Document 1100 - Motion for Reconsideration
Defendant United States Motion for Reconsideration of Court's August 5, 2011 Opinion and Order and Memorandum in Support. (Entered: 09/02/2011)
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS
____________________________________
SHELDON PETER WOLFCHILD, et al., ))
Plaintiffs, ))
v. ) Case No. 03-2684L and
) Case No. 01-568L (consolidated)
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ))
Defendant. )
____________________________________)
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
OF COURT’S AUGUST 5, 2011 OPINION AND ORDER
AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
IGNACIA S. MORENO
Assistant Attorney General
Stephen Finn
Jody H. Schwarz
Daniel Steele
J. Nathanael Watson
U.S. Department of Justice
Environment & Natural Resources Division
Natural Resources Section
P.O. Box 663
Washington, D.C. 20044-0663
(202) 305-3284 (tel.)
(202) 514-8865 (fax)
stephen.finn@usdoj.gov
Attorneys for the United States
OF COUNSEL:
Kenneth Dalton
James Stroud
Department of the Interior
Washington, DC 20240
Case 1:03-cv-02684-CFL Document 1100 Filed 09/02/11 Page 1 of 30
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. The Federal Reports Elimination Act did not decimate the Judgment Fund Use and
Distribution Act. .................................................................................................................4
II. The Court’s Opinions have fully resolved all the claims presented; as such, a final
judgment should be entered. .............................................................................................14
III. The Court’s Order That the Secretary Complete and Submit the Distribution Plan
to this Court Within One Year is Inconsistent with the Distribution Act.........................18
CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................................21
Case 1:03-cv-02684-CFL Document 1100 Filed 09/02/11 Page 2 of 30
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock,
480 U.S. 678 (1987) .............................................................................................. 8, 9
Alli v. United States,
86 Fed. Cl. 33 (2009) . ........................................................................................................2
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England,
546 U.S. 320 (2006) ..........................8
Bd. of Trs. of Bay Med. Ctr. v. Humana Military Healthcare Servs., Inc.,
447 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cl. 2006) ................2
Browning Ferris Indus., Inc. & Subsidiaries v. United States,
No. 05-738T, 2007 WL 1412087 (Fed. C. May 10, 2007) . ..............2
Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976) .....................9
Caldwell v. United States,
391 F.3d 126 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 826 (2005) . ...................................1
Cannon. v. Univ. of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677 (1979).......................12
Cathedral Candle Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
400 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ................6
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm'n of Okla.,
286 U.S. 210 (1932) ....................................9
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837(1984) .......................7
County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
112 S. Ct. 683 (1992) ...............13
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775 (1998) .....................12
Faulkner v. United States,
43 Fed. Cl. 54 (1999) . ................18
Case 1:03-cv-02684-CFL Document 1100 Filed 09/02/11 Page 3 of 30
iv
FFTF Restoration Co., LLC v. United States,
86 Fed. Cl. 226 (Fed. Cl. 2009) . ............... 17-18
Fla. Power & Light Co. v. United States,
66 Fed. Cl. 93 (2005) . ............2
Four Rivers Invs., Inc. v. United States,
78 Fed. Cl. 662 (2007) . ................ 1, 2
Franklin Sav. Corp. v. United States,
56 Fed. Cl. 720 (2003) . ..................8
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,
130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) ....................8
Fru-Con Constr. Corp. v. United States,
44 Fed. Cl. 298 (1999), aff’d per curiam, 250 F.3d 762 (Fed. Cir. 2000) . ........................1
Fulbright v. United States,
97 Fed. Cl. 221 (2011) . ..............17
Garcia v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
437 F.3d 1322 (Fed.Cir.2006) ...................12
Gold v. Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Indian Reservation,
478 F.Supp. 190 (D.C.Or. 1979) ........18
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.,
458 U.S. 564 (1982) .................20
Heinzelman v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,
2011 WL 2746329 (Fed. Cl. Jun. 24, 2011)...............5
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson,
525 U.S. 432 (1999) ........................5
I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre,
526 U.S. 415 (1999) ...................7
I.N.S. v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983)............. 9, 11
Inter-Coastal Xpress, Inc., v. United States,
296 F.3d 1357(2000)....................6
Case 1:03-cv-02684-CFL Document 1100 Filed 09/02/11 Page 4 of 30
v
Lummi Tribe of Lummi Reservation v. United States,
2011 WL 3417092 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 4, 2011) . ...........18
Martin v. Luther,
689 F.2d 109 (7th Cir.1982) . ..............12
Martinez v. United States,
333 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ..............17
Mendoza v. United States,
87 Fed. Cl. 331 (2009) . ...................17
Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.,
498 U.S. 19 (1990) ....................12
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians,
526 U.S. 172 (1999) ......................9
Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535 (1974) ...................13
Murphy v. United States,
993 F.2d 871 (Fed. Cir. 1993) .............17
NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.,
513 U.S. 251(1995) ........................7
New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992)......................8
Nixon v. Missouri Mun. League,
541 U.S. 125 (2004) .......................4
Norfolk Dredging Co. v. United States,
375 F.3d 1106 (Fed.Cir.2004) ...................6
North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas,
515 U.S. 29 (1995) ..................12
PGBA, LLC v. United States,
389 F.3d 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ...........18
Randall v. Loftsgarden.,
478 U.S. 647 (1986) .........................6
Case 1:03-cv-02684-CFL Document 1100 Filed 09/02/11 Page 5 of 30
vi
Regan v. Time, Inc.,
468 U.S. 641 (1984) .................. 8, 9
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
467 U.S. 986 (1984) .....................6
Sharp v. United States,
80 Fed. Cl. 422 (2008) . ....................8
Smalls v. United States,
87 Fed. Cl. 300 (2009) . ................17
St. Paul Fire v.Marin Ins. Co. v. Barry,
438 U.S. 531 (1978) ....................5
Strategic Hous. Fin. Corp. of Travis County v. United States,
86 Fed. Cl. 518 (2009) . .................17
United States v. Alvarez–Sanchez,
511 U.S. 350 (1994) ........................5
United States v. Dann,
470 U.S. 39 (1985) ....................16
United States v. Haggar Apparel Co.,
526 U.S. 380 (1999) .....................7
United States v. Jackson,
390 U.S. 570 (1968) .........................9
United States v. LeCoe,
936 F.2d 398 (9th Cir.1991) . ..........12
United States v. Martin,
128 F.3d 1188 (7th Cir.1997) . ...........12
United States v. Palmer,
16 U.S. 610 (1818) ......................4
United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation,
131 S. Ct. 1723 (2011) ............18
Watt v. Alaska,
451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981)............6
Case 1:03-cv-02684-CFL Document 1100 Filed 09/02/11 Page 6 of 30
vii
Wolfchild v. United States,
96 Fed. Cl. 302 (2010) . ............ 15, 18
Young v. United States,
94 Fed. Cl. 671 (2010) . ...................2
Yuba Natural Res. Inc v. United States,
904 F. 2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1990) .............2
Zhang v. United States,
89 Fed. Cl. 263 (2009) . ..................6
STATUTES
5 U.S.C. § 702 ...........3
5 U.S.C. § 706 ..........18
5 U.S.C. § 706(1) . ..........................17
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) .......................17
25 U.S.C. § 1401 ............2
25 U.S.C. § 1401(a) . .................. 6, 10
25 U.S.C. § 1402(a) . ....... 2-4, 6, 18, 19, 20
25 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(1) ......................20
25 U.S.C. § 1402(c)-(d) . ............... 10, 11
25 U.S.C. § 1403 ................. 10, 18
25 U.S.C. § 1404 ....................
25 U.S.C. § 1405 ........19
25 U.S.C. § 1406 ...............................10
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2) ........... 3, 16, 17, 18
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(G) ..................19
28 U.S.C. § 2517 .......................19
Case 1:03-cv-02684-CFL Document 1100 Filed 09/02/11 Page 7 of 30
viii
28 U.S.C. § 2517(b) . ..........................16
31 U.S.C. § 1304 ........................ 16, 19
Pub. L. No. 104-66 .................... 1, 4
RULES
RCFC 54(d) ............................... 15, 18
RCFC 54(d)(1)(B)(i) ................19
RCFC 54(d)(2)(B)(i) ......................19
RCFC 59 . ..................1
REGULATIONS
25 C.F.R. § 87.5 . .................7
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
H.R. Rep. No. 104-327 (1995)..............7
Case 1:03-cv-02684-CFL Document 1100 Filed 09/02/11 Page 8 of 30
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS
____________________________________
SHELDON PETER WOLFCHILD, et al., ))
Plaintiffs, ))
v. ) Case No. 03-2684L and
) Case No. 01-568L (consolidated)
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ))
Defendant. )
____________________________________)
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
OF COURT’S AUGUST 5, 2011 OPINION AND ORDER
AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
Pursuant to the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”), Rule 59,
the United States respectfully moves for reconsideration of the Court’s August 5, 2011 Opinion
and Order (dkt. no. 1093) (hereinafter “Aug. Op.”). Specifically, the United States requests
reconsideration of the Court’s conclusion that the Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-66, 109 stat. 707, (“Reports Elimination Act”), “decimated” the Indian
Tribal Judgment Funds Use or Distribution Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1401, et. seq, (“Distribution Act”),
and that this Court must fill the “substantial gap” left by the termination of the requirement that
the Secretary of the Interior submit distribution plans to Congress. Additionally, as the Court
has resolved all of Plaintiffs' claims, the United States requests entry of judgment on all claims.
A motion for reconsideration is a request for extraordinary relief and is not a device to be
used by an unsatisfied party to re-litigate the case. Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 126,
1235 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 826 (2005); Four Rivers Invs., Inc. v. United States,
78 Fed. Cl. 662, 664 (2007); Fru-Con Constr. Corp. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 298, 300
(1999), aff’d per curiam, 250 F.3d 762 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Table). Such a motion “does not
provide an occasion for a party ‘to raise arguments it could have raised previously, but did not’”
Case 1:03-cv-02684-CFL Document 1100 Filed 09/02/11 Page 9 of 30
2
or to “‘reassert arguments that the Court had already considered.’” Four Rivers Invs., Inc., 78
Fed. Cl. at 664 (quoting Browning Ferris Indus., Inc. & Subsidiaries v. United States, No. 05-
738T, 2007 WL 1412087, at *1 (Fed. Cl. May 10, 2007)). Instead, the Court should grant a
motion for reconsideration when there has been an intervening change in the controlling law,
newly discovered evidence, or the need to correct clear factual or legal error or prevent manifest
injustice. Young v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 671, 674 (2010); Bd. of Trs. of Bay Med. Ctr. v.
Humana Military Healthcare Servs., Inc., 447 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cl. 2006); Fla. Power &
Light Co. v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 93, 96 (2005). “The decision whether to grant
reconsideration lies largely within the discretion of the [trial] court.” Yuba Natural Res., Inc. v.
United States, 904 F. 2d 1577, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Alli v. United States, 86 Fed. Cl. 33, 34
(2009) (citing Yuba Natural Res., Inc.).
Here, the Court has erred in finding that the termination by the Federal Reports
Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995 of the requirement in 25 U.S.C. § 1402(a) to submit
distribution plans to Congress leaves substantial gaps in the Distribution Act. First, the Reports
Elimination Act did not terminate the requirement that the Secretary submit the distribution plan.
Further, under established principles of statutory construction, regardless of the status of the
distribution plan submission requirements, the other remaining portions of the Distribution Act
remain operable. At most, the distribution plan submission requirements in 25 U.S.C. § 1402(a)
and 1404 that relate to Congress are severed from the rest of the statute. As such, the Secretary
of the Interior retains fully statutory authority to prepare use and distribution plans for the funds
in its discretion pursuant to the Distribution Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1401, et. seq, without further
judicial oversight, and may within his discretion submit the distribution plan to Congress to
effectuate the remainder of the Acts requirements. The Court should correct this portion of the
Case 1:03-cv-02684-CFL Document 1100 Filed 09/02/11 Page 10 of 30
3
August 5th Opinion.
Second, as the Court’s opinions fully address the question of the United States’ liability
and the Court has awarded an amount of damages, the judgment is properly considered a final
judgment on all claims. As such, the ordered remand to the Secretary of the Interior to prepare a
use and distribution plan for the awarded amount exceeds the court’s jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2). To that extent jurisdiction exists to review distribution plans, it falls to the
district courts under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 et seq (“APA”). The
United States respectfully requests the Court to revoke its partial judgment order and enter a
final judgment on all claims in this case.
Third, this Court provided two distinct procedures for the Secretary to submit his
distribution plan to this Court. In one instance the Court required the Secretary to submit the
distribution plan after certification of judgment and appropriation of funds, which is generally
consistent with the reporting requirement to submit distribution plans to Congress found in the
Distribution Act. The Court has also required completion of the distribution plan within one
year of its decision and judgment. This would require Interior to begin its efforts pending any
appeal and prior to a final, non-appealable, judgment, and may result in unnecessary expenditure
of resources in the event this Court’s judgment is reversed or modified. The United States
respectfully requests this Court reconsider the requirement to complete the distribution plan
within one year from judgment and opinion, and to the extent that it does not revoke the portion
of its Opinion and Order that directs the Secretary to submit his proposed distribution plan to the
Court, require submission of the distribution plan one year from appropriation of funds
consistent with the Distribution Act.
Case 1:03-cv-02684-CFL Document 1100 Filed 09/02/11 Page 11 of 30
4
I. The Federal Reports Elimination Act did not “decimate” the Indian Tribal
Judgment Funds Use or Distribution Act.
After holding that the Distribution Act applies to the stipulated amount of damages at
issue in this case, the Court held that the Reports Elimination Act repealed portions of and
"decimated" the Distribution Act. See Aug. Op. at 41-42. Contrary to the Court's holding,
regardless of whether the Reports Elimination Act relieved Interior of the obligation to submit
distribution plans under Sections 1402(a) and 1404, the remainder of the Distribution Act
remains intact. As discussed below, at most, the Reports Elimination Act would only serve to
sever the submission requirements in Sections 1402(a) and 1404 from the Distribution Act. As
such, the Court should reconsider and correct its opinion.
As an initial matter, the Reports Elimination Act did not terminate the requirement to
submit the distribution plans to Congress under 25 U.S.C. § 1402(a). The Reports Elimination
Act provided “each provision of law requiring the submittal to Congress (or any committee of
the Congress) of any annual, semiannual, or other regular periodic report specified on the list
[prepared by the Clerk of the House of Representatives (House Document No. 103-7)] shall
cease to be effective.” Pub.L. 104-66, Title III, § 3003, 109 Stat. 707, 734 (as amended)
(emphasis added). House Document 103-7 provides a list of reports “to which it is the duty of
any officer or Department to make to Congress.” House Document No. 103-7 at iii. The
language of the Reports Elimination Act did not terminate “all” reports found in House
Document No. 103-7 but only “any” reports that were “annual, semiannual, or regular periodic.”
See United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 610, 631 (1818) (Marshall, C.J.) (“[G]eneral words,” such
as the word “‘any’,” must “be limited” in their application “to those objects to which the
legislature intended to apply them”); Nixon v. Missouri Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 126 (2004)
Case 1:03-cv-02684-CFL Document 1100 Filed 09/02/11 Page 12 of 30
5
(“‘
ny’” means “different things depending upon the setting”); United States v.
Alvarez–Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 357 (1994) (“[R]espondent errs in placing dispositive weight on
the broad statutory reference to ‘any’ law enforcement officer or agency without considering the
rest of the statute”). If Congress had intended to cease the submission of “all” reports listed in
House Document No. 103-7, there would have been no need to qualify a subset from the list of
reports.
House Document No. 103-7 lists many reports as annual, semiannual, triennial, quarterly,
monthly, or by date. The Distribution Act does not require an annual, semiannual, or “regular
periodic” submission. It is entirely an ad hoc submission tied to the appropriation of funds
pursuant to a judgment. "As in any case of statutory construction, our analysis begins with the
language of the statute. And where the statutory language provides a clear answer, it ends there
as well." Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). The “clear answer” is that the Reports Elimination Act does not
apply. To find otherwise is to rewrite “any annual, semiannual, or regular periodic report” and
make it “all annual, semiannual, or regular periodic reports.” That is not what Congress
provided and should not be found here.
To the extent that the Court does not change its opinion regarding whether the
requirement to submit distributions plan to Congress has been terminated, the effect of the
Reports Elimination Act on the Distribution Act begins with the plain meaning of the language
found in each statute. Heinzelman v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 2011 WL 2746329, *8
(Fed. Cl. Jun. 24, 2011) (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 547
(1978) (“The starting point in any case involving construction of a statute is the language
itself.”)). If “the language is clear and fits the case, the plain meaning of the statute will be
Case 1:03-cv-02684-CFL Document 1100 Filed 09/02/11 Page 13 of 30
6
regarded as conclusive.” Norfolk Dredging Co. v. United States, 375 F.3d 1106, 1110
(Fed.Cir.2004) (citation omitted). Even though Sections 1402(a) and 1404 were listed on House
Document No. 103-7 amongst reports being eliminated, the Reports Elimination Act cannot be
read to explicitly repeal the Distribution Act.
The language of the Distribution Act also makes clear that Congress did not intend for
other statutes to repeal the Distribution Act. See 25 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (stating that
"notwithstanding any other law, all use and distribution of funds appropriated in satisfaction of a
judgment of . . . the Court of Federal Claims in favor of any Indian . . . group . . . shall be made
pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.") (emphasis added). Likewise, repeals by implication
are strongly disfavored. Zhang v. United States, 89 Fed.Cl. 263, 275 (2009); Inter-Coastal
Xpress, Inc., 296 F.3d 1357, 1369-70 (citing Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 661 (1986)
(“It is, of course, a cardinal principle of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not
favored.”)). “[W]here two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent
a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.”
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1018 (1984) (internal quotation omitted).
“Evidence of intention to repeal [an] earlier statute must be ‘clear and manifest’; courts must
read seemingly conflicting statutes ‘to give effect to each if we can do so while preserving their
sense and purpose.’” Cathedral Candle Co. v. U.S. Int’l. Trade Comm’n, 400 F.3d 1352, 1365
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981)); see also Inter-Coastal
Xpress, 296 F.3d at 1370 (“For a more recent statute to impliedly repeal an existing one, it is
insufficient to demonstrate that the two statutes produce differing results when applied to the
same factual situation. . . . The legislative intent to repeal must be manifest in the positive
repugnancy between the provisions of the two statutes.” (internal quotation omitted)).
Case 1:03-cv-02684-CFL Document 1100 Filed 09/02/11 Page 14 of 30
7
As the Court noted, the purpose of the Reports Elimination Act was to "alleviate the
burden on the Executive Branch [and] to allow the [g]overnment to focus its energy on more
important issues, thereby better utilizing their time." Aug. Op. at 41 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-
327 (1995), 1995 WL 683033, *23.). In other words, the Reports Elimination Act in no way
speaks to or addresses the fundamental purpose of the Distribution Act, that being to distribute
monies from Tribal judgments. Moreover, assuming, the Reports Elimination Act partially
repealed the Distribution Act, it has partially repealed the Distribution Act only to the extent that
the Secretary is no longer required to submit distribution plans to Congress under any particular
deadlines.
In any event, the Secretary’s interpretation and application of the remainder of the Act, if
there is any “substantial gap,” is subject to Chevron deference. Id. at 393 (“For purposes of the
Chevron analysis . . . the agency must use its discretion to determine
how best to implement the policy in those cases not covered by the statute's specific terms.” ).
Indeed, the Secretary’s decision to retain the congressional reporting requirements within the
Department’s regulations, 25 C.F.R. § 87.5, post enactment of the Reports Elimination Act
confirms that the Secretary has construed the Act as not being amended at all. United States v.
Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 392 (1999) (“If, however, the agency's statutory
interpretation ‘fills a gap or defines a term in a way that is reasonable in light of the legislature's
revealed design, we give [that] judgment “controlling weight.”’”) (quoting NationsBank of N.C.,
N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257 (1995)). Where the court is
confronted with a question implicating an agency’s construction of a statute that it administers,
Chevron principles must be applied. I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999) (citing
and quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
Case 1:03-cv-02684-CFL Document 1100 Filed 09/02/11 Page 15 of 30
8
43 (1984)). Further, the court must ask whether “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue” before it; if so, “the question for the court [is] whether the agency’s answer
is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. Here, the construction is permissible
and gives the intended meaning to the Distribution Act.
Once a court has determined that a statute has been partially repealed, the statute that was
partially repealed “operates now just as it did before [except for the partial repeal].” Sharp v.
United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 422, 431 (2008) (holding that the later enacted statute "does not totally
repeal" the earlier statute, but that the earlier statute "operates now just as it did before the [later
enacted statute]."). Severability is fundamentally rooted in a respect for separation of powers
and notions of judicial restraint. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546
U.S. 320, 329–30 (2006). Courts must “strive to salvage” acts of Congress by severing any
infirm provisions “while leaving the remainder intact.” Id. at 329. Likewise, the Federal Circuit
has cautioned against "legislating an alternative to the review mechanisms contained in [a
statute]" and that such an exercise of judicial power "would execute a partial repeal of these
statutes by judicial fiat." Franklin Sav. Corp. v. United States, 56 Fed.Cl. 720, 747 (2003).
Importantly, the Supreme Court has made clear that “the presumption is in favor of
severability.” Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 653 (1984). In the overwhelming majority of
cases, the Supreme Court has opted to sever the defective provision from the remainder of the
statute. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S.Ct. 3138, 3161-
62 (2010) (holding tenure provision severable from Sarbanes–Oxley Act); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 186–87 (1992) (holding take-title provision severable from Low–Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S.
678, 684–97 (1987) (holding legislative veto provision severable from Airline Deregulation Act
Case 1:03-cv-02684-CFL Document 1100 Filed 09/02/11 Page 16 of 30
9
of 1978); I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 931–35 (1983) (holding legislative veto provision
severable from Immigration and Nationality Act); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108-09 (1976)
(holding campaign expenditure limits severable from public financing provisions in Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971). As these cases amply demonstrate, the Supreme Court has
declined to invalidate more of a statute than is absolutely necessary. Rather, courts should “act
cautiously” and “refrain from invalidating more of the statute than is necessary.” Regan, 468
U.S. at 652.
The Supreme Court's test for severability is “well-established”:
Unless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions
which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part
may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law.
Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684 (quotation marks omitted); Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp.
Comm'n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234-35 (1932) (citations omitted); Regan, supra, at 653. “The
inquiry into whether a statute is severable is essentially an inquiry into legislative intent.”
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 191 (1999).
The presence of a severability clause in the legislation may guide the court in
determining that Congress intended for any infirm provisions to be severed, though Supreme
Court precedent confirms that the “ultimate determination of severability will rarely turn on the
presence or absence of such a [severability] clause.” United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585
n.27 (1968). Rather, “Congress’ silence is just that—silence—and does not raise a presumption
against severability.” Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 686.
Likewise, both the Senate and House legislative drafting manuals state that, in light of
Supreme Court precedent in favor of severability, severability clauses are unnecessary unless
they specifically state that all or some portions of a statute should not be severed. See Office of
Case 1:03-cv-02684-CFL Document 1100 Filed 09/02/11 Page 17 of 30
10
Legislative Counsel, U.S. Senate, Legislative Drafting Manual, § 131 (Feb. 1997) (providing that
“a severability clause is unnecessary” but distinguishing a “nonseverability clause,” which
“provides that if a specific portion of an Act is declared invalid, the whole Act or some portion
of the Act shall be invalid”); Office of Legislative Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives,
House Legislative Counsel's Manual on Drafting Style, § 328 (Nov. 1995) (stating that “a
severability clause is unnecessary unless it provides in detail which related provisions are to fall,
and which are not to fall, if a specified key provision is held invalid”).
The Distribution Act provides the framework for the process by which Interior is to
allocate judgments of this court. 25 U.S.C. § 1401(a). Congress instructed Interior to prepare a
use and distribution plan for each judgment, and provided for due process for the recipients of
any funds in requiring hearings, the taking of testimony, and public notice. Id. at § 1403.
Congress also provided for Interior to determine whether such a plan could be accomplished and
provided guidance for what to do where beneficiaries disagreed about how the monies should be
allocated. Id. at § 1402(c)-(d) (providing for Interior to submit a legislative proposal and report
to Congress in the event Interior determines a plan cannot be prepared or Interior cannot obtain
consent to division of the funds); see also id. at § 1406 (providing authority for Interior to
promulgate rules to implement the Distribution Act, including providing adequate notice to
beneficiaries). The Court acknowledged this discretion, provided by Congress to Interior in
distributing judgment funds, by holding that the “dentification of beneficiaries of the final
judgment is within the purview of the Secretary of Interior under the Indian Judgment
Distribution Act,” Aug. Op. at 36 (citations omitted), and that the Court has “no direct role” in
that process. Aug. Op. at 42. Importantly, Congress also provided for a submitted plan to
become effective without further action from Congress. 25 U.S.C. § 1405. The Distribution
Case 1:03-cv-02684-CFL Document 1100 Filed 09/02/11 Page 18 of 30
11
Act does not contain a severability clause.
The particulars of what any use and distribution plan would look like for the funds at
issue here can only be speculation until Interior prepares such a plan. Interior retains full
discretion to determine that it cannot prepare a plan or consent cannot be obtained to any
proposed distribution and may then submit proposed legislation and a report to Congress. Id. at
§ 1402(c) & (d). The Reports Elimination Act does not address the provisions of the
Distribution Act allowing for such action to be taken. Moreover, as the Court noted, the purpose
of the Reports Elimination Act was not to alleviate a burden on the government not to impact the
distribution of Indian judgments. Aug. Op. at 41. In other words, the portions of the
Distribution Act not impacted by the Reports Elimination Act remain "fully operative as a law."
Chadha at 934 (citation omitted).
The legislative history reveals that the purpose of the requirement to submit the proposed
plan was to effectuate Congressional oversight. 119 Cong. Rec. H32075 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1973)
(statement of Rep. Meeds) (“H.R. 8029 is designed to delegate much of the function of the
Congress with respect to distribution while maintaining ample congressional oversight.”)
Indeed, prior to 1960, funds from Indian Claims Commission judgments were distributed by
Interior without congressional action. Id. Beginning in 1960, Congress adopted an oversight
procedure wherein each Interior appropriations act required Interior to obtain legislation
authorizing distribution of funds and setting forth the purposes for which the funds were to be
used. Id. “Congress adopted this oversight procedure because it was felt that the Department
was not giving adequate consideration to more effective use of parts of the[] awards by the tribe,
such as education, economic development, and so forth.” Id. Subsequently, guidelines and
patterns for distribution developed within the procedures for separate legislation for each award.
Case 1:03-cv-02684-CFL Document 1100 Filed 09/02/11 Page 19 of 30
12
Id. However, the process became a burden on the members and staff of the Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs. Id. At that point, Congress decided to delegate “much of the
function of the Congress” to Interior. Id. To the extent that the Reports Elimination Act may
have later terminated the requirement to submit the distribution plans to Congress, Congress has
determined that the distribution plans are unnecessary to further its oversight responsibilities.
At the same time, Congress did not shift its oversight responsibilities to this Court.
Indeed, Congress instead relies on the remaining requirements of the Distribution Act and
Interior’s regulations to effectuate its intent. The “substantial gap” found by this Court, if it
exists, is one Congress created and Congress is assumed to act with knowledge of existing law
and interpretations when it enacts new legislation. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775, 792 (1998) (noting the “presumption that Congress was aware of [prior] judicial
interpretations [of a statute] and, in effect, adopted them”); North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515
U.S. 29, 34 (1995) (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 699 (1979)) (in
interpreting new legislation enacted by Congress, “it is not only appropriate but also realistic to
presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar with [federal court] precedents . . . and that it
expect its enactment to be interpreted in conformity with them.”); Miles v. Apex Marine
Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990) (“We assume that Congress is aware of existing law when it
passes legislation.”); United States v. Martin, 128 F.3d 1188, 1192 (7th Cir.1997) (in construing
amendments to a statute, a court presumes that Congress was aware of judicial interpretations of
the statute); Martin v. Luther, 689 F.2d 109, 115 (7th Cir.1982) (“Congress is presumed to know
the law.”). Cf. Garcia v. Department of Homeland Sec., 437 F.3d 1322, 1336 (Fed.Cir.2006)
(“Congress is presumed to enact legislation with knowledge of the law and a newly-enacted
statute is presumed to be harmonious with existing law and judicial concepts.”) (collecting
Case 1:03-cv-02684-CFL Document 1100 Filed 09/02/11 Page 20 of 30
13
cases); United States v. LeCoe, 936 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir.1991) (“Congress is, of course,
presumed to know existing law pertinent to any new legislation it enacts.”).
Moreover, the Reports Elimination Act does not preclude the Secretary from submitting
distribution plans to Congress to effectuate the remainder of the Distribution Act. The
obligations that flow from the submission of the distribution plan to Congress that are found in
25 U.S.C. § 1405 suggest that the Secretary retains the discretion to effectuate the statute by
submitting plans to Congress although the requirement itself might have terminated. County of
Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683, 692
(1992) (“Judges 'are not at liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments, and
when two [or more] statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a
clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.'") (quoting
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551(1974)). Indeed, the Secretary continues to submit
distribution plans to Congress without objection. See e.g. Plan for the Use and Distribution of
the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon Judgment Funds in Docket
02-126L Before the United States Court of Federal Claims, 75 Fed. Reg. 9250-51 (Mar. 1, 2010)
(“On September 1, 2009, the plan for the use and distribution of the funds was submitted to
Congress pursuant to the Indian Tribal Judgment Fund Act, 25 U.S.C. 1401 et seq. Receipt of
the plan by the House of Representatives and the Senate was recorded in the Congressional
Record on September 30, 2009, and September 8, 2009, respectively. The plan became effective
on December 18, 2009, because a joint resolution disapproving it was not enacted.”).
Assuming that the Reports Elimination Act has partially repealed the Distribution Act,
Congress has partially repealed the Distribution Act only to the extent that the Secretary is no
longer required to submit distribution plans to Congress under any particular deadlines. Such an
Case 1:03-cv-02684-CFL Document 1100 Filed 09/02/11 Page 21 of 30
14
approach gives effect to the remaining language of the statute, provides more flexibility and
discretion to the Secretary while removing arguably burdensome reporting requirement
deadlines, yet still provides for Indian judgments to be paid in an a reasonable time given all
circumstances and difficulties in arriving at a plan. This effectuates both the intent of the
underlying substantive Distribution Act to get judgments paid, and the intent of Congress to get
the agencies out from under the burden of deadlines and reporting requirements deemed
unnecessary to Congress. Imposing those same deadlines back on the Department by order of
remand judicial order is at direct odds with a house-keeping statute that eliminates the reporting
requirement deadlines. See infra 15-17. It is reasonable to construe the statutes together to
require that DOI submit a plan within a reasonable time giving broad discretion on the timing to
the agency. At the same time, Congress has provided for review of Interior’s actions and
inaction under the APA by the federal district courts. It is not reasonable to construe the Report
Elimination Act as eliminating all obligations to provide a plan to Congress, or prohibiting even
the submission of a plan to Congress. Therefore, the Court should reconsider its holding in this
regard.
II. The Court’s opinions have fully resolved all the claims presented; as such, a final
judgment should be entered.
Instead of issuing a judgment on all claims, the Court has issued a partial judgment and
ordered “the Secretary of the Interior to develop a roll of eligible individuals and prepare a
distribution plan” within one year and to submit a report to the Court with the roll and plan.
Aug. Op. 43-44. At the same time, the Court has entered an order finding liability on the part of
the United States and quantifying the amount of damages owing. Further, the Court has
determined that it “has no direct role in specifying the individual persons entitled to share in a
Case 1:03-cv-02684-CFL Document 1100 Filed 09/02/11 Page 22 of 30
1 Given that the Court has determined that the Distribution Act controls identification of
distributees of the judgment funds and that Congress has reserved to itself along with Interior to
determine who those distributees will be, there is no further judgment to be made by this Court.
2 In addition to the counts on liability found in Plaintiffs’ many complaints, Plaintiffs’
have included additional counts for costs and attorney fees see e.g. Pls.’ Sixth Am. Compl. (dkt.
no. 736-1) at 29, which are not ripe unless and until a non-appealable, final, judgment has been
entered. RCFC 54(d).
3 The DuMarce and Harley Zephier groups did not include a Count III or IV in their
amended complaints.
15
judgment in favor of the descendants of the loyal Mdewakanton as an identifiable group of
Indians.” Aug. Op. at 42.1 Indeed, the Court has fully adjudicated all outstanding claims against
the United States within its jurisdiction. Compare Sixth Am. Compl. (dkt. no. 736-1) with
Wolfchild v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 302, 352 (2010) (granting plaintiffs’ motion to amend
their Complaint, dismissing Counts I (trust mismanagement), II (breach of contract), III
(separately-pled claims of minor plaintiffs), and V (community governing documents) and Aug.
Op. at 43 (granting summary judgment as to Count IV (statutory use restriction);2 Pls.
Robertson-Vadnais group Seventh Am. Compl. (dkt. no. 929-1) with Wolfchild, 96 Fed. Cl. at
352 (dismissing Counts I (trust mismanagement), II (breach of contract), III (separately-pled
claims of minor plaintiffs), and V (community governing documents)), and Aug. Op. at 43
(granting summary judgment as to Count IV (statutory use restriction) and dismissing Count VI
(Indian Non-Intercourse Act and 1863 Act) and Count VII (takings); Pls. DuMarce and Harley
Zephier groups Fourth (dkt. no. 930-1) and Third (dkt. no. 934-1) Am. Compls. (respectively)
with Wolfchild, 96 Fed. Cl. at 352 (dismissing Count I (breach of trust) and Count V (separatelypled
claims of minor plaintiffs), and Aug. Op. at 43 dismissing Count II (1863 Act)3. And, as
there are no claims left for the Court to adjudicate and for the reasons stated below, the United
States requests the entry of a final judgment on all claims.
Case 1:03-cv-02684-CFL Document 1100 Filed 09/02/11 Page 23 of 30
16
Once the liability of the United States is discharged, as discussed above, the Distribution
Act provides the process whereby the Secretary determines how the monies are to be distributed.
The Court correctly recognized that the discharge of claims against the United States brought in
this court occurs upon certification of the payment pursuant to the Judgment Act, 31 U.S.C. §
1304. Aug. Op. at 35 (citing United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. at 44-45.); see also 28 U.S.C. §
2517(b) (“Payment of any such judgment and of interest thereon shall be a full discharge to the
United States of all claims and demands arising out of the matters involved in the case or
controversy . . .”). The discharge of the claims deprives this Court of continuing jurisdiction
over the Secretary’s exercise of discretion while preparing and executing the distribution plan.
Even if the Court disagrees and finds that a partial judgment is appropriate,
the statute providing for payment of judgments would discharge the United States for those
claims covered by the partial judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2517(b). Here, the partial judgment
covers the statutory use restriction claims. Thus, upon certification of the judgment, all claims
addressed in the Court’s previous orders would be discharged. And, at the very least, the Court
would cease to have jurisdiction over any of the claims addressed in the Court’ previous orders
and thus, the Court does not have jurisdiction over the distribution of the monies covered by the
Court’s August 5th Order.
The Court has additionally required that Interior prepare a use and distribution plan
within one year and submit a report to the Court. In remanding to Interior, the Court relies upon
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2), which states in pertinent part:
In any case within its jurisdiction, the court shall have the power to remand appropriate
matters to any administrative or executive body or official with such direction as it may
deem proper and just.
The other cases in which the court has exercised this authority have been in the context of
Case 1:03-cv-02684-CFL Document 1100 Filed 09/02/11 Page 24 of 30
17
required administrative action before being able to issue a judgment. For example, in Mendoza
v. United States, neither party opposed the remand because it allowed the Office of Personnel
Management (“OPM”) to determine whether “plaintiffs were federal employees” and if so,
“what, if any benefits they are entitled to receive.” 87 Fed. Cl. 331, 337 (2009). But Mendoza
also recognized that this Court had “no provision for its subsequent review of any decision OPM
may render because a ruling by OPM can be appealed to the Merit System Protection Board and
then to the Federal Circuit.” Id. at 338 n.8. Even if this Court chooses to remand the
Distribution Act issues to the Department of the Interior rather than permitting those issues to
move to the Secretary by the plain terms of the Act, no provision allows for this Court to review
the outcome of that remand. Any such jurisdiction to review the distribution plan lies with the
district courts under the APA. Further, because this Court has entered judgment on the statutory
use restriction claims, its jurisdiction on that matter is at an end.
Importantly, in the event Plaintiffs choose to challenge any future-issued use and
distribution plan, such a challenge to that administrative decision would not fall within the
waiver of sovereign immunity found within the Tucker Act. Strategic Hous. Fin. Corp. of Travis
County v. United States, 608 F.3d 1317, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Fulbright v. United States, 97
Fed. Cl. 221, 227 (2011) (“the Court of Federal Claims lacks APA jurisdiction”) (quoting
Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc)); Murphy v. United
States, 993 F.2d 871, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Smalls v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 300, 308 (2009).
Although the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2) states that this Court may remand matters, it does
not provide for review of what it has remanded. Even in bid protest cases, where the Tucker Act
provides limited review, it incorporates the standard of review and not the ability to set aside
agency actions, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), or compel agency actions, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). See FFTF
Case 1:03-cv-02684-CFL Document 1100 Filed 09/02/11 Page 25 of 30
4 This Court’s ability to remand without retaining jurisdiction to hear challenges to the
result of the agency’s administrative process is also consistent with recent Supreme Court
precedent. This Court’s jurisdiction is limited, even though that may “lead[] to incomplete
relief.” United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S.Ct. 1723, 1731 (2011); see also id. at
1729 (“The distinct jurisdiction of the CFC makes overlapping relief the exception and distinct
relief the norm.”)
18
Restoration Co., LLC v. United States, 86 Fed. Cl. 226, 236 (Fed. Cl. 2009) (citing PGBA, LLC
v. United States, 389 F.3d 1219, 1225-27 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Where, as is the case here, claims are based on an alleged money-mandating duty, this
Court’s jurisdiction is limited to liability and payment but not efforts “to define an ongoing
relationship between the parties going forward.” See Lummi Tribe of Lummi Reservation v.
United States, 2011 WL 3417092 *11 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 4, 2011). The APA “may not form the
basis for jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims.” Faulkner v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 54,
55 (1999). Absent the requirement to submit the plan to Congress, this Court is not the
appropriate venue for review of distribution plans. Indeed, such review is appropriate only
under the APA. Gold v. Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Indian Reservation, 478 F.Supp.
190, 197 (D.C.Or. 1979) (citing and applying 5 U.S.C. § 706). To that extent, this Court’s
assertion of supervisory responsibilities under 1491(a)(2) in this instance directly conflicts with
those expressly established by Congress for the district courts in the APA.4
Therefore, this Court should reconsider its Opinion and enter final judgment on all claims
and vacate its order for RCFC 54(b) judgment.
III. The Court’s Order That the Secretary Complete and Submit the Distribution Plan
to this Court Within One Year is Inconsistent with the Distribution Act
This Court ordered the Secretary to complete the distribution plan requirements under 25
U.S.C. § 1403 within one year “of this decision and judgment” and to submit a report to the
Case 1:03-cv-02684-CFL Document 1100 Filed 09/02/11 Page 26 of 30
19
Court “setting out the proposed roll and plan.” Aug. Op. at 43-44. On the other hand, this Court
stated that “[o]nce the judgment is certified and the money automatically appropriated, the
Secretary shall begin work necessary to create a distribution plan.” Id. at 43. These directives
create two distinct time periods initiating the Secretary’s obligations to begin his efforts on the
distribution plan. The requirement to submit a plan within one year of decision and judgment
would require immediate action by the Secretary without waiting for any reconsideration or
appeals process to run its course. The alternative requirement to begin work on the distribution
plan after appropriation of funds is consistent with the Distribution Act and appropriations law
applicable to this court. 25 U.S.C. § 1402(a) requires submission of the distribution plan within
one year “after appropriation of funds to pay a judgment.”
28 U.S.C. § 2517 provides that “final judgment” of this court are paid from general
appropriations. Likewise, the applicable appropriations statute, 31 U.S.C. § 1304, appropriates
funds for “final judgments” when authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 2517. A judgment is “final” in
this court when it is no longer appealable. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(G); RCFC 54(d)(1)(B)(i) &
(2)(B)(i). Therefore, given that funds are not appropriated under 31 U.S.C. § 1304 until there is
a non-appealable “final judgment,” the portion of the Court’s order requiring the Secretary to
complete and submit the distribution plan one year from the date of the Court’s judgment is
inconsistent with 25 U.S.C. § 1402(a) and should be accordingly modified. To do otherwise,
would require significant effort by Interior that may not be necessary, or change, as a result of
any further proceedings in this matter. That is simply unwarranted, as was recognized by
Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a) by requiring submission of the distribution plan one year after
appropriation of funds.
Case 1:03-cv-02684-CFL Document 1100 Filed 09/02/11 Page 27 of 30
20
Whether Congress terminated the reporting requirement is not important here because
Congress has not repealed the statute. What matters is whether the Distribution Act, discussed
supra, remains valid law to be followed by Interior and enforceable under the APA. If it does,
the one year preparation requirement as set forth in the Act remains in effect. Although
Congress may no longer require submission of the distribution plan to Congress, see Reports
Elimination Act § 3003(a)(1) (“each provision of law requiring the submittal to Congress (or
any committee of the Congress) of any annual, semiannual, or other regular periodic report
specified on the list described under subsection (c) shall cease to be effective, with respect to that
requirement”) (emphasis added), it did not eliminate the requirement that the Secretary
“simultaneously submit a copy of such plan to each affected tribe or group.” 25 U.S.C. §
1402(a).
It should be noted that the Distribution Act, even if the obligation to submit the
distribution plan has been terminated, still requires Interior to prepare a distribution plan.
Whether Congress still requires a copy of the plan is peripheral to the operation of the
Distribution Act. Indeed, as addressed supra, to the extent the reporting requirement has been
terminated, it merely indicates Congress no longer requires the distribution plans for its
oversight purposes and not an intent to “decimate” the Act. This reading of the Distribution Act
and the Reports Elimination Act harmonizes the statutes and avoids the absurd result that this
Court must now exercise oversight by reviewing the distribution plan where Congress itself does
not. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) ("nterpretations of a
statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations
consistent with the legislative purpose are available").
Case 1:03-cv-02684-CFL Document 1100 Filed 09/02/11 Page 28 of 30
21
CONCLUSION
Therefore, Defendants request that this Court reconsider its August 5th Opinion and
Order, revoke its order remitting and remanding the matters of developing a roll of eligible
claimants and a plan for distribution of the funds, and the requirement that the Secretary submit a
report to this Court. To the extent the Court does not reverse the requirement that the Secretary
submit a report for its review, Defendants request the Court modify its Order so that the report is
due one year from the date of appropriation of funds consistent with 25 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(1).
Finally, Defendants request the Court enter a final judgment on all claims.
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of September, 2011.
IGNACIA S. MORENO
Assistant Attorney General
/s/ Stephen Finn
Stephen Finn
Jody H. Schwarz
Daniel Steele
J. Nathanael Watson
U.S. Depa
