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Post by mdenney on Nov 21, 2009 22:53:23 GMT -5
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No. _______
SHELDON PETERS WOLFCHILD, et al., Petitioners, v. UNITED STATES, Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
_______________________________________
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE OGLALA SIOUX TRIBE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
______________________________________________
Mario Gonzalez Law Offices of Mario Gonzalez 522 Seventh Street, Suite 202 Rapid City, South Dakota 57701 Phone: 605~716-6355 Fax: 605-716-6357 Emall: gnzlaw@aol,com
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
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Gonzalez LIST OF PARTIES
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SHELDON PETERS WOLFCHILD~ et al., ERNIE PETERS LONGWALKER, et al.~ SCOTT ADOLPHSON, et at, MORRIS J. PENDLETON~ et al., BARBARA FEEZOR BUTTES, et at, WINIFRED ST. PIERRE FEEZOR~ et al., AUTUMN WEAVER, ct al., ARIES BESOTTING WEAVER, et al., ELIJAH BLUESTONE WEAVER, et al., RUBY MINKEL, et al., LAVONNE A. SWENSON, et aI., WILLIS SWENSON, et al., AARON SWENSON, et al., BEVERLY M. SCOTT~ et al., LILLIAN WILSON, et nl., MONIQUE WILSON, et al., SANDRA COLUMBUS GESHICK, et al., CHERYL l{, LORUSSO, et al., JENNIFER K. LORUSSO, et al., CASSANDRA SHEVCHU:K, et al., JASON SHEVCHUK, et al., JAMES PAUL WILSON, et al., EVA GRACE WILSON, et aI., BENITA M. JOHNSON, et at, and KEVfN LORUSSO, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, and HARLEY D. ZEPIDER, SR., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, and ELIZABETH T. WALKER, WALKER GROUP, and. JOHN DOES 1-30, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and GERTRUDE GODOY, et al., MICHAEL STEPHENS, et al., JESSE CERMAK, et al., DELORES KLINGBERG, et al., SALLY ELLA ALKIRE, et al., PIERRE GEORGE ARNOLD, JR., et al., and DENISE HENDERSON, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees~ and LOWER SIOUX INDIAN COMMUN1TY, Plaintiffs-ApJ;1ellees, and WINONA C. THOMAS ENYARD, et aI., and JEFFREY ARNOLD KITTO, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, and MADALINE ROCQUE, et al.~ MARY TAYLOR (TATEWASTEWIN),
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et al., MARGARET (DUMARCE) PRESCOTT, et al., and JOSEPH COURSOLLE, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,
LIST OF PARTIES (CONT.)
and MARY BETH LAFFERTY~ et at, ANITAD WHIPPLE, et al., BONNIE RAE LOWE, et al., and LENORA. SCHEFFLER BLAESER, et aI., PlaintiffsAppellees, and JULIA DUMARCE, et al., PlaintiffsAppeUees, and FRANCINE GARREAU HALL, et al., Plaintiffs-AppeJIees, and KRISTINE ABRAHAMSON, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, and VICTORIA ROBERTSON VADNAIS, et al.~ Plaintiffs-Appellees, and MARVEL JEAN DUMARCE, et al., and VIVIAN CORDELIA YOUNGBEAR, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, and DANNY LEE MOZAK, et a)" Plantiffs-Appellees and DAWN BURLEY, RAYMOND COURNOYER, SR., FRANCIS ELAINE FELIX, REBECCA ELIZABETH FELIX, LYDIA FERRIS, LESLIE LEE FRENCH, DAWN HENRY, SANDRA KIMBELL, JERRY ROBINETTE, VASSAR. ROONEY, DEBORAH L. SAUL, ROBERT LEE TAYl.OR, DANIEL M. TRUDELL, LAURA VASSAR, CHARLENE WANNA, KE ZEPHIER, and JOlIN DOES 31-433, Petitioners, v. UNITED S'J.'ATES, Respondent.
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Gonzalez TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
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___________________TABLE OF CONTENTS_________________
.................................................................................................PAGE
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES....................................................ii
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE.....................................................1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.............................................................4
ARGUMENT..................................................................................5
I. Review By This Court Should Be Granted To Correct The Federal Circuit's) Decision Of An Important Federal Question Regarding The Creation Of Trust Relationships In Favor Of Indians, As That Decision Conflicts With The Relevant Decisions Of This Court, Namely Mitchell II And White Mountain Apache.....................................................5
II. Review Should Be Granted To Decide Whether A Trust In Favor Of Indians Can Be
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Terminated By Congress Without Either Express Or "Plain And Unambiguous`` Language, Since The Federal Circuit's Decision Created A Conflict In The Circuits On This Question .....................................................21
CONCLUSION................................................................................................26
............................................TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES.............................................
.............................................................................................................PAGE
Cases
Brown v. United States, 86 FJd 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1996)......................................................................................................10
Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1930) ...............................................23
Cobell v, Norton, 240 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001)......................................8
DeCoteau v. District County Court for Tenth JudicialDistrict, 420 U.s. 425,444 (1974).................................................24
Joint Tribal Council o/the Passmaquoddy Tribe v, Monon, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975)..................................................25
LeBeauv. United States, 474 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1146 (2007) .............................................................9
...........................................................v.........................................................
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McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm 'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) ...............................................................................................23 Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 224 Ct. C1. 171,624 F.2d 981,987 (1980)..............................................................7 Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977)............................................................................................................23
__________________________TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES (Cont.)_____________
.........................................................................................................PAGE
Cases
Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942.).................................................................................................15
Smith v. Babbitt, 100 F,3d 556 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Feezor v. Babbitt, 522 U.S. 807 (1997)..................................6
Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984)................................................24
South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998)..........................................................................................24
United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) [Mitchell II ............................................................................................9, 13
United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) [Mitchell 11].......................................................................................passim .............................................................vi................................................................
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United States v. Navajo Na.tion, 537 U.S. 488 (2003)......................................................................................................13, 14
United States v. White Mountain Apache, 537 U,S. 465 (2003)............................................................................................passim
..............................................TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES (Cont,)..................
............................................................................................................PAGE
Cases
White Moun/ain Apache Tribe v. United States, 249 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001), aff'd, 537 U.S. 807 (2003)..........................................................................................................8
Wolfchild v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 521 (2004), rev'd, 559 F.3d 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2009)...........................................................1, 17, 22
Wolfchild 1), United States, 559 P.3d 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2009) .. ……………..........................................................................................................passim
Statutes
Act of June 29, 1888, ch. 503,25 Siat. 217.......................................................2
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Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 412,25 Stat. 980...................................................2, 14
Act of Aug. 19, 1890, ch. 807,26 Stat. 336.................................................2, 14
Pub.L. No. 96-557, 94 Stat. 3262 (1980)..................................................22
......................................TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES (Cont.)......................................
....................................................................................................................PAGE
Rules
Supreme Court Rule 10(a)...............................................................................6
Supreme Court Rule I0(c)................................................................................6
Supreme Court Rule 37.3(a)............................................................................1
Other Authorities
Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 5.05[1], at 429-30 (Nell Jessup Newton et aI., eds., 2005) ....................................12
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 13 (2003).................................................11
Restatement (third) of Trusts § 65(1).........................................................22
...............................................viii..............................................................................
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Post by mdenney on Nov 22, 2009 0:22:43 GMT -5
11/20/2008 12:04 FAX 18665670221 Gonzalez = 010/035 __________________INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 1_____________ The interest of the Oglala Sioux Tribe ("the OST") in this Htigation stems from the fa.ct th~t approximately 2,000 members ofthe Tribe are also members of the plaintiff class of lineal descendants of the 1886 Mdewakantons, commonly known as the loyal Sioux (or the loyal Mdewakantons), in Wolfchild v. United States, 559 F.3d 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2009), rev'g, 62 Fed. Cl. 521 (2004). Thus, the Tribe has an interest in promoting the general welfare of these tribal members by having the Court grant the Petitioners' Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in the _______________________ 1 Letters from the parties consenting to the filing of this brief have been filed with the Clerk of this Court in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 37.3(a). No counsel for any of the parties has authored this brief, and no person or entity other than amicus curiae, its members or counsel, has made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief .............................................1.......................................................... ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11/20/2008 12:05 FAX 18885670221 Gonzalez I&J 011/035 Wolfchild case, reverse the judgment of the Federal Circuit, and hold in accordance with the decision of the Court of Federal Claims the that the Federal Government owed a fiduciary obligation to the lineal descendants of the 1886 Mdewakantons by virtue of the three Appropriations Acts of 1888, 1889, and 1890, which directed the expenditure of specified monies by the Secretary of the Interior ("the Secretary") for the benefit of these Indians -- as well as their families -- who had remained loyal to the white settlers during the Sioux conflict in Minnesora in ] 1862. See Act of June 29, 1888, ch. 503, 25 Sta.t. 217, 228-29 ($ 20,000); Act of Mar. 2,1889, ch. 412,25 Stat. 980, 992-93 ($ 12,000); Act of Aug. 19, 1890, ch. 807,26 Stat. 336,349 ($ 8,000). The Federal Government breached this fiduciary obligation, thus making the Federal Government liable in money damages for ................................................2......................................................... ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11/20/2009 12:05 FAX 18665670221 Gonzalez I4i 012/035 breach of trust to the Wolfchild plaintiffs, including those plaintiffs who are also members of the OST. The OST wishes to emphasize that it is taking no position on the efforts of the Wo[fchild plaintiffs to seek relief other than money damages for breach of trust from the Federal Government under the Indian Tucker Act. However, the OST does not endorse the efforts of the Wolfchild plaintiffs to claim or take reservation and/or trust land from either the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community, the Prajrie Island Indian Community or the Lower Sioux Indian Community, or to claim or take "income, profits and proceeds from all [of these tribes'] reservation businesses," including "casino profits." SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................3......................................................... ...................................SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT................................ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11/20/2008 12:05 FAX 18885870221 l30nzalez I4J 013/035 Aside from the conflict in the circuits that has been highlighted by the Wolfchild Petitioners, review should be granted because the Federal Circuit decided an important federal question concerning the creation of trust relationships in favor of groups ofIndians in a way that conflicts with the fundamental principles of law laid down by this Court in United States, v.. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) [Mitchell 11] and United States v. White Mountain Apache, 537 U.S. 465 (2003). The Federal Circuit gave undue emphasis to the fact that the Appropriations Acts do not contain the word ''trust'', as well as to the context and legislative history of those Acts! even though the Acts presumptively created a trust by giving the Secretary, as trustee, control and supervision over the appropriated monies and the property purchased with those monies (the trust corpus) and by adequately defining a class ...........................................................4........................................................ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11/20/2008 12:08 FAX 18885870221 Gonzalez I4J 014/035 of beneficiaries, namely the loyal 1886 Mdewakantons and their lineal descendants. The Court should also grant the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in order to address and decide an important question of federal law regarding whether Congress, in order to terminate a trust in favor of Indians, must use clear and explicit or plain and unambiguous language, especially since the Federal Circuit's decision of this question is in conflict with an earlier decision of the First Circuit. ................................................ARGUMENT....................................... I. Review By This Court Should Be Granted To Correct The Federal Circuit's Decision Of An Important Federal Question Regarding The Creation Of Trust Relationships In Favor Of Indians, As That Decision Conflicts With The Relevant Decisions Of This Court, Namely Mitchell II And White Mountain Apache. The Wolfchild petitioners argue at length that their .........................................................5................................................... ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11/20/2008 12:08 FAX 18885870221 Gonzalez I4I 015/035 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be granted because the Federal Circuit's decision in Wolfchild conflicts with the Eighth Circuit's decision in Smith v. Babbitt, 100 F.3d 556 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Feezor v. Babbitt, 522 U.S. 807 (1997). See U.s. Sup. Ct. Rule l0(a). Aside from the need to resolve this conflict in the circuits, the OST, as amicus curiae, urges that the Petition should also be granted because the Federal Circuit decided an important question of federal law in a way that conflicts with the relevant decisions of this Court. See U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 10(c). First, this Court has held that "a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises when the Government assumes ... elaborate control over ... property belonging to Indians." United States v. Mitchell. 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983) [Mitchelll]]. In such cases, " ll of the necessary elements ...................................................6..............................................................
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of a common-law trust are present: a trustee (the United States), a beneficiary (the Indian allottees [or, as in this case,
the loyal Mdewakanton Sioux and their lineal descendants,])
and a trust corpus (Indian timber, lands and money [or, as in
this case, property, improvements to property, and money])."
Id. Moreover, "'[(w)here] the Federal Government takes on
Or has control Or supervision over tribal [or Indian] monies or properties, the fiduciary relationship normally exists with
respect to such monies or properties (unless CongreS5 has
provided otherwise) even though nothing is said expressly in
the authorizing or underlying statUte (or other fundamental
document) about a trust fund, or a trust or fiduciary
connection.'" Mitchell!I, 463 U.S. at 225 (emphasis added),
quoting Navajo Ttibe of Indiar/S v. United States, 224 Ct. Cl.
171,183,624 F.2d 981,987 (1980).
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In other words, the Court in Mitchell II recognized
that the Federal Government's control or supervision of tribal
or Indian properties is ordinarily sufficient to create a trust.
See While Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States; 249 F.3d
1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[T]he language of Mitchell II
makes quite clear that control alone is sufficient to create a
fiduciary relationship."), aff`d, 537 U,S, 465 (2003), The
Mitchell II rule operates as a presumption that in such
circumstances a fiduciary relationship exists despite the
absence of an express mention of the word "trust". See, e.g"
Cobell v. Norton, 240F.3d 1081,1098 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(“This rules operates as a presumption .... Therefore, courts
correctly recognize a trust relationship even where it is not
specifically la.id out by statute.") (citations omitted). This presumption has been applied by the Federal .........................................................8............................................
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Circuit in previous cases to recognize a trust obligation even where a statute did not mention the word "trust". See, e.g., LeBeau v. United States, 474 F.3d 1334, 1341 n. 5 (Fed. Cir.)
(relying on Mitchell II in support of holding that terms of
1972 Distribution Act created a trust responsibility because
the United States retained control over tribal monies while
the tribes were preparing their rolls subject to the Secretary
of the lnterior's approval, and while ilie Secretary was
preparing me roll of lineal descendants), cert. denied, 551
U.S. 1146 (2007). It has likewise been applied by the
Federal Circuit to recognize fiduciary obligations to
Individual lndian allottees going beyond the limited or bare
trust recognized by the Court in Mitchell P under the General
Allotment Act. See Brown v. United States, 86 F.3d 1554,
2 United States v, Mitchell, 445 u.s. 535 (1980) [Mitchell 1]. .................................................9....................................................
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1560 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Under Mitchell II then, as properly
(and literally construed) the assumption by Congress and/or
the Secretary, its delegatee, of control of allottee money or
property beyond the limited trust embodied in the General
Allotment Act imposes on the government a fiduciary duty to
the allottees.")
The Federal Circuit's decision in Wolf child, however,
improperly turns the Mitchell II presumption on its head.
The Federal Circuit reasoned that, "[w]hiIe it is true that a
statute need not contain the word 'trust' in order to create a trust relationship, the failure to use that term gives rise to
doubt that a trust relationship was intended" Wolfchild, 559
F.3d at 1238 (emphasis added and citations omitted). In
other words, the Federal Circuit appeared to presume that a
trust relationship was not intended absent an express mention ..............................................................10........................................................
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of the term "trust," even though the Federal Government clearly had both control and supervision of the monies appropriated by Congress for the benefit of the 1886
Mdewakantons and their lineal descendants, and of the property purchased by the Secretary with such monies.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit gave great weight to the fact
that the Appropriations Acts, instead of using the term
"trust", contained "simple" or "minimal" statutory directives,
which the appeals court reasoned were insufficient to "properly manifest" an intention on the part of Congress to create a trust relationship. See id, quoting Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 13 (2003).
Thus, the reasoning of the Federal Circuit in this case - is totally at odds with this Cowtls opinion in Mitchell II. Furthennore, its presumption that it is doubtful that a trust .........................................................11.....................................
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relationship is created absent the use of the term "trust" in
the statute or regulation under review is not supported by the
authorities cited by the appeals court. The Cohen treatise 3
actually confirms the rule of Mitchell II that the use of the word "trust" in a statute is not "necessary" to create a
compensable claim for breach of trust. As for the passages quoted from Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion in United
States v. White Mountain Apache, 537 U.S. 465,480-481 (2003), Justice Ginsburg nowhere stated or indicated that the absence of the term "trust" from a statute a.utomatically makes it doubtful that the statute creates a trust relationship.
_________________________
3 ........See Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law §
5.05[1], at 429-30 (Nell Jessup Newton et at., cds., 2005)
(" [W]hile the presence of the word 'trust' in a statute by .......itself is neither necessary nor sufficient to create a
compensable claim, statutory or regulatory language using
terms normally associated with trust or fiduciary law will be
given great weight in the analysis."), cited at Woljchild, 559
F.3d at 1238.
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Rather, in discussing the Courtts holding in the companion
case of United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003),
in which she wrote the opinion for the Court. Justice
Ginsburg observed that the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of
1938 ("IMLA") and its implementing regulations, at issue in
Navajo Nation, "lacked the characteristics that typify a
genuine trust relationship: Those provisions assigned the
Secretary of the Interior no managerial role over coal leasing; they did not even establish the 'limited trust
relationshipt that existed under the law at issue in Mitchell 1."
White Mountain Apache, 537 U.S. at 480-481.
By contrast, the Appropriations Acts specifically gave
the Secretary discretionary control and supervision over the
expenditure of the funds appropriated by Congress, and by
implication, over the use and occupancy of the land and
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other property purchased with those funds, for the benefit of
the loyal Mdewakantons and their families, see, e.g., 1890
Act, 26 Stat. at 349 Coo ••• to be expended by the Secretary of the Interior as in his judgment he may think best, for such
lands, agricultural implements, buildings, seeds, cattle, horses, food, or clothing as may be deemed best in me case of each of these Indians or families thereof'). and further
directed the Secretary that the appropriated funds should be “so expended that each of the Indians in this paragraph
mentioned shall receive, as nearly as practicable, an equal
amount in value of this appropriation." See 1889 and 1890
Acts, 25 Stat. at 992-93; 26 Stat. at 349. Thus, unlike the
IMLA in Navajo Nation, the Appropriations Acts clearly gave the Secretary a comprehensive "managerial role" over
the appropriated monies and the property purchased with ....................................................14..................................................
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those monies.
Moreover, this Court in Mitchell II made it clear that its
construction of the statutes and regulations at issue in that case as having created a trust and fiduciary obligation on the
part of the Government was "reinforced by the undisputed
existence of a general trust relationship between the United
States and the Indian people." Mitchell 11,463 U,S. at 225. The Court recognized that it had "previously emphasized 'the
distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited people.I" ld., quoting Seminole Nation
v. United States, 316U.S. 286, 296 (1942). By contrast, while recognizing that "[ c ]onsistent with the principle that there is a general trust relationship between
the United States and the Indian people,' [quoting Mitchell II, .....................................................15......................................
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463 U.S. at 225], Interior Department officials often characterized the 1886 lands as being held in trust for the
1886 Mdewakantons and their descendants," Wolfchild,559
F.3d at 1248, the Federal Circuit ruled that the "general trust
relationship" principle did not apply to the instant case because the 1886 Mdewakantons and their descendants were
not a tribe of Indians. See id ("[T]he 1886 Mdewakantons
were not a tribe of Indians, but rather were viewed as a group of individuals who had severed their tribal relations and were in need of assistance."). The "general trust relationship"
principle, however, applies to all "the Indian people,"
Mitchell II 463 U.S. at 225, including individual Indians, not
just tribes, and would certainly extend to the 1886
Mdewakantons and their descendants. Again, the Federal
Circuit's refusal to recognize the applicability of the "general
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trust relationship" principle to alllndians, not just tribes,
conflicts with Mitchell II. The Federal Circuit's decision also conflicts with this
Court's pronouncement in White Mountain Apache that "[w]here as in Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 206, 225 ... (1983), the
relevant sources of substantive law create 'all of the necessary elements of a common-law trust,' there is no need to look elsewhere for the source of a trust relationship."
White Mountain Apache, 537 U.S. at 475 n. 3. The Court of
Federal Claims, after quoting this passage from White
Mountain Apache, determined that "[t]he 1888J 1889, and 1890 Acts in combination have [the] three key features [of a
common-law trust] that show the creation of a trust."
Wolfchild, 62 Fed. Cl. at 540-541. First, the language of the
Appropriation Acts "functionally appoints the Secretary of
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Interior to serve as the trustee to spend the funds on behalf of
the beneficiaries, the loyal Mdewakanton." Id at 541.
Secondly, the Appropriations Acts designated the loyal
Mdewakanton and their families (which the Secretary
interpreted as including lineal descendants) as the
beneficiaries of the trust. See id. at 541-542. Third. the
Appropriations Acts created a trust corpus that included
property, improvements to property, and momes. ld. at 541. In reversing the Court of Federal Claims, the Federal
Circuit did not follow the approach of White Mountain
Apache in addressing whether the three fundamental elements of a common law tru$t were present. Instead, the
appeals court focused on (1) the absence of any express use of the term "trust" in the Appropriations Acts themselves,
Wolfchild, 559 F.3d at 1238; (2) the fact that each of the
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Appropriations Acts "was enacted as part of a much longer
statute that contained appropriations for payment of the
expenses of the Indian Department and for the support of
certain Indian tribes ... [which] contained no language
suggestive of a trust relationship," id. at 1238-1239; and (3)
the fact that "nothing in the legislative history of the three
provisions at issue in this case indicates that they were
designed to create a trust relationship." Id. at 1240. As already pointed out above, the Federal Circuit's
reliance on the absence of the use of the term "trust"
conflicts with this Court's decision in Mitchell II. As for the
appearance of each of the three Appropriations Acts in "much longer" appropriations statutes and the lack of any
legislative history that the Mdewakanton appropriations were
designed to create a trust relationship, these matters are
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irrelevant under the approach outlined in White Mountain
Apache. Since (as the Court of Federal Claims correctly
determined) the "relevant sources of substantive law," namely the three Appropriations Acts themselves, "create all of the necessary elements for a common-law trust," namely a
trustee, a class of beneficiaries, and a trust corpus, "there [was] no need [for the Federal Circuit] to look elsewhere [.
such as context or legislative history,] for the source of a
trust relationship." See White Mountain Apache, 537 U.S. at
475 n. 3.
In sum, the OST respectfully urges the Court to grant
theWolfchild Petitioners' Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, not only to resolve the conflict in the circuits pointed out by the
Petitioners, but also to correct the Federal Circuit's serious
deviation from the principles laid down by this Court in ................................................20...........................
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Mitchell II and White Mountain Apache in deciding an
important question of federal law, by holding that the Appropriations Acts created a. trust in favor of the loyal
Mdewakantons and their lineal descendants.
II. Review Should Be Granted To Decide Whether A Trust In Favor Of Indians Can Be Terminated By Congress Without Either Express Or "Plain And Unambiguous" Language, Since The Federal Circuit's Decision Created A Conflict In The Circuits On This Question.
The 0ST also urges the Court to grant the Wolfchild
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in order to decide an
important question of federal law, namely whether a trust
whose beneficiaries are Indians can be terminated by Congress without 'either express or "plain and unambiguous" language to that effect, or the consent of the beneficiaries. In ruling that the 1980 Act, see Pub. L. No. 96-557, 94 Stat.
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3262 (1980), did not termina.te the trust in favor of the loyal
1886 Mdewakantons and their lineal descendants, the Court
of Federal Claims pointed Qut that, while Congress
"typically" uses explicit language in terminating trusts in
favor oflndians, "the 1980 Act does not state as its purpose
that the trust for the Mdewakanton would be terminated."
Wolfchild, 62 Fed. Cl. at 543. The Federal Claims Court
further pointed out that, while the consent of the
beneficiaries is generally required in order to terminate a
trust, such consent "was not received here." Id, citing
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 65(1).
On appeal, the Federal Circuit nevertheless reversed
the Court of Claims on this question also, concluding that
"Congress's failure to include ex.press language of trust
termination [in the 1980 Act] cannot be regarded as .................................................22.......................................
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indicative of an intention not to alter the previous legal
relationship among the parties." 559 F.3d at 1258 (footnote
omitted). This Court has long held that in determining
congressional intent, the federal courts follow "the general
rule that '[d]oubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor
of the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the
nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith..```
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm 'n, 411 U .S, 164,
174 (1973), quoting Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367
(1930); accord, Rosebud Sioux Tribe 11. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 586 (1977). The Court has applied this rule of construction
to hold, with respect to the termination of Indian
reservations, that the federal courts will not lightly conclude that a reservation has been terminated and will require a clear
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indication of that fact. DeCoteau v. District County Court
for Tenth Judicial District, 420 U.S. 425,444 (1974): see
also South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343
(1998) ("[O]nly Congress can alter the terms of an Indian treaty by diminishing a reservation ... , and its intent to do so must be I clear and plain.' ") (citations omitted); Solem v.
Barlett, 465 U.S. 463,470 (1984) (Congress must clearly evince an intent to change boundaries before diminishment
will be found).
The Federal Circuit failed to adhere to this rule of
construction in holding that the 1980 Act terminated the trust in favor of the toyal1886 Mdewakantons and their lineal
ancestors, despite the a.bsence of clear and express language to that effect or the consent of the beneficiaries. The Federal Circuit's decision also conflicts with the ...............................................24....................................
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decision of tbe First Circuit Court of Appeals in Joint Tribal
Council of the Passmaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370
(1 st Cir. 1975), that "any withdrawal of trust obligations by
Congress" would have to be made in "plain and unambiguous" language in order to be effective. 528 F.2d at
380. In so holding, the First Circuit analogized to this Court's holding in DeCoteau regarding the termination of
Indian reservations. Id, at 380 n. 12. The Court should therefore also grant the Wolfchild
Petitioners' Petition for a W1it of Certiorari in order to resolve this conflict in the circuits and decide the important
question offedera11aw, never before addressed by this Court, as to the need for clear and explicit Or "plain and unambiguous" language in congressional enactments that
purport to terminate a trust in favor of Indians, absent the .....................................25.........................................
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.........................consent of the beneficiaries of the trust. ............................
..............................................CONCLUSION........................................
For the reasons set forth above and in Petitioners'
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, this Court should grant the
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari requested in, this case.
Respectfully submitted, ____________________
Mario Gonzalez Law Offices of Mario Gonzalez 522 Seventh Street, Suite 202 Rapid City, South Dakota 57701 Phone: 605-716-6355 Fax: 605-716-6357 Email: gnzlaw@ao1.com Counsel for Amicus Curiae ................................................26............................................
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