequent events proved that it was probably the most important element among all that prevented the capture of Fort Eidgley by the Sioux. Save the occasional minor individual disturbances incident to the frontier, the relations between the whites and the Indians located on the reservation to the northwest of Fort Eidgley were appar ently profoundly peaceful. During a long period no circumstance had occurred calling for military interference or aid. But under existing treaties the time for payment by the United States of their annuities to the Indians was at hand, and that possible disorder from the coming together of the various bands in such large numbers might be prevented, it was deemed advisable to temporarily in crease the force of troops in this locality; therefore the following order was issued:
HEADQUARTEES FORT RIPLEY, June 18, 1862. iSpecial Order, No. 30.]
1st. Lieut. T. J. Sheehan of Company C, Fifth Regiment Minnesota Volunteers, will pro ceed with 50 men to Fort Ridgley and there report to Captain Marsh, commanding post, for further orders. FRANCIS HALL,
Captain, Commanding Post.
Lieutenant Sheehan, with the command above designated, left Fort Eipley on June 19th, and marching via Elk River and Henderson, a distance of about two hundred miles, reached Fort Eidgley on the evening of June 28th. Here the following order was issued:
HEADQUARTERS FORT RIDGLEY, June 29, 1862. [Special Order, No. 57.]
1st. Lieut. T. J. Sheehan, Fifth Minnesota Regiment, with detachment of 50 men of Com pany C and one lieutenant and 50 men of Company B of said regiment, will proceed forthwith by the most expeditious route to the Sioux Agency on the Yellow Medicine river, and report to Maj. Thomas Galhraith, Sioux agent at that place, for the purpose of preserving order and pro tecting United States property during the time of the annuity payment for the present year.
2d. Interpreter Quinn will accompany the troops.
3d. The A. A. Q. M. and the A. A. C. S. will furnish the necessary transportation, forage and subsistence for the command. JOHN S. MARSH,
Capt. , Fifth Regiment, Commanding Post.
This command marched from Fort Eidgley on June 30th with fifteen days 7 ra tions, taking in addition to small-arms one 12-pounder mountain howitzer; camping that night at Lower Sioux Agency, having crossed the Minnesota river by the ferry near that place, continuing the march on the following day, and on the 2d of July arrived at the Upper Sioux Agency at Yellow Medicine, fifty- two miles from Fort Eidgley, going into camp on an eminence about one hundred .and fifty yards from the government buildings. The Indians were already ar riving in quite large numbers in anticipation of their annuities, and every suc ceeding day brought accessions to the number. The expected payment to the Indians was the one topic of absorbing interest; as early as July 8th, a party of warriors sent word through Interpreter Quinn to Lieutenants Sheehan and Gere that they desired a " council 7 with them. Their request for an interview having been granted, the substance of their address was as follows: " We are the braves. We have sold our land to the Great Father. The traders are allowed to sit at the pay table and they take all our money. We wish you to keep the traders away
176 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
from the pay table, and we desire you to make us a present of a beef." To this the officers replied that the regulations concerning payment were in the hands of the Indian agent appointed by their Great Father; also, that the soldiers had no provisions except their own rations, but that their request would be communi cated to the agent. Indian dances and similar demonstrations various in char acter and import became quite frequent as the numbers arriving increased, and some dissatisfaction was expressed at the non-arrival of the annuities. A detail was sent to Fort Eidgley, returning with fifteen days additional rations for the command. It being reported that quite a number of Yanktonais and Cut-heads not entitled to pay were encamped near the annuity Indians, a visit to their camp on July 14th developed the presence of 659 lodges of annuity Indians, 78 lodges. of Yanktonais, 37 of Cut-heads, and 5 said to be Winnebagoes. Major Galbraith at this time looked for the arrival of the annuities about the 18th or 20th inst. As the day passed the limited quantity of supplies in the possession of the Indians was rapidly reduced. On the 18th they reported they were starving; trouble was anticipated unless they could obtain something to eat; yet Major Galbraith was of the opinion that any alarm was wholly uncalled for, the Indians being quiet and peaceable and making no threats. Lieutenant Sheehan dispatched a detail to Fort Eidgley for a second mountain howitzer, which arrived on the 21st. On that day, at a conference between Lieutenants Sheehan and Gere and Major Galbraith concerning the situation, the latter stated that he would soon count the Indians, issue the provisions, and send them back to await advices from him of the arrival of their money. On the morning of the 24th a war party of about 1,200 Sioux, stripped and painted, over 400 of them mounted, passed close by the agency buildings and camp of the soldiers in headlong pursuit of a party of Chippewas, who had a day or two before killed two Sioux about eighteen miles from the agency. It was expected to find the Chippewas about seven miles south, but the party returned in the afternoon unsuccessful.
On July 26th, in conformity with an agreement reached at a council held OD the day previous between the Indians and Major Galbraith, the counting of the Indians took place. This was accomplished by congregating all the Indians in a space adjacent to the government building and encircling the same by a con tinuous chain of sentinels. The various chiefs called up their bands in succes sion, and as the number in each family was recorded, each passed outside the line of guards homeward. Twelve and one-half hours were required for this work. Crackers were issued and scattered by the soldiers throughout the unique congregation, to the infinite satisfaction of the recipients.
Upon receipt by Lieutenant Sheehan of Agent Galbraith s letter of July 27th (printed on page 164 of this volume), he addressed orders to Lieutenant Gere to take command of the camp, and with 14 soldiers, 4 citizens and an Indian guide, left about midnight on the service indicated; but, notwithstanding the precaution taken, the Indian camp learned promptly of the departure of the party, and Ink- paduta was duly warned. On the evening of August 3d Lieutenant Sheehan returned to the agency, having been unsuccessful in his search. Early on the morning of August 4th, the Indians sent two messengers to the camp, saying they were coming down to fire a salute and make one of their demonstrations; that they desired to inform the soldiers in advance, so they would understand it was all right. This proposition involving nothing unusual, no remonstrance was
BATTLE OF FORT RIDGLEY. 177
made, and soon some 800 warriors, mounted and on foot, came down with wild yells, firing tlieir guns in the air, completely surrounding the camp of the de tachment, and riding about wildly in all directions. It became at once apparent that this was something beyond their ordinary demonstrations, but the object was not developed until the leader of a party that had ridden past the camp, rushed to the door of the government warehouse and struck it with his hatchet.
The situation was now perilous in the extreme, the soldiers being outnumbered eight to one by red devils, who were thingying and priming their guns on all sides at a distance of less than one hundred feet; and had a single shot then been fired, not a soldier could have lived to tell the story. But no panic ensued, and the command sprang promptly into line. Eealizing quickly that the object of the attack was to secure provisions stored in the warehouse, that had bloodshed and not intimidation been intended, the former would have commenced at once, it was resolved to meet the issue as presented. Promptly removing the tarpaulin* covering from a mountain howitzer, by direction of Lieut. Gere, the men of Com pany B trained the gun to bear on the warehouse door, through which the Indians had by this time broken and were removing flour in sacks. Instantly the Indians fell back to either side from the line covered by the gun, and through the opening thus formed a squad of sixteen men, Sergt. S. A. Trescott at the head, and accom panied by Lieutenant Sheehan, marched straight to the government building. Upon reaching the government building, Lieutenant Sheehan at once repaired to the office of Major Galbraith, to seek the presence and advice of that officer, while Trescott with his men drove every Indian out of the warehouse, from which, by this time, twenty sacks of flour had been removed. Meanwhile the command at the camp stood steadily in line awaiting developments. Now came a period of excitement and uncertainty. The Indians who were surrounding the camp moved toward the warehouse, and forming in groups were addressed by the chiefs and leading braves, who told them these provisions had been sent to them by their Great Father at "Washington; that the agent refused to let them have food while their wives and children were starving; that the provisions were theirs; that they had a right to take them, etc. Lieutenant Sheehan favored an issue of provisions to the Indians; Major Galbraith feared a concession would be destructive of any control of the Indians in the future, and desired the return to the warehouse of the flour that had been removed. After much parleying, however, the agent decided to make an issue of pork and flour upon the promise of the Indians that they would immediately retire, and send their chiefs for a council on the next day. Upon receiving the provisions, however, they again became insolent, declining to go; whereupon the entire detachment of troops was moved to the warehouse, forming in line of battle, with both howitzers in position. These dis positions having been made, the Indians decided to return to their camps, and at once withdrew.
On August 5th, the camp of the detachment having been established in close proximity to the government buildings, and information being received from the Indian camp that much excitement existed there, also that a general attack was proposed, the command was held in position for action, while the citizens, with all the arms available, collected in the warehouse. No attack, however, was made. The following letter was received from Major Galbraith: 12
178 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
OFFICE Sioux INDIAN AGENCY, PAJUTAZEE, Aug. 5, 1862.
SIB: Your interpreter, Quinn, is a man whom I cannot trust to communicate or correspond with my Indians. I have therefore to respectfully request that said Quinn be at once ordered to hold no communication, direct or indirect, with any Sioux Indian under my jurisdiction. And I further request that he he ordered off the reservation and placed in charge of Captain Marsh, com manding at Fort Ridgley, with a copy of this request.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
THOMAS J. GALBEAITH,
U. 8. Indian Agent. First Lieut. T. J. SHEKHAN,
Commanding, Etc., Yellow Medicine, Minn.
Upon receipt of this letter, Lieutenant Gere was instructed to proceed at once to Fort Eidgley with Interpreter Quinn; also, to advise Captain Marsh of the situation of affairs and request him to come in person to the agency. On these Orders Lieutenant Gere left Yellow Medicine at 4 o clock P. M. , and, driving as rapidly as possible, passed through the lower agency at midnight, reaching Fort Eidgley at 3 o clock on the morning of the 6th. Captain Marsh promptly responded, and at 5 o clock was on his way to the front with Lieutenant Gere, arriving at Yellow Medicine at 1:30 o clock p. M. of the same day. On the 7th a council with the Indians was held by Captain Marsh and Agent Galbraith, result ing in an agreement that all the annuity goods should be issued immediately, whereupon the Indians would return to their homes and there remain until ad vised by the agent that the money to which they were entitled had reached the agency. This agreement was carried out in good faith, the delivery of goods beginning immediately and continuing on the 8th and 9th. By the 10th the In dian camp had disappeared, and on the llth the detachment marched for Fort Eidgley, arriving at that post on the evening of August 12th . All prospect of trouble in this region seemed now to have disappeared. The upper agency Indians had dispersed. The Lower Sioux Indians had taken no part in the events above recounted. All had apparently decided to wait patiently for the arrival of the annuity money. Eeceiving no information on the latter subject, and believing that no good reason existed for a longer detention of the detachment of Company C, Captain Marsh instructed Lieutenant Sheehan to report at Fort Eipley, and, in compliance, that detachment marched from Fort Eidgley at 7 o clock on August 17th. On the same day Lieutenant Culver and 6 men of Company B were detached to St. Peter, with transportation for a company of some 50 recruits, just enlisted at the Indian agencies, now en route for Fort Snelling for muster, leaving at Fort Eidgley 2 officers and 76 men. Such was the military situation on the very eve of one of the most horrid massacres recorded on the pages of American history.
On Monday morning, August 18th, at 10 o clock, Mr. J. C. Dickinson reached Fort Eidgley from the Lower Sioux Agency, bringing the startling news that a wholesale massacre of the whites was in progress at the last named place, this at first incredible rumor being a moment later confirmed by the arrival of other refugees bringing a wounded man. Captain Marsh at once resolved to go to the rescue. The long roll was sounded, the little garrison was promptly under arms, and hastily dispatching a mounted messenger (Corporal McLean) with orders to Lieutenant Sheehan to return immediately with his command to Fort Eidgley,
BATTLE OF FORT RIDGLEY. 179
and directing teams with extra ammunition and empty wagons for carrying the men, to follow as soon as harnessed, Captain Marsh with Interpreter Quinn and 46 men marched for the agency, within thirty minutes of the first alarm, leaving at Fort Eidgley 29 men under command of Lieutenant Gere. Captain Marsh and the interpreter were mounted on mules. About three miles out the teams overtook the command, and, placing the men in the wagons, Captain Marsh hastened toward the scene of slaughter, meeting on his way scores of affrighted citizens fleeing toward the fort for protection. Only six miles from Fort Eidgley houses in flames, and mutilated but not yet cold corpses of men, women and chil dren at the roadside, marked the limit thus far reached by the savages, and revealed the appalling character of the outbreak; but still in the hope that all this was the work of some desperate band of outlaws among the Sioux, and strangely confident that it was in his power to quell the disturbance, Captain Marsh, again forming his command on foot, hurried on.
At Faribault s Hill, some three miles distant from the lower agency, the wagon road descended from the high prairie and crossing a small stream stretched across a wide bottom land of the Minnesota river, covered at this time with tall grass, to the ferry. Half way across this bottom, Captain Marsh halted his com mand for a moment s rest, and proceeded in single file, advancing in this order to the ferry-house, which stood on the north side of the road some two hundred feet east of the ferry landing. Here, on the east bank of the river, on either side of the road, the heavy grass merged with scattered thickets of hazel and willow, interspersed with open sand patches left by the river s overflow, one larger thicket extending southward along the river bank some two miles in vary ing width from twenty to two hundred feet. Across and close to the west bank were the high bluffs on which the lower agency was located, their steep face then covered by a thick growth of young trees and underbrush. Halting at the ferry- house shortly after noon, the boat was discovered to be on the east side in ap parent readiness for the command to use for its crossing, though the dead body of the ferryman had been found on the road. Up to this time but few Indians had been seen, and these on the high prairie west of the river, south of the agency, on their horses. Now appeared some squaws and children on the bluff west of the river, and near the ferry was a single Indian who seemed marching as a sentinel. This was the chief White Dog, and Captain Marsh addressed him through his interpreter. White Dog said, "Come across; everything is right over here. We do not want to fight and there will be no trouble. Come over to the agency and we will hold a council." During this discussion two soldiers went to the river to obtain water for the men and discovered the heads of many Indians concealed behind logs in the brush on the opposite side. A drunken man at the ferry-house told the soldiers, " You are all gone up; the Indians are all around you; that side hill is covered with Indians." Captain Marsh then ordered the soldiers forward to the ferryboat. The posts to which the ferry ropes were attached had apparently been loosened, and pending attention to these, the command formed in line facing the river. Sergt. John F. Bishop stepped to the water s edge to fill his cup, and, returning, reported to Captain Marsh his belief that Indians were crossing above to the east to surround the command.
The plan of the ambuscade was to withhold the attack until the soldiers were on the ferryboat, but apparently doubting its exact fulfillment, at this juncture
180 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
White Dog leaped back, firing his gun. "Look out!" shouted Quinn, and the next instant came a volley from the concealed Indians on the west side. Several men fell at the first fire, among them Interpreter Quinn, riddled "by twelve bul lets; but fortunately most of the volley passed over the heads of the men, and Captain Marsh gave the order to fall back to the ferry-house. This command had hardly been uttered when, with demoniac yells, large numbers of the savages- attacked from the east, pouring from the grass and bushes along the road, and firing from the ferry-house and barn, of which they had gained possession. Here for several minutes ensued a contest, at short range and hand-to-hand, most san guinary but unequal, the little command holding its ground until nearly half its- numbers had fallen, and Indians by the score lay dead. But Captain Marsh now seeing that he would soon be completely surrounded and overpowered, gave the order to gain, if possible, the thicket along the river to the south, this being the only quarter not held by the savages; and, fighting every inch of the way, 15 of the men succeeded in reaching this thicket. Captain Marsh now only hoped to reach Fort Eidgley with the remnant of his command. The Indians riddled the thicket with buckshot and ball, but had the troops no longer at such a serious disadvantage; and deterred too, by their own heavy losses, they fired at longer range. Husbanding their now scanty ammunition and gradually woiking down the river, the surviving soldiers maintained the fight until 4 o clock, by which time the south end of the thicket was nearly reached. Discovering a large party of Indians moving down the fort road, with the evident intention of intercepting him at the open ground south of the thicket, and thinking escape possible only by reaching the west bank, Captain Marsh determined to cross the river, which was here some ten rods wide, and, taking his sword and revolver in hand, led the way. He had succeeded in wading, perhaps two-thirds of the distance, when he found the water beyond his depth, and dropping his arms, attempted to swim across, but had proceeded only a short distance, when he called loudly for help. Privates Brennan, Dunn and Van Buren swam to his assistance, the former reach ing him as he was sinking the second time. Brennan drew him above the surface and the captain grasped his shoulder for an instant, but losing his hold, the brave officer sank beneath the remorseless waters to rise no more. The men joined their comrades on the shore. The command now devolved on Sergt. John F. Bishop, the party now comprising, besides himself, 3 corporals and 11 privates. Bishop himself had been wounded, Private Svendson was badly shot and had to be carried, and Bishop decided they must continue southward on the east side. Believing that the soldiers had reached the west bank, many of the Indians had crossed at an adjacent ford and were hiding in ambush in a convenient thicket; providentially, an overhanging bank of the river en abled the little command to pass unperceived those who were opposite the open ground on the east side; and so, out of the very jaws of death, they passed, car rying the wounded men, and in momentary expectancy of encountering other savages. No pursuit, however, was made. Five miles from the fort, darkness approaching, Bishop dispatched two brave men, Privates Dunn and Hutchinson, in advance with the tidings of disaster, and himself reached Fort Eidgley at about 10 o clock. Eight other men of Captain Marsh s party afterward reached Fort Eidgley, having eluded the Indians by hiding in the bushes near the ferry until nightfall, and escaping in the darkness. Five of the survivors were wounded,
|
|
|
Post by mdenney on Sept 2, 2007 13:36:39 GMT -5
BATTLE OF FORT KIDGLEY. 181
and thus the total loss was 1 officer drowned, 23 men killed and 5 wounded. Some weeks later the bodies of the fallen were removed by their sorrowing comrades to Fort Kidgley, and buried in one grave beside their leader, Captain Marsh s body having been recovered in a search made by members of his company.
On Monday, August 18th, after the departure of Captain Marsh, refugees from the surrounding country, mostly women and children, flocked into Fort Eidgley in large numbers, all bringing tales of murder and desolated homes. The few available small-arms in the fort were furnished to the men who seemed most likely to handle them to advantage, these men being placed on duty with the soldiers, of whom, besides the sick and hospital attendants, only 22 were available for active duty. At about noon there arrived at the fort in charge of C. G. Wykoff, clerk of the Indian superintendent, and his party of four, the long-expected annuity money, $71,000 in gold. Here this party was, of course, halted. As the day passed, the frightened fugitives continued to come in, until at nightfall more than 200 had arrived. Intelligence from Captain Marsh, so anxiously awaited, came not. Pickets were posted in every direction by Lieutenant Gere in person, instructed, as this duty required nearly every man in the command, to rally promptly on the fort in case of attack in any quarter. Shortly after dark, the two men sent forward by Sergeant Bishop reached the fort, bringing to the young officer in command the direful news of the slaughter of his comrades and death of his commander; a tale whose import, in view of the possible result to the helpless and well-nigh unprotected mass of frightened humanity now in his charge, was sufficient to appall the stoutest heart. Knowing, however, that new regiments were at this time forming at Fort Snelling, the nearest military post, Lieutenant Gere, without a moment s delay, penned a dispatch to the command ing officer of that post, briefly detailing the situation and asking for immediate re-enforcement; also, requesting that officer to acquaint Governor Ramsey with the state of affairs. This dispatch was written at 8:30 o clock, and sent forward immediately by Private William J. Sturgis, mounted on the best horse in the garrison. The messenger was also instructed to report the situation to Lieutenant Culver and Agent Galbraith at St. Peter, hastening, if possible, their return with the men in their charge.
Pending the uncertainty concerning the result of Captain Marsh s expedition, apprehension of an attack upon the fort had not been grave, but when the extent of the disaster to the greater part of its usual garrison was fully known, such a contingency was indeed imminent. Immediately upon the dispatch of the cou rier, Lieutenant Gere ordered the removal of all the women and children, who were scattered in the frame houses forming three sides of the fort, to the stone building used as soldiers quarters, which stood on the north side of the square; but before this order could be executed, one of the citizens on picket fired his gun, and came running in crying, "Indians!" Panic beyond description seized the refugees, who rushed frantically for the quarters, terror-stricken men even breaking through the windows in their haste for safety. The few soldiers, true to their discipline, rallied promptly to their designated positions; the alarm proved false, but good in effect, as now all but the fighting men were in the quarters; the pickets were replaced and the first night of unceasing vigil wore away. The Indians, hilarious at the desolation they had wrought during the
182 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
day, were at the agency , celebrating in mad orgies their successes, and neglected their opportunity to capture what proved to be the barrier to the devastation of the Minnesota Valley. Tuesday morning dawned on mingled hope and appre hension for the coming hours, and when sunlight shone upon the prairies, every quarter was closely scanned from the roof of the highest building through Ihe powerful telescope fortunately at hand. At about 9 o clock Indians began con gregating on the prairie some two miles west of the fort, mounted, on foot and in wagons, where, in plain view from the fort, a council was held. This council was addressed by Little Crow, and their movements for the day decided upon. While this was in progress, cheers of welcome announced the arrival at the fort of Lieutenant Sheehan with his 50 men of Company C. The courier dispatched by Captain Marsh on the previous day had reached this command at evening, soon after it had gone into camp, forty-two miles from Fort Eidgley, between New Auburn and Glencoe. Promptly obeying the order for his return, Lieuten ant Sheehan at once struck tents, and the command commenced its forced march, covering during the night the entire distance traversed in the two preceding- days, arriving the first to the rescue, and meriting high praise. Lieutenant Sheehan now took command at Fort Eidgley.
Little Crow s intention had been to attack Fort Eidgley promptly, but at the council above mentioned it was determined to first proceed to New Ulm, and soon after the dispersion of the council the Indians were seen passing southward on the west side of the river. No demonstrations at the fort were made during the day. Meanwhile, at St. Peter, at 6 P. M. on Monday, news of the outbreak reached Lieutenant Culver and Agent Galbraith. Obtaining there during the night fifty old Harper s Ferry muskets, the company of recruits in their charge was armed and a small supply of powder and lead collected. Before morning cou rier Sturgis arrived with Lieutenant Gere s dispatches, and, fully advised of the perilous situation they were approaching, at 6 o clock Tuesday morning this gal lant party left St. Peter with barely three rounds of cartridges, and twelve hours later had reached Fort Eidgley, completing its roll of defenders. Thus aug mented, the effective force at the fort consisted of 51 men of Company B, first lieutenant, N. K. Culver, second lieutenant, T. P. Gere; 50 men of Company C, first lieutenant, T. J. Sheehan; 50 men Eenville Eangers, James Gorman com manding; Ordnance Sergeant Jones, IT. S. A. ; Post Surgeon Muller, Post Sutler Eaudall, and about 25 armed citizens, a total of 180 resolute men, Lieutenant Sheehan in command of all. The non-combatants now numbered about 300. Men of Company B, who, it will be remembered, had been instructed and were expert in the use of artillery, were detailed to man the guns, of which three were put into service, one 6-pounder field-piece under Ordnance Sergeant Jones, two 12- pounder mounted howitzers, one of them under Sergeant James G. McGrew of Company B, and one in charge of J. C. Whipple, an artillerist of experience during the Mexican War, who had himself escaped from the lower agency to the fort. Thus organized, the garrison was confident of a sturdy defense should an attack be made.
The fort, which consisted of a group of buildings standing at intervals, sur rounding an open square ninety yards across, stood on a spur of the high prairie tableland which extended from the northwest toward the Minnesota river, that stream being about one-half mile to the south. Along the east and north side of
BATTLE OF FORT RIDGLEY. 183
this spur, and within easy musket range of the fort, a long and deep ravine ex tended southeasterly to the main valley; to the south, at a distance of about three hundred yards, ran the line of a quite abrupt descent to the valley, while from this line, and nearly opposite the southwest corner of the fort, another lateral ravine projected into the spur, terminating not over three hundred feet from the buildings on that angle. The buildings on the east, south and west sides of the square above referred to were two-story frame houses, erected for officers quar ters, excepting a one-story storehouse for commissary supplies, which stood adja cent to the northwest corner, while on the north side stood the two-story barracks built of stone. In rear, to the north of the barracks, was a row of log buildings comprising houses for families of post attaches and the post hospital, while at the northeast corner, and near the end of the barracks, stood the post bakery and laundry. Thus, while conveniently arranged for occupancy in time of peace, neither by location nor construction was the post well adapted to repel attack.
Eepulsed in the attack made at New Ulna on the 19th, Little Crow had de termined to carry out his original plan and to attempt the capture of Fort Eidg- ley, and on Wednesday, August 20th, made his dispositions to this end. Knowing the facility of approach afforded by the long ravine to the east, also that the usual park of the artillery was on the west line of the buildings, the main attack ing party was moved down the river valley to the north of this ravine, thence under its shelter to a point opposite the fort, this movement being executed under cover and entirely unobserved. To divert attention from the real point of attack, Little Crow himself, at about 1 o clock p. M., made hh appearance just out of range of the pickets, on the west side of the fore, mounted on a pony, and apparently inviting conference. Sergeant Bishop, at the time sergeant of the guard, endeavored to induce his nearer approach, but without success. At this juncture the advance of the party approaching from, the northeast was discovered by the pickets on that side, and skirmishing commenced. Lieutenant Sheehan ordered the troops to form in line on the west side of the parade ground at the south end of the commissary building, facing east. By this time the Indians coming up the hill from the ravine had reached the level ground, and, driving in the pickets, poured a heavy volley through the opening at the northeast, gain ing possession of some of the outbuildings at that quarter. Lieutenant Gere was ordered with a detachment of Company B directly to the point of attack, and moved at double-quick, stationing Whipple with his howitzer in the opening be tween the bakery and the next building to the south; a detachment of Company C moved on a run around the north end of the barracks to the row of log build ings, while McGrew wheeled his howitzer rapidly to the northwest corner of the fort and went into position on the west side of the most westerly building in the row. All these forces were at once engaged in a hard fight at short range.
The infantry, advantageously located around Whipple, kept up a hot fire, enabling him to work his gun to good advantage, and some admirable work was here performed. The men of Company C similarly covered McGrew s operations. McGrew first trained his gun to bear northeasterly, on the most northerly point at which the enemy appeared, and from which a heavy fire was coming; but his fuse had been cut for a range of a quarter of a mile, and the first shell, though passing close to the grass, exploded over the ravine. Eunning his piece quickly behind the building, McGrew cut his next fuse to its shortest limit, reloaded, ran
184 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
the howitzer out amidst a shower of bullets, and exploded his second shell in the very midst of this extremely troublesome party, wholly dislodging the savages from their position. The converging fire of these two howitzers, with their musketry supports, soon drove the Indians from the buildings they had reached and forced them back to the line of the ravine. The plan to capture the fort in the first rush had been frustrated. Meanwhile, upon the attack at the east, the pickets in other directions, in accordance with their instructions, had rallied on the fort, and Little Crow quickly closed in with the balance of his force on the west and south to divert, as far as possible, the defense from his main attack. Ordnance Sergeant Jones, with his 6-pounder field-piece, took position at the opening at the southwest angle of the square, supported by Lieutenants Culver and Gorman, while the remaining men were posted in and around the various buildings and sheds in the most advantageous positions obtainable. Jones position was particularly exposed by reason of the short ravine before described, up which the savages swarmed to easy musket range in large numbers, compelling him to deliver his fire under the most trying circumstances.
It becoming soon apparent that the Indians were in large enough force to maintain a continuous siege, if so disposed, and that all the artillery ammunition was likely to be required, it was decided to remove at once into the stone buildings, from the magazine, the ammunition remaining there, consisting principally of the supply for the extra field-pieces. The magazine stood on the open prairie to the northwest and distant some two hundred yards, the one quarter from which the Indians could not approach under cover. McGrew now took position so as to command any locality from which men detailed for this duty could be reached by the enemy, and the ammunition was all safely brought in. Little Crow s original plan having met with such vigorous repulse on the northeast, the attacking force was distributed to all quarters, and the battle became general. For five hours an incessant fire was kept up on the fort. The men in the garrison were directed to waste no ammunition and fired only when confident their shots would be effective, but found sufficient opportunity to maintain a steady return of the enemy s fire. The artillery did most efficient service in all directions throughout the entire engagement. At dark the firing ceased, but the men re mained each where night found him, all in almost momentary expectation of further attack by the wily foe. Little Crow had, however, withdrawn his forces to the lower agency. Bain commenced falling at midnight and continued through out most of the following day. Thursday passed without an engagement, and the day was improved by the construction of barricades, made of everything available, for the better protection of the gunners, especially at the southwest corner where Jones was in position. A 12-pounder field-piece w^as manned and put in position in reserve on the parade ground under Sergeant Bishop of Com pany B; otherwise, the officers, men and gnus remained in the positions assigned in Wednesday s battle, and so continued, generally during the remainder of the siege.
But Little Crow believing that Fort Kidgley once taken his path to the Mis sissippi would be comparatively clear, resolved to make one more desperate at tempt at its capture, and on Friday, August 22d, his numbers having been largely augmented, a second and more furious attack was made. At about 1 o clock P. M., dismounting and leaving their ponies a mile distant, with demoniac
BATTLE OF FORT RIDGLEY. 185
yells the savages surrounded the fort and at once commenced a furious musketry fire. The garrison returned the fire with equal vigor and with great effect on the yelling demons, who at first hoped by force of numbers to effect a quick entrance and had exposed themselves by a bold advance. This was soon checked, but from the cover of the slopes their fire was unceasing, while the very prairie seemed alive with those whose heads were clothed with turbans made of grass to conceal their movements. Little Crow s plan in this attack, in case the first dash from all sides proved unsuccessful, was to pour a heavy, continuous fire into the fort from every direction, exhausting the garrison as much as possible, and to carry the fort later by assault upon the southwest corner. To this end he col lected the greater portion of his forces in that quarter, and, taking possession of the government stables and sutler s store, the fire literally riddled the buildings at that angle. It was found necessary to shell these buildings to dislodge the foe, resulting in their complete destruction by fire. Attempts were made to fire the fort by means of burning arrows, but the roofs being damp from recent rains all efforts to this end were futile. Still, in pursuance of the plan of battle, the hail of bullets, the whizzing of arrows, and the blood-curdling war-whoop were incessant. From the ravine to the northeast came an especially heavy at tack, the object being to divert as far as practicable the defense to this side, and here was some gallant and effective service again performed. "Whipple from the northeast corner, protected in every discharge by the hot musketry fire of Gere s detachment and the men of Company C to the left, swept the very grass to its roots all along the crest of the slope, while McGrew, improving the opportunity, with most conspicuous bravery, ran his howitzer out from the northwest corner to the very edge of the ravine and delivered several enfilading volleys of canister down along the hillside, practically sweeping the savages from their position.
Now began the convergence to the southwest, the Indians passing from the opposite side in either direction. In moving around the northwest corner a wide detour was necessary to avoid McGrew s range, but the open prairie ren dered the movement plainly apparent. Divining its object, McGrew hastily re ported to Jones what was transpiring, and was authorized to bring out the 24-pounder, still in park, with which McGrew went into position on the west line of the fort and at the south end of the commissary building. Meanwhile the fire in front of Jones gun had become so hot and accurate as to splinter almost every lineal foot of timber along the top of his barricades, but he still returned shells at shortest possible range, himself and his gunners most gallantly exposing themselves in this service. During an interval in the fusilade Little Crow was lieard urging, in the impassioned oratory of battle, the assault on the position. Jones double-charged his piece with canister and reserved his fire; meanwhile McGrew had fired one shot from the 24-pounder at the party passing around the northeast, and, training his gun westerly, dropped his second shell at the point where this party had by this time joined the reserve of squaws, ponies and dogs west of the main body. A great stampede resulted; the gun was swung to the left, bringing its line of fire between the two bodies of Indians. Its ponderous reverberations echoed up the valley as though twenty guns had opened, while the frightful explosion of its shells struck terror to the savages and effectually prevented a consolidation of the forces. At this juncture Jones depressed his piece and fired close to the ground, killing and wounding 17 savages of the party
186 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
who had nerved themselves for the final assault. Completely demoralized by this unexpected slaughter, firing suddenly ceased and the attacking party precipi tately withdrew, their hasty retreat attended by bursting shells until they were beyond range of the guns. Thus, after six hours of continuous blazing conflict, alternately lit up by the flames of burning buildings and darkened by whirling clouds of smoke, terminated the second and last attack.
During the engagement, many of the men becoming short of musketry am munition, spherical-case shot were opened in the barracks and women worked with busy hands, making cartridges, while men cut nail rods in short pieces to use as bullets, the dismal whistling of which strange missiles was as terrifying- to the savages as were their fiendish yells to the garrison. Incredible as it may appear, during these engagements at Fort Eidgley the loss of the garrison was only 3 men killed and 13 wounded. Fighting on the defensive, and availing themselves of all the shelter afforded by buildings and barricades, the infantry were admirably protected; while, as before noted, as each piece of artillery was fired the enemy was kept down by a hot musketry fire. The number of Indians engaged in the attack on the 20th is estimated at 500 to 600, and in the battle of the 22d, 1, 200 to 1, 500. Their loss in the two days could hardly have been less than 100, judging from the number found buried afterward in the immediate vicinity of the fort.
It was a battle on the part of the garrison to prevent a charge by the savages, which, had it been made, could hardly have failed, as Little Crow seemed confi dent, to result in the destruction of the garrison and the consequent horrible massacre of its 300 refugees. It is but truth to add that no man in the garrison failed to do his duty, and that, worn by fatigue and suspense, and exhausted by loss of sleep, to the end every man was at his post bravely meeting what ever danger confronted him. The conspicuous gallantry of the artillerists was the theme of general praise, and the great value of their services was conceded by all, while the active and intelligent support that rendered their work possible is entitled to no less credit. Post Surgeon Muller was active in attention to the wounded and ill, nobly seconded by his brave wife, w^ho was, through out the dark days, an angel of mercy and comfort to the sufferers, and who, with many other ladies, admirably illustrated the quality of most praiseworthy courage in the midst of surrounding danger. While the withdrawal of the Indians on the 22d terminated the fighting at Fort Eidgley, the weary garri son could not be aware that such would be the case, nor for a moment relax its vigilance; hence the forces continued to occupy the positions to which they had by this time become accustomed. The construction of a line of earthwork on the south side of the fort was begun, the roof of the commissary building was cov ered with earth to prevent fire, and the barricades were strengthened as much as possible. Four more long days of suspense ensued, no word from friend or foe reaching the garrison until the morning of Wednesday, August 27th, just nine days after the first dispatch for help had been sent by courier, when Col. Samuel McPhail, of the Minnesota mounted troops, and Win. E. Marshall, at that time a special agent dispatched by Governor Eamsey to hasten the relief of Fort Eidgley, rode into the fort with 175 volunteer citizen horsemen, having left St. Peter at 4 o clock p. M. on the day previous, the advance of the expedition under General Sibley, whose infantry reached the fort on the 28th. Thus was terminated the siege, and with its end came the much needed rest to the exhausted garrison.
|
|
|
Post by mdenney on Sept 2, 2007 13:37:29 GMT -5
BATTLE OF FORT ABERCROMBIE. 187
During the early progress of General Sibley s campaign against Little Crow Company B remained in garrison at Eidgley. Lieutenant Sheehan left with his detachment of Company C on September 18th to join his company at Fort Eipley. Company B marched for Fort Snelling on November 9th, as part of the escort under Col. W. E. Marshall, accompanying the captured Indians en route to that post. Uniting there with Company C, these two companies proceeded South and joined their regiment near Oxford, Miss., on Dec. 12, 1862.
Company D, Capt. John Yander Horck, was mustered into service March 15, 1862, and was ordered the same day to proceed to Fort Abercrombie, D. T. , to relieve the troops stationed at that post. The company arrived on the 29th of March, and Captain Yander Horck took command of the post the next day. The order to proceed to Fort Abercrombie also stated that a detachment should be stationed at Georgetown, fifty-two miles north of the fort, on the Ked Kiver of the North; accordingly 30 men under command of First Lieut. Francis A. Cariveau were ordered to take station at Georgetown. Fort Abercrombie, the post proper at this time, consisted of but three buildings; the men s quarters for one company, the commissary building and commanding officer s quarters. Along the river bank a few scattering log huts were occupied by half-breeds, the interpreter and other attaches of the post. Fortifications there were none at all, not even a board fence. August 13th the commanding officer received orders to guard an Indian treaty train which was to arrive at the fort about the 19th en route to Bed Lake, where a council was to be held with the Eed Lake Indians. Upon the arrival of the treaty commission at St. Cloud the report of the Indian outbreak reached them. The order to guard the treaty train was thereupon countermanded and instructions issued to detain the train at the fort This order, however, was not received until the 20th of August, after the train had already left its camp on Whisky creek, about two miles from the post. This last order was accompanied with a proof slip from a St. Cloud newspaper, containing dispatches of the Indian outbreak. This was the first notice at Fort Abercrom bie that the Indians were on the warpath. A courier was immediately dis patched to Mr. Thompson, who was in charge of the treaty train, to return to the post for protection. The courier also carried orders to Lieutenant Cariveau to return with his command to the fort immediately. The treaty train came back about noon the same day, and the detachment from Georgetown arrived on the third day following.
As soon as the news of the outbreak reached the fort the garrison began to construct fortifications of earthen breastworks, hewed logs, etc. When the de tachment from Georgetown arrived, ten men under command of Lieut. John Groetch were detailed to reconnoiter as far as Breckenridge (a distance of fifteen miles), if possible. They arrived there without having seen an Indian, but found that the inmates of the hotel, three men, a woman and a child, had been murdered and terribly mutilated. This was the first evidence secured that the Indians were in the vicinity. The same evening there was observed in the direc tion of Breckenridge a large fire, and the belief that the Indians had fired the large four-story hotel, the only building in the place, was confirmed by another scouting party under Lieutenant Groetch the next day. This scouting detachment found an old lady, Mrs. Eyan, creeping along the river bank at Breckenridge, having been shot by an Indian at her place, a station about twelve miles east of
188 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
Breckenridge. She reported that the Indians had also fatally shot her son and kidnaped her little grandson. She was taken to the fort, and under the skillful care of Dr. Brown, the post surgeon, soon recovered. August 23d, Mr. Kent and Mr. Tarble, citizens, were dispatched to St. Paul to report the situation, and ask for re-enforcements and ammunition. These gentlemen left the fort at night without escort. Quiet now prevailed for a few days, no one believing that the Indians would attack the fort; event the interpreter, Joseph Demarais, a half- breed, did not think it probable. In the meantime work upon the breastworks was prosecuted as rapidly as possible. About the*29th of August a good protec tion had been provided, and in the bastion of the work on the southwest corner of the garrison there was placed a 12-pound howitzer. This commanded the approaches to the south and west line of the fortifications. Another howitzer was placed in a log house to protect, the north and east sides of the garrison, and also as a defense against an attack from Slab Town, the old site of Fort Aber- crornbie. A third howitzer was placed near the men s quarters. These three pieces were manned by experienced men of Company D, who had been in the artillery service in Germany. About 2 P. M. , August 30th, a party of Indians appeared within a mile of the fort, near the Wild Rice river, and drove off a herd of stock grazing in the vicinity. That evening two more messengers were sent to St. Paul with duplicate dispatches, stating what had transpired. The following morning a detachment was sent out to recover the stock, if possible, and returned in the evening with about forty head. The Indians made no demonstrations for several days, except to watch our movements from the thick underbrush across the river. The work on the fortifications was continued. The men were much exhausted, half of them being on guard during the day while the other half worked on the breastworks. During the nights the whole com mand was on guard, half being on post at a time, the relief occurring every two hours. It was feared that the men thus tired out would relax in their vigilance, and to guard against this, the officer of the day made the rounds at night every two hours and the commanding officer visited the guard and post every night, usually before daybreak. On the 3d of September, Captain Yander Horck and the orderly sergeant inspected the outside picket line, between 4 and 5 o clock, as usual; on reaching the last post of the line, the guard, mistaking the party for Indians, fired. The shot wounded the captain in the right arm. The guard, in explanation, claimed he had seen Indians crawling near the line during the night. At daybreak, an hour later, while Dr. Brown was dressing Captain Yander Horck s wound, the Indians attacked the post from the south side, in large force. First Lieutenant Cariveau being sick, Lieutenant Groetch was or dered to take command of the post. The fight lasted from 5 to 11 A. M., when the Indians were repulsed and retired to their camp south of the fort. It was estimated that over 400 warriors participated in the attack. Many of the Indians were killed and wounded, the loss of the garrison being but two, Corp. Nicolas Hettinger wounded in the right shoulder and Private Edwin D. Steele in the abdomen, of which he died September 7th. After the fight was over and the Indians had retreated, it was ascertained that there were but three hundred and fifty rounds of musket ammunition left in the garrison. The arms in the hands of the men were the Harper s Ferry muskets, caliber 69, and on leaving Fort Snelling the command was furnished with only 2,000 rounds of ammunition, the company
BATTLE OF FORT RIDGLEY. 189
commander being told that there were 40,000 cartridges at Fort Abercroinbie. On examination, however, it was found that these cartridges were 58-caliber. This discovery was made in April, and the commanding officer at once made requi sition for 20,000 rounds 69-caliber to the chief of ordnance. About the 1st of May he was ad vised that the requisition had been ordered to be filled from the St. Louis arsenal. Not hearing from it, a report was made to the chief of ordnance about June 10th. July 30th notice was received from the St. Louis arsenal that ammunition would be shipped, but none reached the post before the attack. For tunately there were on hand several cases of canister for the 12-pound howitzers, which contained round balls of caliber 69; these were used for the muskets, the powder for the cartridges being obtained from the treaty train. The canisters were refilled with broken pieces of cast iron and other materials. In this way about 2,000 cartridges were provided. The ladies of the garrison rendered ma terial assistance in making them.
September 4th and 5th frequent shots were fired from across the river. About daybreak on the 6th the Indians attacked the post with an increased force. They succeeded in getting into the stable, where a sharp fight took place for about ten minutes. Two Indians were killed and many wounded, and 2 of our men slightly wounded. After being driven from the stable the Indians attacked the fort from three sides, south, east and north. The hottest of the contest was at the commissary buildings, and at this point the howitzer did very effective ser vice, as was shown by the fact that the Indians left their dead upon the battle field. Eight or 10 dead were found there, half buried in the sand, on the bank of the river. On the west side of the new commissary building there was also a hot contest. Here was a small breastwork of hewed logs, defended by about 10 privates under Sergeants William Deutch and Fred Simon. This small force fought nobly, though greatly outnumbered, and succeeded in killing and wound ing many braves. Two of the killed were within thirty or forty feet of the breast works. The Indians failing to penetrate the garrison at these two points, con centrated their entire force at the southeast corner near the stables and the ferry. Here the fight, at times most furious, lasted till 3 P. M., the Indians losing many warriors. The post interpreter, Joseph Demarais (a half-breed), subsequently learned from the attacking force that their losses were so great they were dis couraged from renewing the attempt to take the fort. Our loss was 1 killed, Private Wm. Siegel, and 2 wounded, in the whole day s fight.
From this date there were no further attacks except from small squads of Indians, who would fire at the fort from the opposite side of the river. On the 21st of September two more dispatch carriers were sent to St. Paul, with an escort of 10 soldiers and 10 citizens to accompany them a part of the way. This detach ment on its return was ambushed by the Indians, and one soldier, "Wm. Schulz, and a citizen, Mr. Wright, were killed. September 23d brought re-enforcements, about 500 strong, under command of Captain Burger. Immediately after this Company D was relieved and ordered to join its regiment in the South, which it did at Germantown, Tenn., on the 14th of February, 1863.
There was a quasi-understanding between the Sioux and Chippewa Indians that they should make common war upon the whites, notwithstanding the two Indian nations were hereditary enemies, either of whom would kill the other at sight, and the one who took the scalp wore an eagle s feather. At the time of
190 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
the Sioux outbreak a portion of the Chippewa Indians had gathered at Gull Lake, about twenty-five miles north of Fort Ripley, which at that time was one of the frontier military posts, and, being only about ten miles from the Chippewa Agency, served as its defense.
This post, before the war, was usually garrisoned by a company of regulars, but during the summer of 1862 the command consisted of 30 men of Company C, Fifth Minnesota Volunteers, under command of Capt. Francis Hall, the balance of the company being away on detached service, under command of Lieut. T. J. Sheehan, at Fort Eidgley, where they nobly aided in the defense of the fort against a large body of Sioux. Fort Eipley was situated on the west bank of the Missis sippi river, one hundred and thirty miles by wagon road north of St. Paul and fifty miles from St. Cloud.
This troop, small as it was, seemed sufficient, as no one had anticipated trou ble with the Indians who for years had been perfectly friendly with the whites, so much so, that "Good Injun" was applied to all except a few wild bucks who would occasionally fill themselves with fire-water and amuse themselves by carv ing each other with hunting knives; but as this diversion was among themselves no one felt any uneasiness. The boys at the fort spent their time in hunting and fishing and such other amusements as their ingenuity might invent; consequently it was a season of pleasure to this little band until a messenger from, the agency brought the intelligence that the Indians at Gull Lake were killing cattle and were about to commence war upon the whites.
The Indian agent, Major Walker, requested the commander of the post to send soldiers to the agency to protect the government property. A glance at the situ ation revealed our helpless condition. Our arms consisted of old " Brown rifles," without bayonets, and for which we had no cartridges. We had four 6 -pound howitzers standing on the river bank, where they were usually kept during the summer months. For these we had ammunition, but only one man had ever loaded a gun larger than a blacksmith s anvil. That man was Ordnance Sergeant Frantzkey of the regular army, who was appointed to that position as a reward for twenty years service in the regular army, and assigned to duty in charge of ordnance at that post. The fort consisted of several one-story frame buildings, situated so as to form three sides of a square, the fourth side being the Mississippi river, which at this point runs from east to west. On the southwest corner upon the river bank, and the northeast corner diagonally opposite, were block houses, built of logs, with port-holes from which the cannon could command the four sides, providing there had been gunners to man them all. Between the buildings forming the fort were openings from ten to twenty-five feet wide, through which anyone might enter the inclosure unobstructed, except on the east side, where a stockade had been built of logs placed on end.
The reader can judge how helpless we would have been had the Indians at tacked us unawares. Fortunately, however, we were warned of the approach ing danger by a chief of the Pillager band, named Bad Boy, who refused to join with Hole-in-the-Day, head chief of the Chippewas, in his war upon the whites, and, to escape the wrath of the other tribes, took refuge at the fort with his family and a few of his tribe.
Upon receipt of the message from the agency all hands were set at work by candle-light making cartridges. At daylight, the morning of the 20th, the writer
OFFICIAL EEPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE. 191
with 20 men started for the agency, leaving the fort in charge of Sergeant Frantz- key. We had proceeded as far as Crow Wing village, seven miles from the fort, where we met Indian Agent Walker, with all the whites at the agency, in full retreat, having abandoned the government property. They reported the Indians were coming down from Gull Lake in force, and an attack was expected at any time.
Walker then issued the following order:
CHIPPEWA AGENCY, MINN., Aug. 19, 1862. COMMANDER AT FORT RIPLEY:
You are hereby directed to proceed immediately to the house of Puga-Nege-Sliek, or Hole-in- the-Day, in Crow Wing, or wherever else you may find him, and then arrest and at the fort or elsewhere hold him in close confinement until otherewise ordered.
Your obedient servant,
Lucius C. WALKER,
Indian Agent.
Walker thought by arresting the ringleader a check would be put upon the outbreak. A good house had been built for Hole-in-the-Day near the river, about two miles from Crow Wing village, where he lived with his squaws (three in number) and a few of his trusty lieutenants, for it was necessary for him to keep a body-guard, being acknowledged as head chief of all the Chippewas. Many of the tribes feared and hated him, as was proven a few years later when some of the Pillager Indians shot him from ambush, killing him on the spot.
. Thinking we might find him at his house, we started in that direction. Just as we got outside the village we discovered him in company with another chief, whom we succeeded in capturing, together with a six-shot Colt rifle, the property of Hole-in-the-Day. Suspecting what our intentions were, Hole-in-the-Day took to his heels, the soldiers in hot pursuit, through the woods. Having a better knowledge of the paths around the marshes, he succeeded in reaching his house in time to give the alarm to his squaws and Indian friends, who made their escape across the river in canoes. Sergt. D. K. Stacy and Privates Horning and Godley came up just in time to see them land and give them the command to halt. This order not being obeyed, a bullet was sent after them, which fire was promptly re turned. Several shots were exchanged. When Horning shot, Hole-in-the-Day fell. We afterward learned that he was confined to his tepee for several days, and we supposed he was wounded, though we could never learn positively, for an Indian considers it a great disgrace to be wounded and will keep it secret if possible.
Having failed in capturing the object of our chase we returned to the fort, and Sergeant Stacy started for St. Paul to advise the Governor of the situation and ask for re-enforcements. Mounted upon a mule, the sergeant made good time, and reached St. Cloud in time to catch the stage for St. Paul.
Upon our return to the fort, the ordnance sergeant was ordered to move the howitzers into the block houses, and instruct the soldiers how to use them. This move, as was afterward learned, saved us an attack, and consequently our scalps, for had the Indians made a determined effort we could not have successfully re sisted it. Hole-in-the-Day had sent scouts to watch our movements, and when they reported that we had moved the big guns from the river bank to the block houses they were puzzled, and concluded to wait until the Eed Lake Indians joined them, notwithstanding they had 275 warriors at Gull Lake, only twenty- five miles from the fort.
192 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
It is a matter of history that the outbreak of the Sioux was hastened by a few wild young bucks who commenced their depredations before the older ones were ready to strike. A similar state of affairs existed among the Chippewas. They were not ready to attack, but the early depredations and the timely information furnished by old Bad Boy put us on our guard, which, together with the fear an Indian entertains for a big gun, saved the whole northern part of the state from their murderous designs.
Agent Walker with his family started for St. Paul, and when a few miles from St. Cloud committed suicide, whether from fear or remorse no one ever knew. Immediate steps were taken to strengthen our position. Martial law was de clared. All white citizens were ordered to take refuge at the fort and assist in its defense. An additional stockade was commenced and barriers placed at the opening between the buildings. Governor Eamsey immediately ordered Captain Tattersall, Company II, Sixth Minnesota, Captain Libby, Company G, Seventh Minnesota, and Captain Burt, Company C, Seventh Minnesota, to go to our relief. They arrived at the fort about the last of August. Captain Hall having heard of the trouble hastened his return and resumed command of the post before re-en forcements arrived. The Eed Lake and Leech Lake Indians joined Hole-in-the Day, making his force number about 500 warriors, who moved their camp from Gull Lake to near the agency on the west bank of the Mississippi, north of the Crow Wing river, and about ten miles from the fort. The junction, however, was too late, as re-enforcements were within reaching distance of the fort.
Immediately following the troops came Mr. Dole, commissioner of Indian affairs, accompanied by C. W. Thompson, superintendent of Indian affairs for Minnesota, John G. Nicolay, President Lincoln s private secretary, and several persons of less note from Washington and other Eastern cities, making a party of about thirty.
Commissioner Dole sent a messenger to his royal highness Hole-in-the-Day, requesting an audience, to which the wily chief gave assent. It was arranged that a council should be held at Crow Wing village the next day, to which place the commissioner went, accompanied by his body-guard, one company of infantry and a detachment of Company C, Fifth Minnesota, all under command of Captain Hall, to meet, as they supposed, the chiefs of the various tribes. Imagine our surprise when we found ourselves surrounded by the whole force of Indians. The situation was anything but pleasant, but fortunately Hole-in-the-Day, who was a very shrewd fellow, expecting to gain more by diplomacy than by war, was will ing to concede to the demand of Captain Hall, that the Indians who had taken possession of the road leading to the fort l must withdraw or they would be blown to - - in five minutes." The commissioner was not ready to treat with them at such disadvantage, and by various pretexts adjourned the council until the next day, when we took the precaution to increase our force one company of infantry and a 6-pound howitzer. It was whispered that there would be some fun that day, but not an Indian appeared upon the scene.
The Indian traders and some of the Indians had taken a dislike to Agent Walker, and when they learned of his death one cause of their trouble was re moved. Knowing that their game had been checkmated, they were only too willing to negotiate with Commissioner Dole for a treaty of peace and disperse. Commissioner Dole returned to Washington, the citizens to their houses and the soldiers went South to take part in the War of the Rebellion.
|
|
|
Post by mdenney on Sept 2, 2007 13:38:13 GMT -5
OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE. 193
It is impossible to measure the magnitude of the service to Minnesota and to her people of the gallant defense of Forts Eidgley and Abercrombie, and the vigilance of the garrison at Fort Eipley, nor would it hardly be possible to exaggerate it. With scarcely a warning signal, the state was precipitated into all the horrors of an Indian war. The entire Sioux nation was upon the war path. With fire and tomahawk they had desolated and depopulated a wide stretch of the frontier, and were sweeping onward toward the populous portions of the state. The Chippewas in the north were restless and eager to join them. They were crouching, ready to sound their war-whoop and spring into the fray. Had these outposts fallen, a horde of barbarians from the north would have made common cause with these savages of the west, and the fairest portions of Min nesota would have become their easy prey.
Aside from the garrisons of these forts the state was practically in a defense less condition. She had suffered a serious drain of her able-bodied men for ser vice in the Eebellion, and though she had yet ample material for her defense, it required time to rally and organize it. The desperate stand made at these posts arrested the progress of the savages in the west, caused those in the north to hesi tate, and gave time for the authorities and the people to come to the rescue and save the populous portions of the state from, the horrors of desolation and death that had lain the frontier waste. Minnesota can never forget the debt of grati tude she owes to these gallant men of the Fifth Minnesota for this most timely and effective service.
FORT SNELLING, Aug. 20, 1862. His Excellency, ALEX. EAMSEY,
8t. Paul, Minn.,
SIR: I have the honor to report that the steamer Pomeroy has arrived here, with, however, but a portion of the fixed ammunition required, and without tents or camping equipage of any kind.
The men detailed for the expedition are now on board, ready for departure. I shall proceed to Shakopee with them, and endeavor to prepare transportation so as to be ready to move as soon as my quartermaster, Mr. Mills, shall have secured the articles above mentioned and other requisites, and rejoined me with them.
The men are without cooked rations, and I trust no time will be lost in having all these articles furnished, as they are necessary, not only to the comfort of the men, but to the success of the expedition.
Yery respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. H. SIBLEY, Colonel, Commanding.
PROCLAMATION BY THE GOVERNOR.
To the People of Minnesota :
The Sioux Indians upon our western frontier have risen in large bodies, at tacked the settlements, and are murdering men, women, and children. The rising appears concerted and extends from Fort Eipley to the southern boundary of the state. 13
194 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
In this extremity I call upon the militia of the valley of the Minnesota and the counties adjoining the frontier, to take horses and arm and equip themselves, taking with them subsistence for a few days, and at once report, separately or in squads, to the officer commanding the expedition now moving up the Minnesota river to the scene of hostilities. The officer commanding the expedition has been clothed with full power to provide for all exigencies that may arise.
Measures will be taken to subsist the forces so raised.
This outbreak must be suppressed, and in such manner as will forever prevent its repetition.
I earnestly urge upon the settlers on the frontier that, while taking all proper precautions for the safety of their families and homes, they will not give way to any unnecessary alarm. A regiment of infantry, together with 300 cavalry, have been ordered to their defense, and with the voluntary troops now being raised, the frontier settlements will speedily be placed beyond danger.
ALEXANDER EAMSEY.
Executive Chamber, St. Paul, Aug. 21, 1862.
ST. PAUL, MINN., Aug. 21, 1862 4 p. m. Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:
The Sioux Indians on our western border have risen, and are murdering men, women, and children. I have ordered a party of men out, under Col. H. H. Sibley, and given the command of the Sixth Regiment, also ordered up, to Capt. A. D. Nelson, U. S. Army. I must have Nelson. Telegraph at once.
ALEX. EAMSEY.
ST. PAUL, MINN., Aug. 21, 1862. Hon. C. P. WOLCOTT,
Assistant Secretary of War:
A most frightful insurrection of Indians has broken out along our whole fron tier. Men, women, and children are indiscriminately murdered; evidently the result of a deep-laid plan, the attacks being simultaneous along our whole border. The Governor has ordered out infantry. It is useless. Cannot you authorize me to raise 1,000 mounted men for the special service?
J. H. BAKER, Secretary of State.
ST. PAUL, Aug. 21, 1862. Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War,
DEAR SIR: On the 19th inst., I was informed by an express messenger from Maj. Thomas J. Galbraith, agent for the Sioux Indians, and from Lieutenants Gere and Cullen, stationed at Fort Eidgley, that the Sioux Indians in consider able numbers were taking the lives and destroying the property of citizens of that vicinity.
OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE. 195
I immediately organized an expedition, composed of four companies of infantry of the Sixth Minnesota Volunteers, and placed them under the charge of ex-Gov ernor Sibley, with orders to proceed as rapidly as possible to the scenes of the massacre, for the purpose of giving protection to the settlers and of arresting the cruel barbarities of the savages. Having learned about midnight last night by special messenger that there was also trouble with the Chippewas in the region of Fort Eipley, and that the agent of that tribe with his family had been driven into the fort, and that further difficulties were apprehended, I have dispatched one company of infantry from the men at Fort Snelling to report at Fort Eipley at the earliest time possible. ALEX. EAMSEY.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE, ST. PAUL, Aug. 21, 1862. General MALMROS:
Lieutenant Fobes of the Fifth Minnesota Volunteers, in command at Fort Eipley, informs me that in consequence of some difficulties with the Chippewa Indians, the agent for that tribe fled to the fort for protection, and that the Indians, it is apprehended, may continue in this temper. You will therefore dispatch one company of infantry from those now at Fort Snelling, to report at Fort Eipley at the earliest possible day. ALEX. EAMSEY.
BELLE PLAINE, Evening 21st [Aug."], 1862.
MY DEAR SIR: I have just received your note of yesterday. I leave with 225 men for St. Peter to-morrow evening, and hope to be there by 3 or 4 o clock, from which point I will be directed in my movements by latest intelligence. ]N"ews just received here, whether true or false, state that either the fort or the outbuildings were burned last night. Don t expose yourself to attack by an overwhelming force before I unite forces with you.
I send a special messenger to-morrow morning to Glencoe to recall Captain Grant with a detachment of 150 men, who I ordered from Carver to pass by Glencoe and unite with me at Fort Eidgley. I shall direct him to make his way as rapidly as possible to St. Peter; for if the recent intelligence is to be credited, we shall need a considerable force to operate with success.
Communicate with me at St. P. if you can. With best wishes, believe me,
Your friend,
Hon. C. E. FLANDRAU, H. H. SIBLEY.
St. Peter or Neio Ulm.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, Aug. 22, 1862. Brigadier General SCHOFIELD,
St. Louis, Mo.:
Send the Third Eegiment Minnesota Volunteers against the Indians on the frontier of Minnesota. H. W. HALLECK,
General-in- Chief.
196 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, Aug. 24, 1862.
Governor EAMSEY,
St. Paul, Minn.:
If General Schofield can spare the Third Minnesota Volunteers they will be sent to you. They either have been or soon will be exchanged.
H. W. HALLECK, Geneml-in- Chief.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, Aug. 24, 1862.
Brigadier General SCHOFIELD,
St. Louis, Mo.:
If the Third Minnesota Volunteers can be spared send them to St. Paul, Minn. They have been or soon will be exchanged.
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in- Chief.
HEADQUARTERS INDIAN EXPEDITION, ST. PETER, Aug. 22, 1862.
His Excellency, ALEX. EAMSEY,
SIR: Mr. Shelley will give you a detailed statement of all the news here up to the present, and I send with him a dispatch from Judge Flandrau, giving val uable information from the New Ulm region, where he now is.
I arrived with the three companies to-day, after a very fatiguing march through the big woods, where the roads are execrable.
I send Lieutenants Cox and Buck, with portions of their companies from Mc- ollet and Sibley counties, to Judge Flandrau s aid very early in the morning. Major Fowler is here, and his military ability should be employed here.
If you desire me to remain in charge of operations here, I would be gratified if you would send him a commission as lieutenant colonel, which I think he would accept, although I have not asked him.
I learn from Captain Skaro that Colonel Nelson was employed in preparing to dispatch 300 mounted men and 300 infantry here immediately. Be sure that he brings ample supplies of Springfield muskets and ammunition.
I learn that the United States quartermaster has these arms on hand, which he does not feel authorized to issue until the regiments of volunteers are fully organized. I would respectfully suggest that if red tape is in the way in this emergency, that you cut it with the bayonets of a corporal s guard.
This is no emergency of a common nature, to be dallied with in the circumlo cution office.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. H. SIBLEY, Colonel, Commanding.
OFFICIAL EEPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE. 197
ST. PETER, Aug. 22, 1862. Hon. C. E. FLANDRAU,
New Ulm 9
DEAR SIR: I have received your dispatch and that of Mr. Myrick s inclosed and have sent them to Governor Eamsey to-night. I did not arrive with my command until after dark, the men being very much fatigued by their long march through the woods in execrable roads. I send Lieutenant Cox (to whom I have issued 50 Austrian muskets) with 74 men and 48 under command of Lieutenant Buck to report to you. My detachments from the north side have not yet ar rived, but I hope they will be here to-morrow. I will let you know to-morrow, if opportunity offers, should they come in, and we will act in concert in our opera tions. I do not see that any advantage would be gained to the garrison in the fort by simply opening communication without the means of furnishing any sup plies, but if you deem it necessary, we will make the attempt when my men all arrive. Captain Skaro reports that Governor Eamsey and Colonel Nelson are diligently employed in equipping 300 mounted men and 300 infantry for instant service, and that they will be here very soon. I have no more guns to distribute. Write me if you need larger force to hold your position before the re-enforcements arrive. I will act in any quarter where my small force can be effective, but it is evident that no formidable demonstration can be made until we are largely re-en forced. Yours very sincerely,
H. H. SIBLEY, Colonel, Commanding.
ULM, Aug. 22, 1862 3 p.m. Ex-Governor SIBLEY:
Your dispatch of 21st, evening, is this moment received. I inclose a dispatch that I haA 7 e just received from My rick, whom you have probably seen. It was delayed at the ferry, and useless. I could not have re-enforced the fort had I received it in time, being weak myself. They had over 100 men there, as I learned from a man who left there the morning of the 20th; nothing had occurred at that time. I sent a dispatch to the fort on the 20th, and my man was seen within one and one-half miles of the fort going in. I fear the man spoken of by Myrick is my messenger, as he has not returned. I have no further news from the fort, and can tell you no more than Myrick will, save the fact of the numbers there, which you probably did not know, and Myrick could not inform you. I learn that a company of citizens, 100 strong, left St. Peter for the fort this morning. If so, my opinion is that if you make a junction with your detail to Glencoe of 150 men, which will give you 375, and with 100 already gone up will make 475, you liad better send about 200 this way, and the other 275 the other side to the fort. I have about 200 men here, but very poorly armed, and they are getting dis satisfied at being detained and want to get back to their farms and families. I would like very much to see you if you have any man you can intrust with com mand to the fort. I don t think the Indians have taken it, but not knowing the extent of the outbreak can form no idea of the force they have. It must be con siderable, or they would not attack the fort. The men at the fort were the balance
|
|
|
Post by mdenney on Sept 2, 2007 13:39:15 GMT -5
198 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
of the soldiers, some citizens, and Major Galbraith, with 50 or 60 men. The Indians may not have known of the re-enforcements, and have attacked on the supposition that no one was there but those left of the garrison.
I have large expeditions out all day, which weakens me, but I think I can hold the town until you come, if not attacked by a very large force. I hear of Indians all around me, but see none. I am making some intrenchments, etc. I am sure that everything above is lost, and all the people killed. I have found a spear at one of the houses sacked about eight miles from here that is unquestion ably Yarikton; also, a saddle, the ordinary pads with beads. This leads me to believe that it is the Indians from the region of the Missouri that attend the payment that are doing the mischief. There may, however, be a general rising.
If you can come this way, do so, and we can co-operate. We are but eighteen miles from the fort, and can go there if necessary, as well from here as any other point. I wish you would leave the same evening you get to St. Peter, if possible. The roads are good, and you can get here by morning. I have a good ferry to- cross you at Eed Stone, about two miles below the town.
I think I have said all that will be of service to you, and now urge expedition,. by all means. Wishing you success and speed, I am, yours,
CHAS. E. FLANDRAU, Commanding at New Vim.
Bring powder, lead and caps. We are short. Send me a dispatch from La Fayette if you go to the fort, and order the officer you send, if you come this way, to do so. C. E. F.
Eeports of 3 and 4 Indians in squads, driving cattle and horses toward the river, have been made from the opposite side about six miles distant above here. I have a party of about 30 men to find out the truth. You may send this on to Governor Bamsey if you think best. C. E. F.
ST. PETER, Aug. 24, 1862 10:80 a. m. Governor KAMSEY,
St. Paul,
DEAR SIR: I refer you for details to my official communication to the adju tant general, and I trust my requisitions and recommendations will meet your approbation and be carried out in every particular. There is no use to disguise the fact that unless we can now, and very effectually, crush this rising, the state is ruined, and some of its fairest portions will revert for years into the possession of these miserable wretches, who, among all devils in human shape, are among the most cruel and ferocious. To appreciate this, one must see, as I have, the muti lated bodies of their victims. My heart is steeled against them, and if I have the means, and can catch them, I will sweep them with the besom of death.
Don t think there is exaggeration in the terrible pictures given by individuals. They fall short of the dreadful reality. This very moment the work of destruction is going on within ten miles, and yet we have not mounted force enough to spare for chasing and destroying the rascals. A family was fired upon last night within four miles of here, and a boy killed. You will hear of stirring events very soon.
OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE. 199
Cullen and Nelson will reach here to-day, and to-morrow we shall move toward the fort. The trouble will be in keeping up our communications and guarding our rear and the villages and people, and still retain men enough for active operations in the field.
Please not to forget that we are without mail communications, and would like to have late papers occasionally by these special messengers.
I have no word from my family since I left, except from some one indirectly, who saw Mrs. S. going straight to St. Paul to obtain a guard against the Indians, supposed to be lurking in the Mendota thickets. Please send any letters there may be for me from her or others.
Very truly yours,
H. H. SlBLEY.
I opened Flandrau s dispatch to you, supposing it might contain something essential for me to know. It is not of the latest. Any letters for officers or men 3 send to me.
ST. PAUL, MINN., Aug. 25, 1862 2:80 p. m. E. M. ST ANTON:
The Indian war is still progressing. I have sent up the Sixth Eegiment, and called out 1,000 horsemen. The panic among the people has depopulated whole counties, and in view of this I ask that there be one month added to the several dates of your previous orders for volunteers, drafts, etc. 22d August be 22d September, 1st September be 1st October, 3d September be 3d October. In view of the distracted condition of the country, this is absolutely necessary.
ALEX. EAMSEY.
I have a full knowledge of all the facts, and I urge a concurrence in this request. WM. P. DOLE,
Commissioner Indian Affairs.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, Aug. 25, 1862. Governor EAMSEY,
St. Paul, Minn.,
The Secretary of War directs me to say that a regiment of mounted infantry for three months service will be received. H. W. HALLEOK,
General-in- Chief.
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY EXPEDITION,
Aug. 26, 1862. Governor EAMSEY,
DEAR SIR: We move this morning in the direction of the fort, and will reach there to-morrow. The Indians are either concentrating their forces to fight us before we reach the fort or they are in full retreat, with a view of eluding our
200 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
pursuit. Oh, that I had the means to pursue and crush these wretches, without being obliged at every moment to halt and calculate how far I can go, and how long I can get along without the veriest necessaries. We are here without a soli tary ration except of pork, and of that but little.
The Sixth Eegiment has seven days rations belonging to them; the rest of the post, which includes men, women and children, absolutely nothing. Never theless, I propose to reach the fort and relieve the occupants at once, which I have not dared to attempt before, as a disastrous repulse of my force would be the ruin of the state. What I most dread, with the raw elements that compose my column, is a night attack and panic. This I will use every precaution to prevent, and as to ambushments and flags of truce, they will be provided against in the first place, and I shall certainly fire upon the latter. The day for com promise of any kind has past. The war of races has begun again, renewed in its old and simplest form, and one must go to the wall.
I have no official report to make now, having written a long dispatch on the 24th. Governor Donnelly arrived late last evening. I shall probably send an advance of mounted men to communicate with the fort this evening.
Truly yours,
H. H. SlBLEY.
ST. PAUL, MINN., Aug. 26, 1862 2 p. m. Major General HALLECK,
General-in- Chief.
Could not Minnesota and Dakota be organized into a military department and Gen. W. S. Harney sent to chastise the Sioux? ALEX. BAMSEY,
Governor of Minnesota.
ST. PAUL, MINN., Aug 26, 1862 2 p. m. Hon. E. M. STANTON:
When the Indian outbreak was first known here, on the 20th instant, I at once called upon the people everywhere to mount horses and with what arms they had to march to the scene of difficulty. Hundreds have done so, and they should be mustered as well as can be at once, and I would suggest Maj. Howard Stansbury, a retired officer of the Eegular Army, resident here, for that purpose, and report to me - ALEX. RAMSEY.
ST. PAUL, MINN., Aug. 26, 1862 10p.m. President LINCOLN:
With the concurrence of Commissioner Dole, I have telegraphed the Secretary of War for an extension of one month of drafting, etc. The Indian outbreak has come upon us suddenly. Half the population of the state are fugitives. It is absolutely impossible that we should proceed. The Secretary of War denies our request. I appeal to you, and ask for an immediate answer. No one not here can conceive the panic in the state. ALEX. RAMSEY,
Governor of Minnesota.
OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE. 201
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY EXPEDITION, Aug. 26, 1862.
Capt. CHAS. E. FLANDRAU,
Marikato,
SIR: You will direct Lieutenant Cox, with his command, to return to their headquarters, and proceed to join my forces in the field. This is intended to include the auxiliary squad or section of a company commanded by Lieutenant Buck. The company of volunteers commanded by Capt. A. J. Edgerton I have directed to return to the Winnebago Agency, and remain there until further orders.
I cannot refrain from congratulating you and your command for the gallant and protracted defense of a weak position against a numerous and ferocious enemy. I shall take pleasure in representing the facts to the commander-in-chief, and in bearing my testimony to your personal skill and bravery as the leader in the defense. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. H. SlBLEY,
Colonel, Commanding.
ST. PAUL, MINN., Aug. 27, 186210:80 a. m. PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:
We are in the midst of a most terrible a$d exciting Indian war. Thus far the massacre of innocent white settlers has been fearful. A wild panic prevails in nearly one-half of the state. All are rushing to the frontier to defend settlers.
M. S. WILKINSON, W. P. DOLE, JNO. G. NICOLAY.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, Aug. 27, 1862. GOVERNOR EAMSEY,
St. Paul, Minn.:
Yours received. Attend to the Indians. If the draft cannot proceed of course it will not proceed. Necessity knows no law. The Government cannot extend the time. A. LINCOLN.
|
|
|
Post by mdenney on Sept 2, 2007 13:40:20 GMT -5
ST. PAUL, MINN., Aug. 27, 1862 4:10 p. m. Hon. P. H. WATSON:
When the Indian war broke out, by proclamation I called out all men of the counties adjacent to the seat of war, to furnish their own horses, arms, etc., and report to the officer in command. They, from necessity, were not mustered. There are about 700 out, and there ought, as near as can, to be a muster of men and horses. I will hereafter proceed to call out the three-months men into the service of the United States. From policy I do not do it immediately.
ALEX. EAMSEY.
202 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
ST. PAUL, MINN., Aug. 27, 1862. Hon. E. M. STANTON:
The Indian war grows more extensive. The Sioux, numbering perhaps 2,000 warriors, are striking along a line of scattered frontier settlements of 200 miles, having already massacred several hundred whites, and the settlers of the whole border are in panic and flight, leaving their harvest to waste in the field, as I have myself seen even in neighborhoods where there is no danger. The Chippe- was, a thousand warriors strong, are turbulent and threatening, and the Winne- bagoes are suspected of hostile intent. The Governor is sending all available forces to the protection of the frontier, and organizing the militia, regular and irregular, to fight and restore confidence. As against the Sioux, it must be a war of extermination. The Governor needs six field-pieces complete, with horse equipments and fixed ammunition; six 12-pounder mounted howitzers; arms, accouterinents and horse equipments for 1,200 cavalry; 5,000 or 6,000 guns, with 500,000 cartridges to suit; medical stores for three regiments and blankets for 3, 000 men. He earnestly asks that you send these, or so much thereof as possible. I am satisfied that I state facts correctly. Colonel Aldrich is just in from the Sioux country, and confirms the worst news. JNO. G. NICOLA Y.
STATE OF MINNESOTA, EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,
ST. PAUL, Aug. 27, 1862. Hon. CHARLES E. FLANDRAU,
with Indian Expedition,
DEAR SIR: My time has been so occupied I have not before had leisure for thanking you for your several favors.
The Indians are troublesome along the entire line of our frontier and the pres sure for assistance from every direction is immense.
We have witnessed with great pleasure and gratitude your prompt and efficient protection to the inhabitants of New Ulm and defense of that place.
Very respectfully, yours,
ALEX. KAMSEY.
ST. PETER, Aug. 27, 1862. Governor EAMSEY,
St. Paul, Minn.,
MY DEAR SIR: I send under this cover my report of the second battle of New Ulm. You have no idea of the fears entertained by the people on the south of the Minnesota, from Mankato up to New Ulm and the Des Moines river, on account of the utter absence of troops in that region. Governor Sibley has moved with a force of some 1,500 men up the Minnesota from this point, but since the withdrawal from New Ulni, the other side has been left unguarded, which I deem unsafe and improper. It is true the advance of such a large force up toward the fort may fix the attention of the Indians upon the upper country, but it is by no means certain that they will not move out to the Watonwan, and even down the Blue Earth, relying on their swiftness for safety.
OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE. 208
Captain Dane has a very efficient company of mounted men out at Crystal Lake, about ten miles from Mankato, a capital point from which to scour the country, Ibut he has no force with which to hold the country, or to advance. The great consideration now is to save the grain. Governor Donnelly has issued a proclamation, advising the inhabitants to return to their homes, etc., but five hundred muskets would do much more good. I have offers of men enough, if they would be furnished with guns.
The mill at Mankato is burned, and flour getting scarce. There is a capital mill at Garden City, that, with fifty muskets of good long range, the inhabitants would put in operation at once, and set to work three or four threshing machines, but they cannot get them. Cannot you direct some 400 or 500 troops from this side to the other, to aid in saving the immense crops that will otherwise rot on the ground?
Ex-Governor Sibley has charged me with the conduct of affairs in that part of the country, but I am powerless to act without men and arms. There are many volunteers ready to report whom I could receive if I could only arm. them, and get something to subsist them on.
The regulars should have their uniforms, as the men hereabouts are utterly naked after a campaign of a week. The whole country from Mankato to New Ulni is ready to follow me back to that point and beyond, if necessary, gathering the crops and collecting the stock, if they had proper arms. The necessity is great, and if you can, do aid us speedily. Truly yours,
CHARLES E. FLAXDRAU.
If you desire my services to conduct matters on the west side or elsewhere, I wish you would give me some kind of authority. I cannot hold any commission,, and don t want any, but desire to be useful at this crisis of the state.
Give me some kind of a roving, irregular commission.
Truly yours,
C. E. FLANDRAU.
BATTLE OF NEW ULM.-Aug-, 23, 1862. Report of Col. Charles E. Flandrau, Commanding Forces.
ST. PETER, Aug. 27, 1862.
His Excellency, Governor ALEX. EAMSEY,
St. Paul, Minn.,
SIR: Events have transpired so rapidly, and my time has been so taken up since my last communication, that I cannot with certainty recall the condition of things existing at its date, but believe I wrote you almost immediately preceding the second attack upon New Ulm, which occurred on Saturdy last, the 23d in stant.
During the morning we discovered a succession of fires on the Mcollet county side of the river, very near the bluffs, approaching us from the direction of Fort Eidgley. Our supposition was that the fort had fallen and that the Indians were
204 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
moving down upon the town on that side of the river, to unite with another party on the side we were occupying. As they increased in number very rapidly, I thought it best to send a detachment to ascertain the design of the enemy, and if possible, give him a check.
Lieutenant Huey, of Traverse des Sioux, volunteering to perform the service, I detailed 75 men with him, and they crossed at the ferry opposite the town about 9 o clock A. M.
Very shortly after their departure the Indians were discovered issuing from the woods above the town in large numbers and assembling upon the prairie. I at once posted all my available force upon the open prairie outside the town, .about half a mile at some points, and at a greater distance toward the point at which I conceived the attack would be made, determined to give them battle in the open field, where I conceived would be our greatest advantage.
At nearly 10 A. M. the body began to move toward us, at first slowly, and then with considerable rapidity. The men were encouraged by their officers to stand firm and meet the attack, and all promised well. We had in all about 250 gurfs, while the Indians were variously estimated at from 400 to 500. I fixed the number at not over 350.
Their advance upon the sloping prairie in the bright sunlight was a very fine spectacle, and to such inexperienced soldiers as we all were, intensely exciting. When within about one mile and a half of us the mass began to expand like a fan, and increase in the velocity of its approach, and continued this movement until within about double rifle-shot, when it had covered our entire front. Then the savages uttered a terrific yell and came down upon us like the wind. I had stationed myself at a point in the rear, where communication could be had with me easily, and awaited the first discharge with very great anxiety, as it seemed to me that to yield was certain destruction, as the enemy would rush into the town and drive all before them. The yell unsettled the men a little, and just after the rifles began to crack they fell back along the whole line, and committed the error of passing the outer houses without taking possession of them, a mistake which the Indians immediately took advantage of by themselves occupying them in squads of 2, 3 and up to 10. They poured into us a sharp and rapid fire as we fell back, and opened from the houses in every direction. Several of us rode up the hill endeavoring to rally the men, and with good effect, as they gave three cheers and sallied out of various houses they had retreated to, and checked the advance effectually. The firing from both sides then became general, sharp and rapid, and it got to be a regular Indian skirmish, in which every man did his own work after his own fashion.
The Indians had spread out until they had got into our rear, and on all sides, having the very decided advantage of the houses on the bluff which commanded the interior of the town, with the exception of the windmill, which was occupied by about 20 of the Le Sueur Tigers, who held them at long range. The wind was from the lower part of the town, and this fact directed the larger part of the enemy to that point, where they promptly commenced firing the houses, and ad vancing behind the smoke. The conflagration became general in the lower town on both sides of the street, and the bullets flew very thickly, both from the bluffs .and up the street. I thought it prudent to dismount and direct the defense on foot.
BATTLE OF NEW ULM. 205
Just at this point Captain Dodd of St. Peter and someone else whose name I do not know charged down the street to ascertain (as I have since learned) whether some horsemen seen in the extreme lower town were not our friends coming in, and were met about three blocks down with a heavy volley from be hind a house, five bullets passing through Captain Dodd and several through his horse. They both turned, and the captain got in sufficiently near to be received by his friends before he fell. He died about five hours after being hit. Too much cannot be said of his personal bravery and general desire to perform his duty thoroughly.
Captain Saunders of the Le Sueur company was shot through a part of his body and retired, placing his rifle in effective hands and encouraging the men. The fight was going on all around the town during the whole forenoon and part of the afternoon, sometimes with slight advantage to us and again to the Indians, but the difficulty that stared us in the face was their gradual but certain approach up the main street, behind the burning buildings, which promised our destruc tion. We frequently sallied out and took buildings in advance, but the risk of being picked off from the bluff was unequal to the advantage gained, and the duty was performed with some reluctance by the men.
In the lower part of the town I had some of the best men in the state, both as shots and for coolness and determination. It will be sufficient to name two as types of a class of the best fighting men in the West, Asa White and Newell Houghton, known to all old settlers. They did very effective service in checking the advance, both by their unerring rifles and the good example their steadiness placed before the younger men.
We discovered a concentration of Indians on the side of the street toward the river and at the rear of the buildings, and anticipated a rush upon the town from that position, the result of which I feared more than anything else, as the boys had proved unequal to it in the morning; but we were not disappointed, for in a few minutes they came on ponies and afoot, furiously, about sixty in number, charg ing around the point of a little grove of oaks.
This was the critical point of the day, but four or five hours under fire had brought the boys up to the fighting temperature, and they stood firmly, and ad vanced with a cheer, routing the rascals like sheep. They received us with a very hot fire, killing Houghton and an elderly gentleman whose name I did not know. l As they fled in a crowd at very short range we gave them a volley that was very effectual and settled the fortunes of the day in our favor, for they did not dare to try it over. I think after once repulsing them in a fair fight, we could have successfully resisted them had they ventured a second time, as the necessary confidence had been gained.
White men fight under a great disadvantage the first time they engage Indians. There is something so fiendish in their yells and terrifying in their appearance when in battle, that it takes a great deal of time to overcome the unpleasant sensation it inspires. Then there is a snake-like stealth in all their movements that excites distrust and uncertainty which unsteadies the nerves at first.
After this repulse the battle raged until dark without sufficient advantage one side or the other to merit mention in detail, when the savages drew off, firing only an occasional shot from under close cover.
1. Mr. John Summers of Nicollet county.
206 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
After dark we decreased the extent of our barricades, and I deemed it pru dent to order all the buildings outside to be burned, in order to prevent their having cover from behind which to annoy us. We were compelled to consume some forty valuable buildings, but as it was a military necessity the inhabitants did not demur, but themselves applied the torch cheerfully. In a short time we had a fair field before us of open prairie, with the exception of a large square brick building, which we held, and had loopholed in all the stories on all sides, which commanded a large portion of our front toward the bluff. We also dug a system of rifle-pits on the front outside the barricades, about four rods apart, which completed our defenses.
That night we slept very little, every man being at the barricades all night, each third man being allowed to sleep at intervals. In the morning the attack was renewed, but not with much vigor, and subsided about noon.
During the day a body of men appeared in the lower town, and turned out to be a detachment of 150 volunteers from Nicollet and Sibley counties, under Capt. E. St. Julien Cox, which had been forwarded to our relief by Colonel Sibley. They had about fifty Austrian rifles and the rest were armed with shotguns and hunting rifles. Their appearance inspired us with gladness, as things were be coming doubtful.
I held a council of the officers, and we determined to attempt an evacuation of the town, carrying off all the inhabitants, women and children, sick and wounded, to the number of about 2, 000. This movement was a very perilous one to undertake with the force at our command, but the confined state of the town was rapidly producing disease among the women and children, who were huddled in cellars and close rooms like sheep in a cattle car, and we were fast becoming short of ammunition and provisions. I feared the result of another attack by a larger force, and all the people decided that they would abandon the town the first opportunity, as residence there was impossible under the circumstances.
At daylight the next morning the barricades were broken and the wagons taken out and put in motion. The scene was one of indescribable confusion and distraction. The poor people, naturally desirous of taking away all they could, filled their wagons with boxes and baggage to the exclusion (as we found before the train was completed) of many of the women and wounded. I was therefore compelled to order all articles of a bulky nature tumbled out, and their places supplied by more valuable freight. It was hard, but necessary, and the inhabi tants yielded with less reluctance than I had anticipated.
About 9 o clock A. M. we moved, with 153 wagon loads of women, children, sick and wounded, and a large company on foot. Lieutenant Cox took the gen eral disposition of the escort, and the various commands were posted so as to best protect the whole in case of attack. It was a melancholy spectacle to see 2,000 people, who a few days before had been prosperous and happy, reduced to utter beggary, starting upon a journey of thirty miles, through a hostile country, every inch of which we expected to be called upon to defend from an attack, the issue of which was life or horrid butchery. Beggary, starvation and probable destruc tion were at one end of the road, a doubtful escape from the latter at the other. We took the latter alternative, and under Providence we got through.
During the battle we lost, as nearly as I can ascertain, about 10 killed and 50 wounded. I can give you no accurate detail of either, as the casualties occurred
|
|
|
Post by mdenney on Sept 2, 2007 13:41:04 GMT -5
BATTLE OF NEW ULM. 207
among citizens, soldiers and strangers. The physicians, of whom fortunately we had a good supply, may have kept some hospital lists, but I have been too much occupied to ascertain. I was satisfied to know the wounded were well cared for, without knowing who they were.
I was seconded ably and bravely by all the officers and most of the men of the companies, and many citizens of different points of the state, and strangers who were present. So uniform was their good conduct, and valuable their services, that one could not be mentioned without naming all. There were several cases of abandonment immediately preceding the attack, which, if designed to evade the struggle, were disgraceful in the extreme and unworthy of Americans, but as they may have arisen from other causes I will not report the names of the parties. Many narrow escapes occurred during the protracted fight, several persons were shot through the hat, one young man received three bullets through different parts of his pantaloons, in rapid succession, without being hurt in the least.
We did not burn the town on leaving, thinking possibly that the Indians might not return and destroy it, and not deeming it much of a defense for them should they occupy it on our return.
It was my design that the country between New Ulna and Mankato should be immediately reoccupied by our troops, and the temporary loss by our withdrawal regained at once by fresh troops, well equipped and capable of remaining in the field, and I looked for material of that sort for the business on my arrival, but not a soldier from the regular service, except Captain Davis, with 100 men and horses, has yet reached that part of the country, which is at this moment utterly defenseless, except so far as he is capable of holding it. The citizen volunteers that went to the assistance of New Ulna disbanded pretty generally on their return, being barefooted, overworked and required at their homes. I wish your Excellency would turn the tide of soldiers flowing into the valley to the Blue Earth region, from which position the whole southern part of the state can be protected, and efficient co-operation afforded the column advancing upon the north side of the Minnesota.
Hoping my operations meet your approval.
I am, truly your obedient servant,
CHAS. E. FLANDRAU, Commanding West of the Minnesota.
List of Killed and Wounded in the Battles of New Vim, Aug. 19, 23 and 24, 1862, as
Compiled from Roster.
CAPT. JOHN BELM S COMPANY, NEW ULM, ELEVENTH REGIMENT, STATE MILITIA Killed: <&. W. Otto Barth, Jacob Castor, William England, Julius Kirschstein, Matthias Meyer, John C. Michaels, August Roepke, Leopold Senzke.
Wounded: L. Fay, R. Fischer, Julius Guetling, Wilhelm Guetling, George Guetlich,
Hess, Hansmann, Harrimann, Daniel G. Shillock, August Westphal.
LE SUEUR TIGERS No. 1, CAPT. WM. DELLAUGHTER Killed: First Lieut. A. W. Edwards, Wm. Lusky.
Wounded John Smith, Luke Smith son (died of wounds).
LE SUEUR TIGERS No. 2, CAPT. E. C. SAUNDEES Killed : Fifth Sergt. Wm. Maloney, Mathew Aherin, Washington Kulp.
Wounded: Corp. Thomas Hazzard.
208 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
CAPT. WM. BIERBAUER S MANKATO COMPANY Killed: Newel E. Houghton, Wm. Nicholson.
Wounded: Privates George Andrews, F. M. Andrews, Patrick Burns, John Fassat, Adam Frenndler.
CAPT. CHARLES E. FLANDRAU S COMPANY, ST. PETER FRONTIER GUARDS, COMMANDED BY CAPT. WOLF H. MEYER Killed: First Lieut. W. B. Dodd, Max Haack, Jerry Quane, Luke Smith, John Summers, Rufus Huggins.
Wounded : Privates Edw. Andrews, W. C. Essler, Wm. Langharst, George Moser.
CAPTAIN Louis BUGGERT S COMPANY Killed: Capt. Louis Buggert.
NEW ULM COMPANY Killed : Ferdinand Krause, August Riemann.
COMPANY A, FIRST BATTALION, BROWN COUNTY MILITIA, COMMANDED BY CAPT. CHARLES Koos Wounded: Privates John Peller, Louis Schmelz.
MILFORD COMPANY Killed : Jacob Haeberle.
Citizens killed Aug. 19, 1862, returning from a reconnaissance : Almond D. Loomis, Uri Loomis, Wm. Tuttle, Wm. Carroll, George Lamb, De Witt Lemon, Ole Olson, Nels Olson, Tory Olson, Jan Tomson.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON CITY, D. C., Aug. 27, 1862. His Excellency, GOVERNOR EAMSEY,
St. Paul, Minn.,
SIR: I have yours of the 19th inst., requesting to be advised whether you shall cause the names of clergymen and such other persons as are commonly ex empted to be stricken from the rolls before drafting commences. In reply, I would say that the Secretary of War cannot designate classes of men not included in the law to be stricken from the lists, but can discharge from service any who ought not to serve, after the draft is made. He reserves all questions of that kind until then. Very respectfully,
C. P. BUCKINGHAM,
Brig Gen. and A. A. G.
STATE OF MINNESOTA, EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,
ST. PAUL, Aug. 28, 1862. To Whom it May Concern :
The Hon. Charles E. Flandrau is hereby authorized to proceed with expedi tion to the Blue Earth country, embracing the counties lying south of the Minne sota river, as high up as the town of New Ulm, and to take such measures as in his judgment he may deem advisable to secure that portion of our frontier and restore confidence to the settlers. For this purpose he is authorized to employ such persons, organize such military companies and to use such means as may be necessary for the objects. He is further authorized to use and control for the purposes above stated such companies or parts of companies as may now be in that locality or such as may be detailed for that purpose by the colonel command ing the Indian expedition. In his absence he is authorized to appoint a suitable person in his place with the same powers for the purposes herein enumerated.
ALEX. EAMSEY.
OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE. 209
WINNEBAGO AGENCY, Aug. 28, 1862. To His Excellency, GOVERNOR EAMSEY,
DEAR SIR: I arrived here with my company of 100 men on the 25th inst., and found great alarm existing here among the whites and half-breeds. At the urgent solicitation of Major Balcombe, I rested a few hours and dispatched a messenger to Colonel Sibley, giving him an account of the excitement and fear at this place. He ordered us immediately to New Ulni, but before we had reached that place it was deserted and we were ordered back to this place.
Your obedient servant,
A. J. EDGERTON.
p g, Information in reference to the danger and necessity of our remaining or not, will be given you by Lieutenant McMicken.
A. J. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C., Aug. 29, 1862. Governor EAMSEY,
St. Paul, Minn.)
The "War Department is not prepared at present to create a new military department in the West.
H. W. HALLECK, General-in- Chief.
STATE OP MINNESOTA, EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,
ST. PAUL, Aug. 80. 1862. Hon. CHAS. E. FLANDRAU,
St. Peter,
DEAR SIR: Your letter of the 27th inst., inclosing your report of the second battle of New TJlrn, has come to hand.
Our entire population feel very grateful to you for the gallant part you have taken in the defense of New Ulm and the frontier in that vicinity.
Yesterday I sent you authority to take command of the section of country south of the Minnesota river for the purpose of protecting that portion of the frontier and restoring confidence to the settlers.
We think the Indians have retired beyond the fort with their booty and prisoners and are not likely to return.
I have ordered two companies of horse into that region of country and have requested Colonel Sibley to send two companies of infantry to the Winnebago Agency and also two companies down through the Watonwan country if he can spare them.
You will please communicate with and report to Colonel Sibley.
Very respectfully, yours,
ALEX. EAMSEY.
210 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, STATE OF MINNESOTA, ADJUTANT GENERAL S OFFICE,
ST. PAUL, Sept. 3, 1862. Col. CHARLES E. FLANDRAU:
Inclosed please find commission and Special Order No. 74. The coinrnander- in-chief directs me to say, that he is greatly gratified by the good judgment, skill and bravery displayed by you in the struggles against the savages, and hopes that you will continue to assist in restoring peace to the frontier counties in which you have already performed invaluable services.
Several companies or fractions of companies have been ordered to report to Mr. Holley, land agent at Winnebago City, Blue Earth county, whom you will also take under your command and report to Colonel Sibley. You will also in form Colonel Sibley that to us it seems inexpedient to remove any troops under your command from the southwestern frontier. The order is not to be under stood as requiring you to move your command so as to join Colonel Sibley s forces, but simply to report their number, condition, etc., to him. I remain, sir, truly your obedient servant,
OSCAR MALMROS, Adjutant General.
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, STATE OF MINNESOTA,
ADJUTANT GENERAL S OFFICE,
ST. PAUL, MINN., Sept. 3, 1862. Special Order, No. 74-
Col. Charles E. Flandrau of the Volunteer State Militia will at once assume command over the troops now under him, in the county of Blue Earth and also in the county of Brown (if they have not yet been reported) and report personally or by letter his entire command at once to Colonel Sibley, commander of the Indian expedition. By order of the commander-in-chief,
OSCAR MALMROS, Adjutant General.
STATE OF MINNESOTA, EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,
ST. PAUL, MINN., Sept. 3, 1862. Colonel FLANDRAU,
DEAR SIR: Your defense of New Ulm challenged the admiration of all; I trust you will in your new position have an opportunity of doing the state even more signal service.
The Third Eegiment is expected here every hour; they are said to be armed and equipped. If so I will send you two or three companies; if Colonel Sibley considers this detached force as essential to his further movements against the Sioux and you can spare them, let them go.
Very respectfully, yours, etc.,
ALEX. EAMSEY.
OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE. 211
SOUTH BEND, Sept. 5, 1862. Gov. ALEX. BAMSEY,
SIR: Yesterday I intended leaving this place early this morning, and mov ing up the Cottonwood river with my force, which consists of about 50 men in all, except Captain Davis company, which is at New Ulm, but in the night, about 12 or 1 o clock, a large train of wagons passed through the town, flying from the neighborhood of Indians on the Minnesota, about fifteen miles above here. They reported that murders were committed in Nicollet county yesterday, at Hilo, about twenty miles above St. Peter, on the river. I at once left for Man- kato, and from, information there received, satisfied myself that the story was true. I communicated with Captain Skaro at St. Peter and decided to defer my departure, and at once dispatched my mounted force for the scene of the murders, crossing the river at Judson. I also ordered Captain Dane to send about 25 men from New Ulm to cross at Eed Stone and proceed down the river on the Nicollet side, visiting Hilo, Nicollet. and endeavoring to ferret out the Indians. I have heard from Skaro. He confirms the report that 3 men were killed by a band of 8 Indians near Hilo, and said he has sent out a small force from St. Peter. This afternoon we hear that the same or another band of 8 Indians has crossed to this side and attacked a party at Butternut Valley, about sixteen miles above here, wounding a son of Mr. Davis in the arm. My opinion now is that if these small bands of Indians are bold enough to keep behind the troops I had better not leave this point entirely abandoned, but keep a small force of 40 or 50 men here, and call Captain Dane down to a point about fifteen miles above here and let him scour the country daily. The company of the Tenth, acting with the Seventh under Captain Eogers, will arrive at New Ulm at about 2 p. M. to-day, and there remain. Dane will at once come this way.
My squad of mounted men will report to-night. I wish the other companies of mounted men you referred to were here, then I could cover more country. I will send the same facts to ex-Governor Sibley, by way of St. Peter, as he is sup plied on that road and I can t afford an escort. I merely write this to inform you of the progress of events. Truly your obedient servant,
CHARLES E. FLANDRAU.
P. S. I have a project of raising a regiment for the fall and winter campaign from the people on the frontier, should your Excellency advise such a course in your message. They will be out of employment and will leave the state unless detained by some such measure. Yours,
C. E. F.
GLENCOE, Sept 3, 1862 S o clock p. m.
I have only time to write a word. Contrary to all expectations, the Indians suddenly attacked Forest City, and from thence made their way towards Captain Strout, who was near Acton. The Indians were repulsed at Forest City. Strout gallantly engaged them. There were about 250 of the Indians. Strout lost 4 men killed and 10 wounded, 2 dangerously. Captain Strout sends me word that he lost none of the officers, but he lost most of his ammunition. I have sent
|
|
|
Post by mdenney on Sept 2, 2007 13:42:00 GMT -5
212 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
for Wienmann s force, scattered on the frontier of this county. "We must have re-enforcements at once. I am now fortifying Glencoe and if I can get a suitable number of men, I shall march at daylight to the relief of Strout. Mr. Chesley is just in for a surgeon and we have to send to Carver for one. The only doctor we have in McLeod county has gone to Minneapolis.
Very respectfully, yours,
J. H. STEVENS. Hon. ALEX. EAMSEY,
P. g e The Indians followed Strout s command until within two miles the other side of Cedar. J. H. S.
STATE OF MINNESOTA, EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,
ST. PAUL, Sept. 4, 1862.
Col. CHAS. E. FLANDRAU,
Commanding Southern Frontier,
DEAR SIR: Your letter of the date has been received. Captain Edger-
ton with his horse company, one of the companies referred to in my former letter, at last accounts was at the Winnebago Agency. I also ordered another horse company from the eastern part of the state, Captain Buck s company of Winona, to pass up through your region, and sent a request to Colonel Sibley that two companies of infantry, if he could spare them, should be sent to the Winnebago Agency and two more should be sent into the Watonwan and Cottonwood districts.
The Third Eegiment has arrived and as soon as they can be sent out we shall send a portion of them into your section of country.
In addition to the horse companies mentioned, Captains Colburn and Jones of Fillmore have been ordered to report to you with a company of horse, and also Captain Mitchell of Olmsted. If those companies reach the Blue Earth country you will please take command of them. Very respectfully, yours,
ALEX. EAMSEY.
BATTLE OF BIRCH COOLIE.-Sept. 2, 1862.
Report of Capt. Joseph Anderson.
HEADQUARTERS CULLEN FRONTIER GUARDS,
FORT EIDGLEY, Sept. 4, 1862. To Major J. E. BROWN,
Commanding Expedition to Sioux Agency,
SIR: I have the honor to report that on the morning of September 2d, at 4 o clock, my company, consisting of 51 officers and men, constituting a part of your command, was aroused by a report of one of the sentinel s guns, instantly followed by a most deadly volley of musketry from the enemy. The officers and men, with but two exceptions, rallied with the coolness and bravery of veterans and immediately formed in position for battle, upon their faces, under the wagons
BATTLE OF BIKCH COOLIE. 213
in front of the encampment, and in less than five minutes from the first alarm returned equally as deadly a fire as we received from him. The officers and men all remained in position for battle, except when sent on special duty, for thirty- three hours, when we were most agreeably re-enforced by Colonels Sibley and McPhail.
To attempt to designate any one of the officers or men for coolness or courage would be but doing injustice to the balance, for never were there men who fought with more coolness and bravery than those under my command, with the excep tion of the two men alluded to, whose names are as follows: Peter Boyer, a half- breed, who deserted and fled to the enemy in the night, carrying his arms with Mm, and Martin Nelson, who was panic-stricken at the commencement of the engagement, and remained so throughout the whole action. I will further men tion that W. H. Grant, Esq., of St. Paul, and Mr. Caruthers of Beaver Creek, fought with my company as independent volunteers, with great coolness and bravery. We assisted Mr. Caruthers, the evening previous, to bury his little son, w T ho had been massacred some fifteen days previously by the Indians.
During the battle there were killed in my command, Sergt. Eobert Baxter and Private Jacob Freeman. Those who were wounded are as follows: E. Gibbons (since dead), Thomas Barton, James Cunningham, dangerously, David Smith, John Mattin, A. H. Bunker, George Dashley, Henry Fandle, severely but not dangerously. There are three others slightly wounded, but reported fit for duty. I received two slight flesh wounds which will disable me for a short time. All our horses, both cavalry and transportation horses, were either killed or so badly wounded as to make them unfit for service. Quite a number of our arms, saddles and camp equipments were rendered useless by the destructive fire of the enemy.
The men fought throughout the whole engagement without any provisions, except one-quarter of a hard cracker to each man and about one ounce of raw cabbage to a man, and joked each other freely in regard to their heavy diet. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOSEPH ANDEKSON, Captain Company A, Cavalry Eegiment.
IAst of Killed and Wounded in the Battle of Birch Coolie, as Compiled from the Roster.
DETACHMENT OF SIXTH MINNESOTA INFANTRY.
COMPANY A, CAPT. HIRAM P. GRANT COMMANDING Killed: Sergt. John College, Corp. "Wm. M. Cobb, Privates George Colter, Chauncey L. King, Henry Rolleau, Wm. Russell, Henry Whetsler.
Wounded First Sergt. Wm. Irvine (died of wounds), Privates Samuel G. Arbuckle, Ernest S. Blase, Enoch Brown, Cornelius F. Coyle (died of wounds), Seth Fielding, P. H. Graney, Alvin Hayford, De Witt C. House, W. A. Newcomb, Morris Neeley, John Quinn, Francis C. Shanley, Charles W. Smith, Sanders J. Weiting.
COMPANY B Wounded: Private Andrew T. Thompson.
COMPANY D Wounded : Private Christopher Swagert.
COMPANY E Wounded: Privates Louis Klinkhammar, Richard Miller.
COMPANY F Wounded: Private Robert K. Boyd.
COMPANY G Killed: Sergt. Benjamin S. Terry, Corp. Ferd. C. W. Benneken.
COMPANY I Wounded: Private St. John T. Bean.
214 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
NINTH MINNESOTA INFANTRY COMPANY A Wounded: Privates Joseph Klene (died of wounds), Louis McDonald.
CAPT. JOSEPH ANDERSON S CAVALRY COMPANY (CULLEN GUARDS) Killed : Second Sergt. Robert Baxter, Private Jacob Freeman.
Wounded : Farrier Thomas Barton, Privates A. H. Bunker, Peter Burkman, James Cunning ham, George Dashney, Henry Fandle, Richard Gibbins (died of wounds), John Martin.
HEADQUARTERS MINNESOTA MOUNTED KANGERS,
Sept. 5, 1862.
Col. H. H. SlBLEY,
Commanding Indian Expedition,
SIR: In accordance with your order, I left camp near Fort Bidgley, Sep tember 2, with 50 mounted Rangers under Captains Sterritt and Potter, and pro ceeded to the relief of Captain Grant s command.
When three miles from camp I was joined by three companies of infantry, commanded by Captains Merriman, Whitney and Schoenemann, and one 6-pounder field-piece and one mountain howitzer, commanded by Captain Hendricks, all under command of Major McLaren of the Sixth Eegiment, who reported for duty.
My command made a forced march to Birch Coolie, when a large force of In dians appeared to the left of my advance. Captain Merriinan was ordered to deploy through the ravine, which was done most admirably. The column then moved forward half a mile. A large force of Indians made their appearance, when the column was ordered to halt and prepare for battle. Messrs. Smith and Day of Captain Potter s company were sent forward as scouts, but very soon both had their horses shot under them, and the scouts chased close to my column by the Indians. By this time the enemy had almost completely surrounded my command. I ordered Captain Hendricks to open upon them with the artillery, which was done in quick time and with such effect that the enemy very soon retired to a more respectful distance. It being impossible to ascertain the location of Captain Grant s command, I did not deem it prudent to advance further, and ordered the column to retire to a commanding position, where we corralled and awaited re-enforcements, which arrived at 12 o clock M.
The entire loss of my command in the battle of Birch Coolie is as follows:
CULLEN GUARDS, ST. PAUL Killed: Sergt. R. Baxter, Private Jacob Freeman.
Wounded: Capt. Joseph Anderson, Privates Thomas Barton, John Matters, R. Gibbons (since died), George Holmes, Bugler Smith, James Cunningham, A. H. Bunker, George Dashley, and Commissary Sergt. G. D. Redfield.
Missing : Peter Boyle (half-breed), Fred Sheelks.
Loss of horses, killed 74, died 2.
In conclusion I would say, too much credit cannot be given to Captain Ander son and his brave boys.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
SAMUEL MCPHAIL, Colonel, Commanding Minnesota Mounted Rangers.
BATTLE OF BIRCH COOLIE. 215
Eeport of Capt. Hiram P. Grant, Sixth Minnesota Infantry.
Sunday morning, August 31st, at Fort Bidgley, Minn., I was ordered to report in person to Col. William Crooks, commanding my regiment 5 I reported, and received the following orders: To take command of an expeditionary force, consisting of Company A, Sixth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, Capt. Joseph Anderson s company of Mounted Bangers, and a detail of 20 men, as a burial party, making the aggregate 150 men, and proceed at once to make a reconnaissance toward the lower agency, bury the dead and afford relief to any who might have escaped the Indians. I was also ordered to see that each man had forty rounds of ammunition and two days rations; the ordnance officer was ordered to turn over to me 3,000 rounds of extra ammunition, and the quartermaster what transportation we might need. A careful de tailed route was given me, both Colonel Crooks and myself believing that the march could be made and all details carried out and that we could return to Port Eidgley on the evening of September 1st. I was further told that a few citizens, whose families or friends had been killed, were desirous of going along with the expedition, and I was requested to permit them to do so Among the anxious ones Colonel Crooks mentioned Maj. J. E. Brown, who feared his family had been killed, and Colonel Crooks told me that Major Brown was well posted in Indian signs, character, etc., and if circumstances should arise so that I wanted advice, to consult the major. About 9:30 A. M., the detail and Captain Anderson having reported, we marched out of Fort Eidgley, taking the usual road across the prairie to the ferry at lower agency, distant about twelve miles. On the way to the ferry we buried several dead bodies, among whom I recognized Bill Taylor, a colored citizen of St. Paul, whom all old settlers will remember. At the ferry we found the bodies of about 20 soldiers of Captain Marsh s command, who were killed the first day of the massacre while attempting to cross the ferry to lower agency ; we also found here the body of the United States interpreter, Quinn. While engaged in burying the dead around the ferry, I sent a part of the command across the river to the agency to reconnoiter and to bury the killed there, with orders to return when their work was accomplished, and to follow me to camp. After leaving the ferry I moved the command up the east side of the river about five miles and went into camp; was soon joined by Captain Anderson. The usual picket guard was detailed, and at 9 p. M. those not on duty were in the tents, lights out, etc. No alarm occurred during the night. At daylight the camp was aroused to prepare breakfast. As soon as every thing was ready I again divided my command, sending Captain Anderson with his mounted rangers back to cross the river, go up the west side through Little Crow s village, and to go toward Yellow Medicine to see if any Indians were below there. With my command I followed up the valley toward Beaver creek, occasionally halting to bury whole families, men, women and children, who had been overtaken by Indians and massacred.
About 10 A. M., while riding at the head of my command, I saw what I thought to be an Indian drop in the grass about one mile toward the Minnesota river. I halted the command, sent a force of 20 men to surround what I had seen; to capture, if white, but to kill if Indian. When they had closed in
216 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
on the spot they found a woman who, thirteen days before, had seen her husband and three children killed. She had been told to run, and when she was three or four rods off one of the Indians had fired at her and put nine buckshot into her back. Then they had cut her clothes off her, and, while doing so, they cut a gash about four inches long over her stomach and left her for dead on the field. When she came to her senses and realized the loss of her family, her brain gave away, and she had wandered unconscious for twelve days, subsisting, probably, on roots and water. Discovering her condition, I rode forward with a soldier s blanket and wrapped it around her, carried her to one of the wagons and made her a grass bed. Other soldiers kindly gave her their only blanket. Dr. Daniels dressed her wounds and made her as comfortable as possible. After an hour s delay we went to Beaver creek, where we found some 30 bodies and buried them; then we went some three miles beyond, left the valley and climbed the hills to the right, up to the open prairie, where we struck a trail that led us by the burned houses of Caruthers and Henderson. "We found the body of Caruthers 7 son to the right of the road about one mile from home; also found what remained of Mrs. Henderson and her babe. Mrs. Henderson being sick, they, learning that the Indians were massacring the settlers, fixed a bed in a wagon and started to escape. They were overtaken and killed, the feather bed having been pulled out of the wagon, set on fire, and the bodies of mother and babe about half consumed. We now realized that our delays made it im possible to reach Fort Eidgley that night, as we were then about twenty- two miles from the fort and six miles from Birch Coolie, the nearest place to get water. I now marched direct to the coolie along the road where it is open prairie for several miles each side. I rode forward and selected my camp about forty rods north of the woods and about the same distance west of the coolie. About the same distance west of the camp was a meadow; north of the camp it was an open prairie for miles. When the teams came up I had them placed in a circle and ropes stretched from wagon to wagon to picket horses to. Our tents were put up inside this circle, my company on the north, Captain Anderson s on the south, side of the camp. About sundown Captain Anderson came in, having ridden about forty miles. He reported they had been well up toward Yellow Medicine, came back, recrossed the Minnesota seven miles further up than I had been, and that they had seen no Indians, but signs indicated the red skins had gone north four days before. Major Brown had been with Captain Anderson during the day. From all reports I did not think there were any In dians within twenty miles of us; however, I detailed 30 men, besides non-commis sioned officers and an officer of the guard, and established ten picket posts at equal distances apart around the camp, with three men at each post.
Soon the camp was quiet. The tired men were glad to get repose and rest. All went well until just before daylight. Private William Hart discovered what he thought was a dog or wolf crawling between his post and the camp. He fired, and it proved to be an Indian. Other Indians raised themselves enough to be seen. Several of the guard fired. The Indians gave their war-whoop and rushed toward the camp. The guards came rushing back into camp. The Indians did not fire until within eight or ten rods of the camp, intending to make a sure thing of us by shooting us down as we came out of our tents. My company came out of their tents and started to form, in line. I gave the order to break to right and
|
|
|
Post by mdenney on Sept 2, 2007 13:42:47 GMT -5
BATTLE OF BIRCH COOLIE. 217
left, get behind the wagons and commence firing. Our horses had received most of the bullets up to this time, and as they fell our men threw themselves behind them. At the order to break and commence firing, the brave and fearless Lieuten ant Gillham sang out, " Follow, boys! " and some 30 men sprang with him to defend the east side of the camp. Lieutenant Baldwin took charge of about the same num ber at the northeast of the camp. With the remainder of my company I took charge of the northwest and west, Captain Anderson taking the south. After one hour s fighting we had driven the Indians all back to at least long range, but it had been at fearful cost. Already 22 of our men were dead or mortally wounded. Sixty more had received serious or slight wounds. One-half of our whole force was killed or wounded. Eighty-five horses were dead, leaving only two alive. One of the two horses that had not been injured was my own faithful horse. I went up to him, slipped the halter off, and he went about three rods from camp. During the day he fed altogether around the camp, and about sundown lie walked inside of the camp and placed himself where he had stood the night before, turned his head around and neighed. I went up to him to put his halter on, when some of the boys shouted, "Down, captain!" Horse and myself fell together 5 he with seven bullets in him, I unhurt. As soon as we had forced the Indians back I put every man I could spare digging and throwing up breast works. We had nothing but our bayonets to dig with, but by noon we had our selves pretty well intrenched, using our dead soldiers and horses to help our breastworks.
The Indians were lying in the grass watching for someone to show himself; our men were watching for an Indian. About this time the men commenced to say, "This is my last cartridge." I then had the 3,000 extra ones brought from the wagon and commenced distributing them, when we discovered that the ordnance officer had given us 62-caliber for 58-caliber rifles. Immediately I put the men to work whittling down the balls to the size of our rifles, and now gave orders not to fire except when necessary, a precaution taken none too soon, as when relieved the next day we did not have over five rounds to the man left. In the early morning of September 2d, General Sibley, at Eidgley, hearing the firing at our camp, although sixteen miles away, promptly ordered Colonel McPhail to take three companies of the Sixth Infantry, three companies of his mounted men, in all 240 men, together with a section (two guns) of Cap tain Hendricks battery, to make a forced march to our relief. [The exact number of this force is stated by General Sibley in a note to page 259 of his biography.] At our camp all was quiet; occasionally a stray bullet came into camp. At 4 o clock, however, we saw quite a commotion among the Indians. There appeared to be large numbers of them crossing the coolie east. In a few moments our hearts felt glad, for McPhail S command hove in sight about two miles across the coolie. I gave orders to fire a few shots to let them know that we were still alive. The Indians fired perhaps twenty shots at long range toward McPhail s command, when that officer retired to the east side of the east coolie and encamped. He sent two messengers to General Sibley with the information that he had met the Indians and that they were too many for him, and re-enforce ments were asked for. Everything was quiet in our camp until about 2 P. M., when the Indians made a show to take our camp. A few volleys from our watch ful men quieted them. During the night the Indians had been re-enforced by about 500 warriors.
218 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
On September 3d the daylight and sunrise were most beautiful, but we dis covered large bodies of Indians southwest and north of us, circling around and closing up nearer to us, when an Indian (probably little Crow s brother) came riding directly toward us on a white horse, waving a white flag. He rode to within twenty rods, stopped, and held a conversation with my interpreter, Corp. James Auge of Mendota. He said the Indians had largely re-enforced during the night; that there were now as many as the leaves on the trees; that we stood no show to resist them any longer; that they were now going to charge the camp and should take no prisoners, but if the half-breeds and all of those who had In dian blood in them would march out and give themselves up, they would be protected. Those with us who had any Indian blood gathered around the inter preter, some eight or ten. I asked them what they were going to do. Corporal Auge, with some hesitation, answered for them: " We are going to stay with you, captain." I then told Auge to tell them that they did not have Indians enough to take our camp; that we were still 200 men; that each had two rifles loaded, and all the Indians that wanted to die should come at once; that we defied them. [It was only a small exaggeration in regard to numbers, as we really had but about 65 men who had not been killed or wounded.] I instructed the inter preter to tell him to ,get out of the way, that we could not respect a flag of truce for any such offer as he had made, and to go at once. He turned his horse and rode slowly toward the meadow. I then gave the order to fire. About twenty shots were fired at him. We killed his horse, but he got off safely. Then there was great excitement among the Indians, who all the while were circling closer and closer around us, myself and officers of the command telling our soldiers to hold their fire, lay low until the Indians were close upon us, and then to take good aim and fire and seize the other gun and repeat. We assured the men they could not take the camp, and I think most of the men believed us. We now expected a general attack, and while almost holding our breath, expecting every moment to hear their war-whoop, we discovered a large powerful Indian come up out of the woods, yelling at the top of his voice. I asked Interpreter Auge what he said; he replied that he told the Indians that there were three miles of white men coming. This made our hearts beat with joy, for we knew that someone be sides Colonel McPhail was coming to our relief. When McPhail 7 s courier reached Fort Eidgley, General Sibley immediately ordered Colonel Crooks with the re mainder of the regiment, and Col. William E. Marshall, who had arrived that day with his regiment, to start at once to our support. At daybreak, the relief, marching by flank, was seen by this Indian, and accordingly he hastened to- report that three miles of white men were coming. We now saw that the attack on our camp had been abandoned; that the great body of Indians was crossing the coolie toward where General Sibley was coming. About this time the command came in sight, halted at about the same place where McPhail re treated from the day before, and after a few minutes resumed their march, moved further up the coolie, crossed over and relieved us, without loss of another life. The sight that met our rescuers the 87 dead horses, 22 dead soldiers, the poor woman who lay in the wagon forty-eight hours without food or water (the wagon had been struck with more than fifty bullets, and she had been shot again through the right arm), the 60 wounded soldiers who had been nearly forty-eight hours without food, water or sleep, the seriously wounded, with
BATTLE OF BIRCH COOLIE.
parched throats, crying for water, the stench from the dead horses that were already bursting open, was a scene long to be remembered. The wounded were gathered up, placed in wagons, and the command started for Fort Eidgley, where we arrived about 8 o clock that evening.
So many years have passed that, should I attempt to recall the names of those who contributed most to the defense of our camp, I might do injustice. Suffice it to say, all did well, and a few such men as Captain Anderson, Lieutenant Swan, Lieutenant Gillham, Sergeant Barnes, Sergeant Gardner, Corporal Auge, Hon. James J. Egan of the Eangers, and Geo. D. Eedfield, a citizen, by their courage and bravery, helped others to be brave and courageous. All did well. After a night s sleep at Fort Eidgley I made my report of this expedition, and when it was ready took it personally to my commanding officer. It was handed back to me and I was coolly informed that I should make my report to Maj. Joseph E. Brown, who was in command of the expedition. This was the first I had heard of it. We had been gone four days, two of which we had been engaged in deadly fight; no order had been given me by Major Brown, not an intimation that he considered himself in command. To say that I was angry, when told to make my report to him, would only express half what I felt. I then and there de stroyed my report and never made another. If any blame rests on anyone, for selection of camps, or in carrying out any of the details of the expedition, it rests upon me. All officers, soldiers and citizens obeyed my orders. I had the full charge.
Statement of the Hon. James J. Egan.
At Fort Eidgley the difficulty of restraining and keeping men under discipline was made manifest. The company to which I belonged disbanded and turned homeward; Anson Northrap s black horse cavalry did likewise, and .all of the " irregular hoss" except Jo Anderson s company abandoned the glories of war for the pleasanter paths of peace. I joined Captain Anderson s- company, and the next day after doing so we were ordered, together with Captain Grant s Company A, Sixth Eegiment of Infantry, to proceed to the agency at Eedwood and beyond as an escort to a fatigue party and for observation. The whole force, including teamsters and fatigue party, consisted of 150 men under command of Maj. Joe Brown, one of the oldest and most experienced Indian traders in the state. The men had confidence in old Joe Brown. It was sup posed he could smell Indians afar off. He knew the country thoroughly, and we felt no special alarm. But on the way to Eedwood Agency we encountered so many scenes of horror and desolation that we began to feel some inward fear. Here along the roadside were burnt houses and the bones of human beings. Among the grasses lay men in eternal sleep, mutilated and marred; to the limb of a tree hung a fair young boy; and when one of the men jumped from his- horse and embracing the lifeless form of a man, cried out in the wild agony of grief, "My God, my God! My brother !" we sickened at heart.
A fatality seemed to hang over us from the moment we started. It was a slow march, necessarily sad, and grief and sadness settled over us all. Men were among us going out to look for their relatives and friends; Nathan My rick for
220 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
his brother, and others eager to obtain information concerning loved ones. "We camped the first night opposite the Redwood Agency, under a huge bluff, a handful of Indians from the top of which could have slaughtered us all. It came my turn to go on guard at 3 o clock in the morning, and from that to 5 being the fatal hours in which Indians were supposed to attack, I considered my scalp as good as gone. In fear and trembling I took my place near a haystack, with musket thingyed, ready to fire and then die. My life was, it seems, not fated to go out by mere fright, and I survived the night. We crossed the river at Eed- wood and beheld the initial battle-field of the Indian War. This was at Eedwood Agency, where Little Crow gave the signal, and upon Lynde, Myrick, Quinn, Eelland, Taylor and others, 24 in all, i i suddenly as from the woods and the fields, suddenly as from, the ground, yawning at their feet, leaped upon them with the flashing of cataracts, Death, the crowned phantom, with all the equipage of his terrors and the tragic war of his voice."
We found the agency buildings were all destroyed. Mr. Nathan Myrick dis covered his brother s body and returned to the fort, as did also Mr. A. F. Knight and Frank Pulle, who had hitherto been with us of their own volition. The command here divided, Captain Grant s company of infantry, with the fatigue party, taking the easterly bank of the river, and we, the cavalry, the westerly side. With a clear sky overhead, beautiful scenery all around, we forgot or be came familiar with the scenes of slaughter, and cantered slowly and merrily along until we reached Little Crow s village. Here a number of the men dismounted, entered Little Crow s deserted house and many of the tepees, and began searching for mementoes to bring home as trophies of prowess. One man had an Indian drum, another a flag, others feathers, and a small molasses keg was proudly tied to the pommel of a saddle, to tell the story in after years that Little Crow had been bearded in his lair. Merrily marching along, crushing the wild flowers in our path, dismounting to gather plums on the wayside, and drink of the brooks that laughed as they glided along, we reveled in the sensuous wealth of nature, and resembled a picnic party more than soldiers in an enemy s country. About 5 o clock in the afternoon we found Captain Grant s party encamped within two hundred yards of Birch Coolie, and, dismounting, we all entered into the duties usually appertaining to camping for the night. The camp was in the shape of a circle on one side; the wagons constituted one-half the circle, with the horses picketed on the outside. The tents in the centre could not accommodate all, and the greater share of the mounted men laid down under the wagons and other con venient places. Major Galbraith was with us,Geo. D. Eedfield of St. Anthony, Wm. H. Grant of St. Eaul, and other well-known persons. Folding our blankets about us, in the silent night, on the broad prairie, with the stars overhead, we laid down to pleasant dreams. At about 4 o clock in the morning I heard a shot, and the next thing I remember was the cry of Indians and Captain Ander son yelling to his men, "Lay on your bellies and shoot, God d n you!" Ten thousand muskets seemed to be going off. The men were stunned, horses frightened, and terror and fear seized hold of us all. We blazed away in return, without aim or other object than to give evidence that there were survivors of their murderous fire, and to prevent a charge on the camp. At this moment 50 Indians could have killed the entire force if they had charged upon us. It was a perfect surprise. The day preceding gave no sign of Indians. Joe Brown,
BATTLE OF BIRCH COOLIE. 221
half-breed spouts, and the most experienced frontiersmen were as much astounded as if hell itself had unloaded 10, 000 fiends upon our heads. But now the scene is changed, and as the red early dawn, covering everything with a halo of gold, revealed to our gaze what we supposed to be 2, 000 Indians surrounding us on all sides, with leaders mounted on horses caparisoned with gay colors, and them selves radiant in feathers, war paint, and all the bright and brilliant habiliments of Indian chiefs, the scene seemed unreal, as if a page from the history of the crusades had been torn from the leaves of history and the Saracen chiefs of the plains of Asia transplanted to the new world. The fiercest yells and war- whoops, the shaking of blankets, the waving of flags to indicate new plans of movements of attack, the riding of horsemen here and there, were right before us, within about five hundred yards. Large bodies of Indians running continu ally, seeking new points of vantage, and taking orders from a chief, and all yell ing and beating drums, made the scene unearthly. A shower of bullets continu ally fell upon us from all sides. The nature of the ground was such that with the coolie or ravine on one side, where was a heavy growth of timber, and the rest an open prairie with little hillocks here and there, just beyond our camp, the Indians could pour in a fire on us from every direction and themselves be protected. Men were dead and dying in the small circle of our encampment; the horses were nearly all killed in the first half hour, and it looked as if our last hour had come on earth. To be scalped and quartered, our hearts cut out, gave us no comforting reflections. Several of the men went crazy, and jumping out to give a full view instantly met death. "We then began to dig, each man for himself, his grave as he expected. Three spades and one shovel were all the implements that could be found for use, but sabers and pocket knives were utilized, and about noon we had dug holes in the ground that afforded some protection. Never for an instant did the firing on us cease. Suddenly someone would drop his musket and roll over to die. Indi vidual instances of bravery were many and some few of cowardice. A fine look ing man near me was unnerved; he did not shoot once, but kept crying out, "O my God, my God!" George Turnbull, first lieutenant, pulled a revolver on him, thingyed it, and said if he did not stop he would blow his brains out. He stopped. Bill Hart of St. Paul was there, and would be called brave among 10,000 brave men. He was the first to discover the Indians when on guard, and manifested courage and nerve. Captain Anderson and George Turnbull had lots of "sand" in them, and never lost their presence of mind. About 1 o clock in the afternoon we heard a loud report like that of a cannon. We were all startled, not knowing from whence the sound came. Could the Indians have captured a howitzer? And did they have artillerists among them to turn it upon us? A terrible fear seized us. Again it boomed. Could it be possible that we were saved? We were sixteen miles from Fort Eidgley, and how could knowledge of our situation have reached the fort? The silence of death prevailed in the camp. The movements of the Indians began to indicate something new, and after awhile again the boom of the cannon sounded in our ears, and simultaneously every man jumped to his feet and gave a God-felt hurrah. The spirit of audacity we exhibited led to a renewed fire upon us, and we speedily sought our respec tive places of safety. That afternoon we did not hear the cannon again, and night coming on all hope of relief left our breasts, and each man sullenly and
|
|
|
Post by mdenney on Sept 2, 2007 13:43:53 GMT -5
222 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
silently pursued his own meditations. It was a night of black despair. There seemed no hope. The cup of salvation had been snatched from our lips, and there was nothing to do but die. We expected to be starved to death, as anyone bold enough to raise up to put an arm into any wagon containing sup plies was instantly shot. Our ammunition was almost exhausted, and each man laid his drawn saber near him and examined his musket, resolved not to fire again until the final moment came, when a fire would do some exe cution. It happened to be quite dark also, which added to the uncertain ties of the night. The agony we suffered, expecting every moment we would be rushed upon, through that long, long night, is indescribable. Each mo ment seemed hours, and hours eternity. A solitary camp-fire at Gray Bird s headquarters partly relieved the gloom, and the blanketed specters stalking ever and anon in front of that fire seemed "ghosts or spirits of goblin d**ned. " Gladly again we hail the morn gilding the horizon. We saw unusual movements and stir among our enemy. Their war-whoops were fiercer and their cries and gestures more frequent and emphatic. We expected the final hour had come when they would charge, and were prepared. The agony had been so intense that we felt a relief at the anticipated blow no dread of death now lingered in the heart of any. Suddenly the boom of the cannon is again heard, and again and nearer and clearer, until its roar, usually terrible, sounded as the sweetest harmony of heaven. Confusion seems to pervade our enemies, and they are in full flight. But we did not move from our holes until General Sibley, with a few officers, came right up to us, and then, and not till then, did we feel we were saved. The scene presented in our camp was a sickening one. Twenty-three men, black and discolored by the sun s rays, lay stark and dead in the small space ; 45 others seriously wounded and groaning and crying for water ; the car casses of 90 dead horses lying about, and a stench intolerable emanating from the whole ground. For thirty hours we had been under fire, and tasted neither food nor water.
The story of our relief is soon told. General Sibley s scout had from the high ground near Fort Eidgley, on the morning of Sept. 2, 1862, heard the firing. A party under charge of Colonel McPhail was sent in our direction and to our relief. It was Colonel McPhail s artillery we heard the first day, the Indians di viding their forces, one-half surrounding us and the other half compelling Mc Phail to send back for re-enforcements. Then General Sibley came with his entire command. The number of Indians who attacked us was about 400. They were on their way to attack St. Peter or Mankato when their scouts encountered us in the afternoon of September 1st. They followed our trail and made the attack as related.
No engagement with Indians that I am aware of compares with the battle of Birch Coolie in its duration, in the disparity of numbers between the respective combatants and severity of loss sustained by the whites, in the desperate resist ance of the besieged, in the tragic elements of death-dealing terror, save that on the Arickee fork of the Eepublican river on the 17th day of September, 1868, when the little band of General Forsyth held at bay for days, with super human valor, the Cheyenne warriors of Roman Nose.
Time will magnify the significance of this Birch Coolie battle, and it will be remembered that it was fought by men without experience in war, those who had
OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE. 223
just enlisted in the service and those who had never enlisted, but who, on the first signal of danger, left their stores and other places of occupation, taking their lives in their hands for the protection of their people and the state.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, Sept. 5, 1862.
His Excellency, ALEXANDER EAMSEY,
Governor of Minnesota, St. Paul, Minn.:
Every minister who has pastoral charge of a church or congregation shall be -exempt from draft for military service. By order of the Secretary of War.
C. P. BUCKINGHAM, Brigadier General, Acting Adjutant General.
HEADQUARTERS FORT EIDGLEY, Sept. 5, 1862. Capt. CHAS. E. FLANDRAU,
St. Peter,
DEAR SIR: Your dispatch of 3d inst. has been received. I shall send down a detail of a few men to scout through the region between this and the scene of the murders. I do not think there is any party than the one composed of eight men you mention in my rear. They have been seen several times within ;a few days in the neighborhood you mention.
I wish, as soon as the Third Eegiment comes up on the other side, you would communicate with me, as, in order to bag any who may not previously have made off, we must have an understanding so that we can co-operate. The attack made upon J. E. Brown s party of 160 men by about 250 Indians, on the morning of the second (at Birch Coolie) shows that they are in force about here and probably determined to hold some strong position near Eedwood. During the attack they were heard to speak of their families being near. The commanding officer of the Third will probably be in command on the other side of the river, as I have no information of his being required to report to me, although he may be ordered to do so. In any case should I remain in command of the expedition I shall depend more upon the information I receive from you than from any other source, and trust you will write me often.
I judge you are in no pressing need of re-enforcements, and I shall want all I have, as there is no doubt the Indians will make a desperate stand.
I cannot move until I get ammunition and rations, which I expect daily.
Very truly yours,
H. H. SlBLEY.
Colonel, Commanding Military Expedition.
224 OFFICIAL EEPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS STATE OF MINNESOTA,
ADJUTANT GENERAL S OFFICE,
ST. PAUL, MINN., Sept. 6, 1862. Col. CHARLES E. FLANDRAU,
SIR: Yours of the 2d lust, lias been received, and in reply I am reluc tantly compelled to inform yon that we have not now under our control a single saber of any description. We have been authorized to raise one regiment of mounted infantry, and have made a requisition upon the general government for all suitable arms for that purpose. We expect that they will be forthcoming, but as yet we have received no answer. Yours respectfully,
OSCAR MALMROS, Adjutant General.
STATE OF MINNESOTA, EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,
ST. PAUL, Sept. 6, 1862. Hon. A. LINCOLN,
President of the United States, and the
Heads of the Departments, Washington, D. (7.,
GENTLEMEN: The extraordinary character of the Indian war which has so suddenly and unexpectedly fallen upon us here, being equally cruel and barbar ous with those waged by that race which have preceded it in the history of our country; therefore, that I may present more fully, than I can by letter, the pressing necessity of our wants, I have accepted the generous offer of Senator Wilkinson to visit you and make them known to you. I would state that up to the 19th ult. our people were generously responding to the call of the govern ment for additional troops, and already 4, 000 men have voluntarily entered the service of our quota of 5,360 men and our full quota would readily have been supplied but for this difficulty.
We need, to carry on this warfare in which we are engaged, 3, 000 stand of arms of the very best quality, of 57.7 or 58 caliber, and they should be forwarded to us as promptly as possible.
The steel battery donated to the state for the First Minnesota Volunteers, now in the arsenal at Washington with the ammunition belonging to it, and the horses, arms and equipments for one regiment of cavalry which should be mustered in for three months or during the Indian difficulties, and should be received as a part of our quota of 5,360, and generally the articles named in the requisition made by the adjutant general of the state on the 30th ult., should be sent by the earliest conveyance from the Department of the West. In the event of the con tinuance of this war beyond the 3d of October, to which time I have deferred the draft, I should have authority to further defer it that we may have time to fill our quota.
I have also to request that the general government assist in the support of the immense number of refugees who have been driven from their comfortable homes into poverty and dependence upon our charities. As our troops are so scattered, the cavalry and infantry should be mustered in and paid by companies.
It is also desirable that we have authority to purchase such necessary supplies as the quartermaster refuses to furnish. Very respectfully, etc.,
ALEX. EAMSEY.
OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE. 225
MADISON, Wis., Sept. 6, 1862. Hon. E. M. ST ANTON:
I have just received the following dispatch from Minnesota:
ST. PAUL, Sept. 6, 1862.
The Indian war assumes daily greater proportions. Our people are massacred because we have not a sufficient number of muskets to arm our troops. Can you send us some say 1,000 mus kets by express ? The emergency is great.
By order of the Governor of the State of Minnesota. OSCAE MALMBOS,
Adjutant General.
I have no arms to send him. "What shall I reply?
E. SALOMON,
Governor.
ST. PAUL, MINN., Sept. 6, 1862 5 a. m. The PRESIDENT:
Those Indian outrages continue. I asked Secretary Stanton to authorize the United States Quartermaster to purchase, say, 500 horses. He refuses. The state cannot purchase on as good terms, if at all, as the general government. This is not our war; it is a national war. I hope you will direct the purchase or send us 500 horses, or order the Minnesota companies of horse in Kentucky and Ten nessee home. Answer me at once. More than 500 whites have been murdered by the Indians. ALEX. EAMSEY.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C., Sept. 6, 1862. Maj. Gen. JOHN POPE,
GENERAL: You will receive herewith an order of this department constitut ing you commander of the Department of the Northwest. The Indian hostilities that have recently broken forth and are now prevailing in that department re quire the attention of some military officer of high rank, in whose ability and vigor the government has confidence, and you have therefore been selected for this important command. You will proceed immediately to your department, establish your headquarters at St. Paul, Minn., and make yourself acquainted with and report to this department the actual condition of affairs, and take such prompt and vigorous measures as shall quell the hostilities and afford peace, security, and protection to the people against Indian hostilities.
This department has received no detailed information respecting the extent of the outrages that have been committed or of the force engaged in their perpetra tion, and therefore must leave to your judgment and discretion the measures to be taken. You will employ whatever force may be necessary to suppress the hostilities, making your requisitions upon the proper departments for whatever may be needed for that purpose.
In conclusion I will add that you cannot too highly estimate the importance of the duty now intrusted to you, and you have been assigned to it because of the high confidence of the government that you have the personal and military qualities to, meet the emergency. Yours truly,
EDWIN M. STANTON, is Secretary of War.
226 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
ST. PAUL, MINN., Sept. 8, 1862 10 p. m. Major General H ALLEGE: :
A messenger is just in from Fort Abercrombie, who left there only on Satur day evening, at 10 P. M., less than forty-eight hours. Sioux Indians, several hundred strong, had made several attacks upon the fort with its 80 men. A hundred women and children in the fort. I have four companies of infantry on the way. If you could send us a regiment of cavalry, to be here in less than a
week, this business would soon be settled.
ALEX. EAMSEY.
STATE OF MINNESOTA, EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,
ST. PAUL, Sept. 8, 1862.
COLONEL: I have sent to Ohio and other states for arms and ammunition and have received for reply that they will be forwarded at once.
Should a sufficient number arrive, the towns along the river shall be supplied with small amounts of guns to be put into the hands of such citizens as will or ganize for their own defense. More companies will be sent to the Blue Earth as soon as possible. Several have already arrived and are now in that region.
You and your command will act as a protective force on the southern frontier, while Colonel Sibley will make the aggressive movement on the upper Minnesota. Should circumstances require it, you will aid him to the extent of your ability.
As soon as they shall be received, arms will be forwarded to you, of which you will make such disposition, as will, in your j udgment best subserve the public interest.
I have sent to Captain Wilkin and other experienced military men of the state and will send to your district one of them to aid and advise with you, in compliance with your request. Your nomination for appointment will be duly commissioned. To you is also committed all questions of alleged depredations by white men at New Ulm and you will proceed to investigate them and adjust the matter. Very respectfully, yours,
ALEX. EAMSEY. Col. CHAS. E. FLANDRAU, St. Paul
|
|
|
Post by mdenney on Sept 2, 2007 13:45:13 GMT -5
CAMP FORT RIDGLEY, Sept. , 1862. Governor ALEX. EAMSEY,
MY DEAR SIR: A week ago to-day I reached this place, and was kindly re ceived by Colonel Sibley, commanding. I placed in his hands your communica tion, and accordingly have been recognized and appointed by him as chaplain of the expedition.
During the short time I remained in St. Paul, and as I passed up and down the river, I became pretty well acquainted with the feeling that then existed in regard to this expedition that the movements were too slow and cautious. I confess that I sympathized somewhat in this feeling. I came up with the hope
OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE. 227
that I should be able to exert some influence in forwarding the movements and especially in securing, if possible, the safety and liberation of the captive white women and children, together with such half-breeds and civilized and Christian Indians as have been forced into these measures, and are really held in captivity and compelled to dress like Indians. The night after I reached this camp, a refugee from Big Stone Lake brought intelligence that Mrs. Huggins with her children and Miss Julia Laflambois were then at Longee s trading place, on the north side of the Minnesota, at the old mission station at Lac qui Parle. My de sire was that a detachment should be immediately sent up on this side of the river to effect their rescue. But the revelations of Tuesday and Wednesday, the Indians pitching into and cutting up so terribly the camp of those who had gone up as the escort of a burial party, and their attacking in force a second detachment sent up to relieve the first, fully satisfied me of the unwisdom of such plan as I had proposed. It did more than that it satisfied us all that the greatest caution and prudence are demanded in conducting this campaign. At present the Indians have all the advantage in this war. Their passing with certainty from place to place on horseback, their mode of shooting and flying, their perfect knowledge of the country, its ravines and hiding places, their bushwhacking and ambush ing, all give them a decided advantage in fighting with our troops. The lesson we have learned at Birch Coolie will not, I trust, soon be forgotten. Wisdom should be justified of her children. In looking at the past and the present I am satisfied that Colonel Sibley has acted wisely in not advancing until he is well prepared for offense and defense. The safety of his command requires it. He is anxious to go forward at the earliest practicable moment. At the same time this necessary delay for ammunition is likely to work good in regard to the prisoners. If so, we shall none of us regret it.
With kind regards to your family, I am, yours very truly,
S. E. RIGGS.
HEADQUARTERS IN CAMP NEAR FORT EIDGLEY, Sept. 11, 1862. His Excellency, ALEX. RAMSEY,
St. Paul, Minn.,
SIR: A Christian Indian, Simon by name, arrived with his son under a truce flag, escorting an intelligent German woman with three small children, escaped through their aid and instrumentality. She states, and Simon corroborates the information, that the Indians decamped yesterday morning and went up to a point near Lac qui Parle, at the mouth of the Chippewa river, twelve miles above Yellow Medicine; that they will leave their families there and prepare to meet my force in battle. I have as yet no reply to my message to Little Crow, but may have in the course of the day. The Indians are said to have abundance of ammunition. The man Simon states since, that he does not believe the Indians will come back to fight, that they are divided in opinion as to whether they will go to the Missouri or to the Eed river. He reports a party of 15 having gone in the direction of Mankato in search of plunder, and I have dispatched informa tion through the quartermaster, Mr. Mills, who goes to St. Peter to-day, to the several detachments stationed at different points, with directions to scout through
228 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
the country and protect the settlers. I fear we shall also hear of the depredations of small parties toward the upper Mississippi, as some few well-mounted men were about starting in that direction. I have no mounted men here. I have but 20 or 25 all told, and these are employed in herding the cattle. If you can send up some mounted men soon, it will be of great service and prevent many murders and outrages, which the infantry are powerless to prevent or punish.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. H. SIBLEY, Colonel, Commanding.
MILITARY EXPEDITION, HEADQUARTERS, NEAR FORT EIDGLEY,
Gen. O. MALMROS, Sept. 13, 1862.
Adjutant General, St. Paul,
SIR: Since my last dispatch I have received, under the escort of Captain Folsom, with 60 men of the Ninth Eegiment, 50,000 cartridges; and I have ordered Captain Folsom to remain on temporary duty at Fort Eidgley with his detachment, as I wish to take with me on the expedition a part of the garrison, who are expert Indian fighters, and will be valuable as scouts and skirmishers. I sent a special messenger four days ago to request Major Welch to join me with the Third Eegiment, but he has not returned, and has probably failed to find him. I have hoped to be re-enforced with some cavalry, but I can learn of none on the way, and although I have but 25 of that description of force with me, I expect to make an advance in the direction of the enemy on the morning of the 16th, as I learn that the clothing train will be here to-day and the provision train is ex pected to-morrow. There have been five murders committed on or Hear the Little Cottonwood within the past week by a small war party, who lost two of their number in a skirmish, probably with some men of Captain Dane s com pany, which I dispatched to that line on my arrival at St. Peter.
The war parties are now all in, as I am reliably assured, and the Indians concen trating to meet me at Eed Iron s village, twelve miles above Yellow Medicine. I received a communication from Little Crow yesterday by the same men who brought his former letter. I send herewith a copy of his letter and of my reply, which was taken back by the bearer of the flag of truce yesterday afternoon. These men represent that the Indians are very much divided in sentiment and are quarreling among themselves; that Little Crow s life has been threatened, and that those who have opposed the war and taken no part in it are organizing them selves so as to make a separate camp when the time comes and claim our protec tion. I have a communication from Wabashaw and Taopee, one of the civilized Indians, brought privately by Eobertson, one of the men who bore the flag of truce, which, if reliable as it may be would seem to indicate such a determi nation. But I shall be on my guard against any treachery which may be intended under cover of these flags of truce, as you will see by my reply to Wabashaw, sent to him in a like private manner, and a copy of which is also inclosed.
|
|
|
Post by mdenney on Sept 2, 2007 13:45:30 GMT -5
OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE. 229
Matters are now assuming a definite shape, and as it has always been, and still is, my opinion, corroborated by all the information I can obtain, that the war party among the Indians intend to make a desperate stand against my forces, I think it probable that within ten days we shall have overtaken and fought them, with what result time will show. While writing this dispatch Mr. George Mc- Leod, whom I sent for the Third Eegiment, has arrived, and reports Major Welch and his command within six or eight miles of this camp, they having made a rapid march to join me. I shall thus be enabled to march with between 1,500 and 1,600 men, and if I can be joined with a couple of hundred or more of mounted men it will be of very great advantage.
H. H. SIBLEY, Colonel, Commanding.
HEADQUARTERS IN CAMP,
Sept. 13, 1862.
To those of the Half -Breeds and Sioux Indians who have not been Concerned in the Murders and Outrages upon the White Settlers :
I write a few lines by Simon to say to you that I have not come into this upper country to injure any innocent person, but to punish those who have committed the cruel murders upon innocent men, women, and children. If, therefore, you wish to withdraw from these guilty people you must, when you see my troops ap proaching, take up a separate position and hoist a flag of truce and send a small party to me when I hoist a flag of truce in answer, and I will then take you under my protection.
Given under my hand in camp the day and year above written.
H. H. SIBLEY, Colonel, Commanding Military Expedition.
HEADQUARTERS INDIAN EXPEDITION, SOUTH BEND, Sept. 13, 1862.
His Excellency, GOVERNOR ALEX. EAMSEY,
Si. Paul,
SIR: Your letter of September llth, ? 62, is just received. I will detail a squad to Madelia under Captain Cox to perform the duty suggested in the petition from citizens of Watonwan county, inclosed in your letter. The matter was under consideration before the letter arrived.
Truly, your obedient servant, CHAS. E. FLANDRAU, Colonel, Commanding.
230 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
HEADQUARTERS IN CAMP NEAR FORT BIDGLEY,
Sept. 14, 1862. His Excellency, ALEX. BAMSEY,
St. Paul, Minn.,
SIR: Anticipating the arrival of the clothing and provision train which left St. Peter two days ago, I gave notice to the officers of corps that I should march to-morrow, but the tremendous rain of last night, which continues unabated, will interfere with the arrangement for an immediate advance; but it will be equally unfavorable for any movement on the part of the Indians, who up to the 12th were still encamped near Bed Iron s village, a few miles on this side of Lac qui Parle. The train has not yet come in, and I fear many of the articles, especially hard bread, will be injured or spoiled, as there is no sufficient coverings for the wagons.
Major Welch, with the Third, has joined me, as I stated in my dispatch of yesterday. He has but one commissioned officer with him, and it would be favorable to the discipline of the regiment if the other officers now in the state would join it immediately. The men are hardy and eager for action. They made a march from Forest City to this point of great rapidity, showing the en durance of the men. Their presence here will inspire much confidence among the raw material of the other regiments, and render the whole command much more reliable and effective.
There is one subject to which I invite your serious attention and invoke im mediate action. By the late order of the War Department, as understood here, mustering into the service of the United States can only be done by regiments. The consequence to this command of such a regulation is very unjust and unsatis factory to the men, as the companies of the different regiments are widely sepa rated and may not be reunited for some time to come. In the meantime, the men cannot receive the bounty to which they are entitled from the government and which many of their families sadly need; and it is feared, also, although I am satisfied the fear is unfounded, that in case of a soldier being killed in battle be fore being mustered in, his family would not, under existing laws, be entitled to the usual pension. Some of the companies have been in service since early in the summer, and yet have not received the bounty held out by the government as an inducement for them to enlist. The difficulty can all be swept away if you will make an appeal to President Lincoln by telegraph for authority to have the new regiments mustered in by companies and then have the mustering officers sent here without delay, prepared as well to muster in as to pay the men the bounty due them. In this, and in no other manner, can justice be tardily rendered the soldiers of these regiments, which are made up of splendid material but many of whom are sadly troubled by the apprehension, and indeed certainty, that their families are actually suffering in their absence because the government does not fulfill at once its part of the contract. I beg leave again to urge this upon your immediate attention.
A small company, from the western part of Goodhue county, of mounted men came into camp with the Third Begiment, but part of them have gone back, as the greater part of this description of force has done, probably because there is a prospect of meeting the redskins very soon. I am now left with 22 officers and men of Captain Sterritt s company and 16 of Captain Davis company of horse-
OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE. 231
men, making 38 in all, and I should not be surprised at a stampede among these, especially the last mentioned. An efficient mounted force of 400 or 500 men would render the success of this expedition a certainty in the extermination of the hostile Indians. Even one squadron of trained cavalry would answer the pur pose, but experience has shown conclusively that the material of which the volun teer mounted force is composed is entirely useless, except for scouting and mak ing reconnaissances. For fighting purposes they are little better than worthless, being untrained themselves and their horses equally so.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. H. SlBLEY,
Colonel, Commanding Military Expedition.
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS STATE OF MINNESOTA, ADJUTANT GENERAL S OFFICE,
ST. PAUL, MINN., Sept. 15, 1862. Col. CHAS. E. FLANDRAU,
Commanding in the Counties of Brown and Blue Earth,
SIR: The communication of Maj. C. E. Bead, of the 10th inst. ? detailing the accounts of several small scouting parties, has been received. As by his letter it appears that Captain Buck is somewhere in the vicinity, and as you may re quire some assistance from him, I herewith inclose an order requiring him to report to you, which will annex him to your command and enable you to direct his further movements. Yours respectfully,
OSCAR MALMROS, Adjutant General.
HEADQUARTERS NEAR FORT EIDGELY,
Sept. 15, 1862. Col. CHARLES E. FLANDRAU,
Commanding Southwest Frontier, South Bend,
SIR : I have your dispatch of 13th, and am pleased to learn that you have returned to your command. I have no doubt Governor Eamsey is doing what he can to forward the movements for the defense of the frontier, but I have been sadly crippled for want of ammunition and rations, as well as proper clothing for the men. I can, however, wait no longer, and it is my intention to march if pos sible on the 17th or 18th instant. I have no mounted force except about 25 men, and they are far from efficient. My belief has been, and still is, that I shall be met in force by the Indians at Eed Iron s village, or Lac qui Parle, as the accounts from all my sources of information agree in the statement that their men are all concentrated there, with the women and children and plunder; and they cannot well retreat if they would. In such case they will of course make a desperate stand, and endeavor to make our position as uncomfortable as possible in the way of night attacks, ambuscades, and the like. Still they will be met with their own weapons and in their own style of warfare, and I do not fear the result of any en counter, unless their re-enforcements from the Upper Sioux should enable them to take the field in numbers superior to my own and my raw troops should be panic-
232 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
struck, which I have little fear of now, since the skeleton of the Third Eegiment has joined me, under Major Welch, composed of 270 men only. But these are valuable in consequence of their having seen more or less service in the field.
The lack of mounted men will tell badly upon the results of the expedition should the Indians determine rather to escape than to fight. I have given the impression to the Indians, through the bearers of the flags of truce, that I shall march upon this side; but I am meanwhile repairing the ferry-boat, so as to cross at this point, and you will then be relieved of all well-grounded apprehensions of attack by the Indians, even in small parties, along the whole line. I am quite well satisfied that the small parties have all returned to the main camp. I think you are so well prepared to receive any straggling parties that the people can safely return to their farms.
I send what I can spare of the ammunition you ask for. My supply is short for an advance into a region where I cannot replenish my cartridge boxes, and you must do with what I dispatch for your use until you can receive a further supply from below. The disposition of your forces is very judicious. The com pany of Captain Bogers, at New Ulm, is one of the best I have, both in men and arms, and I am very loth to leave them behind; but in deference to your judg ment I will leave them where they are.
Be good enough to communicate with me as often as you have opportunity, and when you can furnish a copy of a late paper it will be thankfully received.
Hoping that our joint efforts will enable us to bring matters to successful con clusion and rid the state of the fiends in human shape who have desolated so much of the frontier, believe me, colonel,
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. H. SIBLEY, Colonel, Commanding Military Expedition.
ST. PAUL, MINN., Sept. 16, 1862 5:30 p. m. Major General HALLECK:
From all indications and information we are likely to have a general Indian war all along the frontier, unless immediate steps are taken to put a stop to it. I have requested the Governors of Iowa and Wisconsin not to send any troops from their states for the present without advising me about it, and have request ed the Governor of Wisconsin to send forward to this place immediately three or four regiments now ready for service. You have no idea of the terrible destruc tion already done and of the panic everywhere in Wisconsin and Minnesota. Unless very prompt steps are taken these states will be half depopulated before the winter begins. Already settlements have been totally abandoned with every thing in them. Crops are all left standing, and the whole population are fleeing to the river. Horses are much needed, as we can do nothing against mounted Indians with footmen.
I have ordered 2, 500 horses to be bought, and shall mount the infantry upon them and at once push out against the Sioux. The Chippewas have also begun to rob and murder, and need immediate attention.
Time is everything here, and I must take unusual means to hasten matters.
Please send me regular surgeon. JNO. POPE,
Major General.
OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE. 233
HEADQUARTERS,
IN CAMP, NEAR FORT KIDGELY, Sept. 16, 1862. Capt. A. K. SKARO,
Commanding at St. Peter,
SIR: I should have made an advance movement this morning but for the storm which raged all night and has saturated everything, besides making the road by which I shall proceed with my command almost impassable. I do not think there need be any further fear of war parties of Indians along the line of settlements for the present.
An arrival from the Indian camp of a civilized Indian with some captive women and children this morning corroborates the information previously obtained that the Indians are concentrating their force at or near Lac qui Parle, and have called in their parties.
Inclosed I send you an order, which you will please have printed, and send copies to all the prominent points in the counties around you, as well as to Colo nel Flandrau and his officers in command of posts. Send half a dozen copies to me also. This system of plunder must be suppressed and the criminals punished. You will please communicate with me, as opportunity offers, as to the condi tion of affairs, supplies for the expedition on hand at St. Peter, and other infor mation.
Send any mail matter by every safe occasion for the command.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. H. SIBLEY, Colonel, Commanding.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE NORTHWEST,
ST. PAUL, MINN., Sept. 17, 1862. Col. H. H. SIBLEY,
COLONEL: I transmit inclosed the order of the War Department placing me in command of the Department of the Northwest. I wish in this communication to say to you that I am rejoiced to find you in command of the expedition against the Sioux, and to assure you that I will push forward everything to your assist ance as fast as possible. I have ordered four regiments from Wisconsin, two of them with horses. We can get no cavalry, but I will send you 1,000 mounted men as rapidly as I can. Let me know by special messenger precisely what you wish of everything and it shall be sent. I will place 1,000 men (500 mounted) at Abercrombie, 500 mounted men at Otter Tail, 1,000 men at Eipley, 500 mounted and 500 infantry at Crystal Lake, between the Winnebago and Sioux. I am prepared to bring into the state all the men necessary to put an end to Indian troubles in the shortest possible time, by making an active and vigorous cam paign against them. It is my wish that you move forward as rapidly as possible upon the Sioux lands as far as the Lake Traverse, destroying crops and everything else belonging to them. I think it best to make no arrangement of any kind with them until they are badly punished. By moving rapidly upon the Indian lands and farms you will at once relieve all the settlers north of the Minnesota from
234 OFFICIAL REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.
farther danger. Four hundred men will be at Abercrombie in a few days. I think as we have the men and means now we had best put a final stop to Indian troubles by exterminating or ruining all the Indians engaged in the late out break. From Iowa I shall put out at once expeditions into Dakota along the Big Sioux and farther west, so as to push the Yankton Sioux at the same time you are dealing with those in front of you. I do not think it best to close the campaign until the very last moment, even should our men suffer much. I am putting forage for 1,000 horses and rations for 2,500 men at Eidgley as a depot for your operations. The supplies will be for that number of men and horses for four months j for 500 horses and 1,000 men for the same time at Abercrombie; also, putting up stables and quarters at each place thus occupied. I desire you to seize for the military service and send to Eidgley all the lumber, blacksmith s and carpenter s tools, and everything else that may be useful now at the Sioux Agency or elsewhere, in your reach, giving proper statements and valuation of what is thus taken. I will send in Captain Nelson at once to muster in your regi ment by companies and to pay the advance and bounty to the men. He will leave here immediately for your camp. I cannot urge upon you too strongly the necessity of marching as rapidly as possible upon the Sioux farms. Confidence and safety will at once be restored among the settlers when they find you are driv ing the Indians. Please communicate freely and fully with me, and make any suggestion you deem proper. I shall be glad to have your views on all matters connected with our operations here, as I expect to be but a short time among you. I am anxious to use the whole power given me, rapidly and fully as possible, to accomplish the object in view. I send this by Mr. Galbraith, whom you doubt less know. Will you give him what assistance is proper in saving the property of the Indian Department at this agency?
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JNO. POPE, Major General, Commanding.
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY EXPEDITION, IN CAMP, FOUR MILES FROM EIDGLEY, Sept. 19, 1862. Maj. Gen. JOHN POPE,
Commanding Department of the Northwest, St. Paul,
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your dispatch of 17th instant, which arrived by special messenger this evening, and thank you for the kind manner in which you refer to me as commander of this expedition. I may be allowed to state in this connection that I would not have been displeased to learn that you had selected as my successor in command some one of the gentlemen under your orders who has military qualifications, for to such I make little pre tension.
I am glad to perceive that you have so just an appreciation of the magnitude of the war in which we are engaged with the Sioux or Dakotas, the most warlike and powerful of the tribes on this continent. You have doubtless been apprised of the difficulties and delays which have had to be encountered in the conduct
OFFICIAL EEPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE. 235
of this expedition. At one time we have wanted bullets and at another bread. The men are new levies, except about 250 of the Third Eegiment, and even these latter have with them but two or three commissioned officers; a deficiency which I trust will be promptly remedied.
You will see by the date of this communication that I have crossed the Min nesota river near Fort Eidgley and am on my way in search of the Indians, preferring to move up on the south side of the river, as there might be trouble in crossing at a point higher up. The last communication from the Indian camp was by flag of truce, several days since, when the savages were assembled in force about fifteen miles from Lac qui Parle and about sixty miles above Eidgley. The half-breeds I have with me think it probable the camp has been removed to Lac qui Parle, and that I shall find them there. I hope such will prove to be the case, but it may be they are moving upward, in which case I shall probably fail to overtake them, as they have many horses and teams and I have but 27 horse men all told. My force is about 1,450 men. I shall be rejoiced to be re-enforced by even a portion of the mounted men you propose to send me.
Having thus stated the condition and prospects of the march I beg leave to mention my imperative wants. That of horsemen I have already adverted to; but when you are informed I have but ten days bread rations in camp and no supply nearer than St. Peter, nearly fifty miles distant, you will perceive unless
|
|